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Out of the Darkness:
A look at violence and politics through the experience of the
UVF

You smug-faced crowds with
kindling eye.
Who cheer when soldier
lads pass by.
Sneak home and pray you’ll
never know
the hell where youth and
and laughter go.
-Poem on a UVF mural in West Belfast

Alec Chiquoine
SIT Ireland Spring 2006
Dominic Bryan, Ph.D. Queen’s University Belfast
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Foreword:
The decision to undertake this specific project was relatively easy for me. I came
to Ireland ready to learn more about the conflict, but quickly realized I hardly knew
about, let alone understood, an entire element within it, that of the Loyalist paramilitaries.
As I learned more through classes, lectures, and meeting individuals who had been
involved with these groups, or had dealings with them, my knowledge grew along with
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my curiosity. Who were these people who were so willing to fight, kill and die for a
cause, the preservation of a union with Britain, which I found hard to understand? I also
became interested in with the use of violence, rather than politics or non-violent means,
to achieve a particular set of ends. Northern Ireland was a fully functioning government,
a subset of the United Kingdom, one of the oldest and most successful political structures
in history. Why then had Northern Ireland crumbled into a state of unbridled violence
when political structures existed which seemed capable of creating such change while
minimizing the loss involved?
The act of questioning my expectations and preconceived notions has developed
into a theme of my time in Ireland and Northern Ireland. To view these countries through
textbooks, video, the media and occasional speakers is to receive only part of the story.
However, I certainly formed opinions and pictures in my head in relationship to what I
took to be the whole picture, as I am sure many others do. My time in Ireland and
Northern Ireland has forced me to step back from what I believed to be “true” and take in
often times conflicting information in an entirely new context which would challenge
those old truths. As is so often the case, the truth is almost always more complicated than
it seems.
But this paper is not about the truth. I would be truly bold and more than a little
rash to claim that in my short time studying violence in Northern Ireland as it related to
the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) I had some how stumbled across any truths, let alone
the truth. What I have done, and what I set out to do, is compile together a set of
experiences, opinions, and stories which all relate to the truth and recount personal truths.
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I will also offer my own analysis of this compilation not in an attempt to prove anything
conclusively, but to suggest and encourage that my work is but a tiny part of what has
been done, and what must continue to be done, in the search for understanding Northern
Ireland, the Troubles, the UVF, politics, and violence.
It would be easy to simply pass judgment on a group such as the UVF, and
dismiss, embrace, or ignore it accordingly. The actions of this group, especially to those
from outside the Northern Ireland context, and especially the Loyalists communities from
which many of its members come, are seemingly incomprehensible, selfish, selfless,
cruel, kind, and immensely meaningful and meaningless almost simultaneously. What is
created is whirlwind of confusion which further encourages one to simplify and
generalize. However, such action prompts one to declare truths and make judgments in
an attempt to slow the vortex of confusion. What should be remembered is that another
method of examination and exploration exists. It is one which embraces this very
confusion and heterogeneity by seeking to gather in the various parts for closer analysis
in comparison to their partners. Although not easy, and seemingly against logic and
nature at times, I do believe this process can lead to greater understanding and a better
ability to draw conclusions which are well based and highly accurate.
Only through such analysis and gathering the multitude of experiences and
opinions can we hope to develop better understandings of such complex and changing,
yet important topics. The reader should take this paper as an open invitation to criticize,
challenge, confirm, accept, and/or deny any of what it contains. The only request I make
is that it is approached with an open mind, and that the reader them self endeavors to find
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the same understanding I am searching for in creating this work through similar methods.
I hope to stay true to the same expectations and creed in my writing.

Methodology:
To give a cohesive and coherent account of this project and how I went about it is
difficult to say the least. I had no real plan going in, and what I did have was quickly
changed when I started. Perhaps more difficult is the fact that field study and experiential
learning do not seem to lend themselves to structure and explanation at times. However,
it is very important that any reader has an idea of what it was I was trying to do, how I
went about it, and what the results were. Equally important is for me to have a chance to
explain myself in these regards and caution the reader as to potential shortcomings,
biases, missing information, and other facts which may effect one’s reading and
understanding of the subject at hand. In the following section I will attempt to do this in
as concise and understandable a manner as possible.
Literary Overview
The first step of my research was largely based in academic material. This was
both intentional and a matter of convenience. Background information was essential
before I could begin my interview process and would help me to get an idea of what
organizations, individuals and areas I should investigate. Also, given that the start date of
the project was Easter weekend, most individuals were on holiday, and the vast majority
of organizations and groups were closed for several days. It was actually very difficult
for the entire week following Easter to reach anyone in a formal setting as many were
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still closed. The following is a brief review of the literary material I used for this project,
its usefulness, and anything else I believe the reader should know about the source.
UVF by John Cusack and Henry McDonald: This was my major introduction to
the UVF and its history. Written by security correspondents and journalists the
books offers an overview of the UVF as an organization and a detailed history of
the group from its origins through the Troubles. It is primarily a historical
account of the organization, with little critical analysis although there are some
points where the authors offer their own viewpoints and analysis of particular
events. As an introduction to the UVF as an organization, its key moments, and
history, this book is invaluable. However, it should be noted that even the revised
version, which I read, was published in 2000 and only really offers coverage of
the group through the mid to late 1990s. As such, it is somewhat dated.
The Edge of the Union by Steve Bruce: This book contains a very through
analysis of Loyalist political and paramilitary positions through out the 1960s,
1970s, and 1980s. It also offers some coverage of the early 1990s, but as it was
published in 1994 is also somewhat dated. Bruce offers helpful explanation of
Loyalist identity has it compares to other identities in Northern Ireland, and the
group’s actions as a result. There are also some excellent passages where Bruce
examines the connections and relationships between violence and politics.
However, for my purposes this material was difficult because it not only offered
information on the UVF, but also other Loyalists paramilitaries, Loyalism as a
class and political identity, Nationalism and Republicanism, and how all of these
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fit into greater ideological themes of the Troubles. In short, it is a well written but
very broad overview of a variety of subjects, not all of which applied to my topic,
but were hard to separate from it.
The Red Hand by Steve Bruce: As I understand it, this is and certainly was one of
the foremost books on Loyalists paramilitary groups. Although it does give
historical overviews, the book focuses on changing tactics and objectives,
interactions with other groups, and development of political and social ideologies.
Again, the book is quite dated at this point, having been published in 1992.
However, I think it is a testament to the insight of the author and the strength of
the material he gathered, that it was very helpful for me in formulating questions
for my interviews and directing my research process over fourteen years later. If I
were to hope this project could be turned into a book, I would hope it could
resemble this work in style and content but in updated form.
David Ervine by Henry Sinnerton: This book is an biography of David Ervine, a
former member of the UVF, ex-prisoner, and current Member of the Legislative
Assembly (MLA) in the Northern Ireland Assembly as well as a Belfast City
Councilor for the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP). I would end up interviewing
David Ervine and this book helped me to direct my questioning, not so much in a
biographical sense, but gave me ideas for questions I could ask which would have
a high likelihood of causing Mr. Ervine to address the topics and subjects I hoped
to cover. It also gives a fantastic account of the PUP, its political viewpoints and
how those were shaped by the paramilitary experiences of many of its members,
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and the involvement of politics and violence in the peace process. Still, the book
covers only a single man and it is dangerous to see his perspectives and accounts
as being representative of groups as wholes (although I believe the author and the
subject try to avoid this sort of generalization and extrapolation).
Ex-Prisoners and Conflict Transformation part of the Conflict Transformation
Papers series: This paper is part of a series on conflict transformation efforts and
perspectives in Northern Ireland. This specific volume was a series of articles
written by ex-prisoners and ex-prisoner groups on the subject of conflict
transformation and ex-prisoners’ role within that process. It contained views from
both Loyalist and Republican traditions although more Republican groups were
present. Much of what was said by both groups was helpful in getting a recent
perspective from ex-prisoners about the role they are to play in politics, the peace
process and conflict transformation. I found much of what the Republican articles
covered helpful in a theoretical sense, but I do worry that the Republican
perspective on things is not always applicable or congruent with the Loyalist
viewpoint.
Democratizing the Peace in Northern Ireland: Progressive Loyalists and the
Politics of Conflict Transformation of the Conflict Transformation Papers series,
written by Aaron Edwards and Stephen Bloom: Published in 2005, this was by
far one of the most recent and useful documents I found in terms of guiding me in
my investigation of current topics and issues. Essentially, this article covered
precisely the more current end of paramilitary experience I wanted to look at, that
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being political involvement, the peace process, and criminality. Edwards and
Bloom had been suggested to me as good authors on the subject of Loyalist
relationships with paramilitaries and politics by a number of individuals and it
appears they have published rather extensively on the subject.
Reflections on Violence of the Farset Community Think Tanks Project: This was
the transcript of a conference held involving a number of academics, politicians,
and former combatants from the conflicts of Northern Ireland and Israel/Palestine.
The objective was to give a group of assembled students from those areas the
chance to analysis and rethink their own conflicts through the experience and
history of the other. This particular pamphlet is only a transcript of the sections to
do with Northern Ireland. Although I would have been very interested to see how
the Northern Ireland conflict was seen to compare with the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict, that is another topic for another day. For my purposes, the pamphlet was
helpful in providing a transcript of the discussion amongst the various speakers on
the Northern Ireland conflict from both Republicanism and Loyalism
backgrounds.
Truth Recovery: A contribution from within Loyalism: This is a pamphlet which
came out of a series of meetings between a large number of Loyalist activist
groups around Northern Ireland. Essentially, it was a workshop project designed
to produce a coherent message about the role to be played by Loyalism in the
peace process of Northern Ireland and the feeling of Loyalists about a proposed
truth commission. I did notice that the perspective seemed to be one dominated
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from the ex-prisoner point of view, specifically wit in the UVF and Red Hand
Commando (RHC) communities. For my purposes this was terrific and helpful,
but as for providing a general contribution from Loyalism, it might not have been
completely reflective of the entire Loyalist community.
All these sources did a great deal with guiding and influencing my thinking about
Loyalism, the UVF, violence and politics. As the reader will see, I do quote from many,
but not always frequently. The reason behind this is that I want the focus of the paper to
be the experiences I had and the direct opinions I received, not what has already been
stated. However, to receive a more complete picture, it is a good idea to gain the sort of
background and alternative knowledge these sources put forth. I would encourage any
reader to read these pieces as a supplement to this work as it will enhance their
understanding of where I came from as well as provide them with a number of solid
platforms from which to critique my work and further explore the subject.
Personal Background and Personality
The way in which I approached this project and the successes and shortcomings I
experienced all had something directly or indirectly to do with my own personal
background and personality. I hope in this section to give the reader an idea, to the best
of my ability, of those personal aspects which influenced the project.
The first and most obvious aspect of my background is that I was an American
student in Northern Ireland. This was both helpful and a drawback. Being an outsider of
the Northern Ireland conflict, unaffiliated with any group or side, likely helped to open
some doors to interviews and organizations I may otherwise have been unable to access.
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The fact I was also perceived as being neutral, open, and curious likely helped in this
same regard. I got the feeling from many people, especially those associated with the
UVF, that they very much wanted to speak with someone who would be less likely to
come in with preconceived biases or notions about who and what they were. The very
fact they were willing me meet with me, admittedly arranged through a trusted
intermediary, seems to support this conclusion. However, there were also drawbacks.
Although many people appeared thankful for my neutrality and openness, many
also wanted to “convert” me to their side. Many wanted an ally, not a neutral observer. I
found that in an effort to please them and show my appreciation for their willingness to
meet me, I might have acted in ways which indicated I sympathized with them, or
structured questions and responses in ways which allowed them leeway on certain
subjects and failed to challenge them in critical areas. Whether this was true or not, or if
it had any effect on the interviews I may never know; but I suspect the very fact this has
come to me as a possible point of distortion indicates it probably had some effect.
Finally, I found that many of those I interviewed assumed I knew little to nothing about
the Troubles in Northern Ireland. This was apparent through their explanation of
acronyms, brief historical overviews to almost any question about a specific subject and
in some cases, direct questioning as to what I actually knew about a given subject. I
believe that I may have received more “basic” or simplified answers on some subjects but
I do think I successful countered it in most cases by explaining myself and structuring
questions and responses to indicate that I knew at least the background of what I was
speaking about.

13
Another potential bias I picked up from my background as an American student
was a better understanding and slightly sympathetic take on the IRA and the Republican
movement in general. I believe American media and society in general tend to side with
Republicanism in the Northern Ireland conflict and engender this view in the public as a
result. I think this has much to do with the American sense of tossing off colonial rulers
(especially Britain) and championing the case of democracy. However, as even a brief
study of the Troubles will show, the reality of the situation is anything but that straight
forward or simple. Still, my understanding of Loyalism and its related politics and
paramilitaries were limited and likely biased before I arrived. I do not believe that any of
that bias remains, but it is always possible. It is also a danger that in an effort to
compensate for this bias, I gave undue or undeserved leniency to the Loyalist position.
Finally, as a student and due to my personality, I am a problem solver. I usually
approach a project with the desire and intention on ending with a set of suggestions for a
generating a solution. I think that my schooling as has taught me to approach most
academic material in a similar manner, with presenting, proving and/or defending a thesis
about a particular situation, event, or problem. As I stated in the foreword, this project is
not necessarily about generating solutions or definite truths. I will offer some
suggestions, solutions and critics in this paper, but I will try to let the experiences and
interviews speak for themselves. This requires the reader to approach this paper with the
intent of locating these messages as they will not always be specifically spelled out.
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The Experiences
My experiences in regards to this project were somewhat limited and quite often a
bit removed from the direct topic. Due to the sensitive nature of the UVF in terms of its
publicity, it was not possible to “hang out” or have informal time with its members.
Obviously, it also would not have been ethical for me to get an experience of violence by
participating in it, or possible for me to become a part of politics given my outsider status
and limited time. If I had more time to develop this project, I believe valuable insight
could be gained through experience on a more personal and local level however. Given
my ability to scratch the surface of the UVF and Loyalists communities within a few
weeks, I imagine a greater period of time spent becoming known and trusted by these
groups would lead to more casual and experiential opportunities.
Experiential learning was not, however, a complete wash. I did see, hear, and
participate in a number of activities outside my interviews which added significantly to
the context of my time in Northern Ireland and my approach/understanding of my project
topic. During my entire stay in Belfast, I kept a journal documenting a variety of events I
thought were significant and influential in and on my time there. Since this paper is not
meant to be a complete overview of my four weeks I do limited amounts in connecting
my everyday experience to the project itself. However, In Appendix A, the reader can
find the full content of my journal. I suggest reading this after the paper and seeing how
it adds to, detracts from, and influences the content of this work.

15
The Interviews
As is likely apparent by this point, my interviews make up the bulk of information
in the paper itself. There are several reasons for this. First, I was pleasantly surprised at
the access I had to a wide variety of people with extensive knowledge and personal
experience on my topic. I had worried that finding and gaining access to these people
would prove difficult and was happy when it did not. Second, once I began interviewing
more and more doors opened to me. The person I was interviewing would often put me
in contact with another individual they believed would be beneficial to consult. Although
this did offer the problem of becoming loaded with one particular perspective from
people with similar ideologies and backgrounds, I thought it was also telling as to the
openness and ideology of the person I was dealing with in terms of who they
recommended I speak with. Third, I felt most comfortable in the formal interviewing
process. It was relatively easy to call up someone, explain who I was and what I was
doing, then request a time to speak with them. Finally, I thought that since this project
was about gaining a variety of perspectives, attempting to interview a variety of people
was not only a good way to go about it but also prudent in terms of time management.
There are drawbacks to my interview process of which the reader should be
aware. Most interviews were done as a matter of convenience and not on the basis of
selecting the most diverse range of subjects. If an opportunity presented itself I took it
instead of devoting my time and energy to getting a wider bases of interviewees. I
entered each interview with a generated set of questions. Especially for the first few
interviews, I thought this helped me to stay more focused and also present myself in a
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more articulate and clear fashion. However, this formalized the interviews even more
and also likely constrained the type of questions and how I asked them. In later
interviews, I did leave my “script” in order to pursue topics of interest which were
brought up or clarify points, but the generated questions did still direct the interviews. As
these interviews were so formal, it raises the question as to whether what I was given was
a formulated “party” response or what that individual truly believed. Especially since I
was dealing with a number of groups and parties which had to be careful of their public
appearance due to the nature of their work, I suspect that personal views on some subjects
were withheld.
The reader should also be keenly aware that my interviewees in no way
necessarily represent the entirety of the communities, groups, parties, and organizations I
speak about. In fact, the likelihood is that I am missing significant and large portions of
the Loyalist community, Unionist political parties, and the UVF. Again, some of this
lack is due to availability and time constraints. Also, as Dominic Bryan rightly pointed
out to me, while many of those I interviewed are well known, very intelligent, and
generally quite progressive, they may not, and in fact are likely not, completely
representative of any large group. Still, many were politicians, community leaders, or
people in leadership positions which seems to indicate at the very least that they do have
enough similarities to those they represent to hold, or can create through other means, the
support that elevated them to the positions they are in currently. In the end, this paper
requires me to make some generalizations which may not be appropriate or correct. In
those cases, I apologize and I hope to one day have the time and resources to sort out
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these discrepancies. Until then, I leave it up to my reader to bare in mind these
drawbacks.
The logistics of each interview were quite similar. I held ten formal interviews
with nine different individuals (Chris Hudson was interviewed twice). All interviews
were held in at place and time chosen by the interviewee. I tape recorded the vast
majority of the interviews and have provided transcriptions in Appendix B. Written notes
were also taken at all the interviews. Time of each interview ranged from half an hour to
about an hour and a half. Informal interviews occurred in a number of locations, but
mostly involved taxi drivers who were a wealth of opinions and knowledge which I found
terribly helpful. Accounts of these informal interviews can be found in my observation
and experience journal in Appendix A.
To give the reader a better understanding of those I interviewed I will provide a
brief profile of each interviewee. However, it is important that if the reader wants to
acquire a more full picture of these individuals, they consult Appendix B and the
transcriptions.
Tom Roberts: Mr. Roberts is the director of the Ex-Prisoner Interpretative Center
(EPIC). EPIC is an organization dedicated to addressing the needs of ex-prisoners from
the Loyalist community and their families, especially in the Shankill Road region.
However, it is also involved in numerous cross community projects, community activism,
research initiatives, and providing a medium through which to involve ex-prisoners in the
peace process. Mr. Roberts himself was once a member of the UVF and served a
thirteen-year prison sentence from 1980-1993 for his involvement. Mr. Roberts and his
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writings/speeches are also found in much of the recent literature about ex-prisoners, their
rights and status, and Loyalists involved in the peace process.
Christopher Stalford: Mr. Stalford is a member of the Democratic Unionist Party
(DUP) and is currently serving as a Belfast City Councilor for the Sandy Row area. His
family were originally supporters of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) until the referendum
on the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) in 1998 when they switched their support to the
DUP. Mr. Stalford is also a member of the Sandy Row Orange Lodge and the Free
Presbyterian church and attends services at the Martyr’s Memorial Church of Dr. Ian
Paisley.
David Ervine: Mr. Ervine is currently a MLA for the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP)
in East Belfast as well as a Belfast City Councilor for the same party. He was once a
member of the UVF and served a prison sentence for his involvement in this organization
during which time he met Gusty Spence and became interested in education and politics.
The PUP does still maintain open contact with the UVF offering the group political
analysis and Mr. Ervine is a key figure in this process. However, he is in no way in
control of the UVF and holds no influence over the group other than what respect and
currency they decide to assign his political analysis. Mr. Ervine was also a key player in
the peace process leading up to the Loyalist ceasefire of 1994 and the GFA of 1998.
Although not a unanimous opinion by all in Northern Ireland, Mr. Ervine is considered to
be one of the most progressive, intelligent, articulate, and influential figures in the region
by many, especially those I spoke with.
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Dawn Purvis: Mrs. Purvis is a member of the PUP and was also recently appointed to
the Policing Board of Northern Ireland. She is considered to be very well spoken and
intelligent as a politician and community worker by a number of individuals I spoke with
although most also point out that she may be more liberal in her ideology then many of
those she represents. She was born and raised in Belfast and has experienced the
Troubles first hand, with her housing being destroyed by the Provisional Irish Republican
Army (PIRA) in 1992.
Henry McDonald: Mr. McDonald is from Northern Ireland but has spent quite a bit of
time in the Republic of Ireland (ROI) as well as England and much of Europe. He is
originally from a Catholic Nationalist background but describes his thinking on these
subjects as having changed significantly over the years. At one point, he was a member
of a punk band. He is currently the Ireland editor of The Observer newspaper, has
written a number of books including UVF and UDA about Loyalist paramilitary groups in
Northern Ireland, was the BBC security correspondent in Northern Ireland during much
of the later part of the Troubles, and has worked with Chris Hudson in an effort to
understand and accurately portray Loyalist paramilitary groups, especially the UVF. He
currently lives in East Belfast.
William “Billy” Newman: Mr. Newman is a project coordinator with the John
McMichael Center on Sandy Row. The Center is active as community group which
conducts a number of projects related to community development and also works with
ex-prisoners and current members of the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) to resolve
conflicts in manners which minimize violence and seek to promote cooperation and
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understanding. He is very much involved with Jackie McDonald, a current Brigadier
General of the UDA in the Sandy Row area.
UVF Command Staffers: Due to the sensitive nature of this interview, I cannot disclose
many details about these individuals and was given only limited information about them.
What can be said is that the gentleman I spoke with most has been an active member of
the UVF since 1966 and now works extensively with Henry McDonald and Chris Hudson
in efforts to stand down this organization. Chris Hudson also credits him with playing an
influential role in introducing and maintaining the Loyalist ceasefire of 1994. Henry
McDonald credits him with being the “brains” behind much of the UVF policy which has
been enacted since the mid-1990s and having been especially influential throughout the
peace process.
Roy Garland: Mr. Garland is a member of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). He is
currently a member of the party executive, which is the governing body of that group,
and also works as a constituency worker for Michael McGimpsey in the Sandy Row area.
Mr. Garland has written a biography of Gusty Spence, a leader within the UVF in the
1960s and 1970s and a person credited with instilling political motivation in many
prisoners during his time in Long Kesh (the Maze) prison. Some individuals described
Mr. Garland as a progressive and forward thinking voice in the UUP, but not always
representative of the general Unionist population and quite often ahead of his time.
Chris Hudson: Mr. Hudson was born and raised in the Republic of Ireland (ROI) in a
Catholic Nationalist family. He lost his Catholic faith in his teenage years and spent
much of his early adulthood as a hairdresser in England. At this time, he became
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interested in politics and described himself as a very left leaning communist. However,
he would eventually fall out with the communist message and turn to work as a labor
union organizer and representative. Through this work he became somewhat familiar
with working class Protestant areas in Northern Ireland as well as with David Ervine.
These connections resulted in him beginning to meet with members of the UVF in the
context of trying to convince them to critically examine their position and what it would
take to introduce a ceasefire and then enter the peace process. Since the late 1980s to the
present, Chris Hudson has acted as the primary contact between the government of the
ROI and the UVF, as well as a negotiator for and with the UVF. Mr. Hudson is credited
by David Ervine and the UVF members I met with as not only having saved hundreds of
lives, but also playing an enormous role in facilitating the ceasefire of 1994, its
continuation through the PIRA breaking its ceasefire, and helping to guide and advise the
peace process generally. These views are shared by a number of authors including Henry
Sinnerton and Henry McDonald.
Miscellaneous Important Disclaimers
There are several other points and warning about this paper which are important
for the reader to know in order to view the project in a proper context. First, I suffered
from a lack of direction and focus throughout much of the project, especially before
meeting with my project advisor Dr. Dominic Bryan. The result was a wide spectrum of
questions being covered in every interview, often asked in a succession such that it was
not conducive to creating a congruent or coherent flow. Some of those I interviewed may
not have been clear on what I was trying to find out, and thus were more broad and
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scattered in their answers. Follow up interviews, once I had a better focus to my project
and questioning would probably have proven very helpful, but due to time constraints
were simply not possible. However, I did gather a very wide range of helpful material
which covers topics indirectly related with violence, politics, Unionism and the UVF, in
addition to some subjects completely, or seemingly so, unrelated in nature. Again, the
Appendixes are worth reading for this information.
Second, I use the term “Loyalist paramilitary” quite often in my questioning and
also at points in this paper. When I began this project I planned to write about both the
UVF and the Ulster Defense Association (UDA) in regards to the experience of violence
and politics in Loyalist paramilitaries. However, it quickly became apparent that these
two groups are quite different from one another on numerous levels, including their
feelings on, and successes and failures relating to, violence and politics. I want to
emphasis that except in some limited circumstances the UVF and UDA are not the same
organization and should not be generalized as such. In my research, I became far more
acquainted with the UVF not only in academic writings, but also in those contacts I
made. Thus at the time of writing, I decided to focus solely on the UVF except in some
very specific cases. However, my questioning was often based widely and generally
around Loyalist paramilitaries, and the responses I received may at times have been
directed at the UDA or both the UDA and UVF, rather than just the UVF.
Also, the paramilitary experience often differed from region to region in Northern
Ireland. I was based solely in Belfast, and those I spoke with were speaking from this
perspective as well. It is true that much of the activity of the paramilitary organizations
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were directed and “assigned” from Belfast, in addition to occurring there, but this does
not mean that what stands as fact for the Belfast UVF also stands for a different battalion
or company in another area (even within Belfast itself). I will do my best to avoid making
generalizations between the two in this paper, but the reader should be aware that my
focus is on the UVF and not the UDA, although my questioning does not directly reflect
this which may create some discrepancies. The reader should also assume that I am
talking specifically about the UVF in Belfast, and those members associated with the
groups I spoke with, unless I mention otherwise.
Third, I will talk about violence and acts of incredible brutality in general and at
best neutral terms throughout this paper. Some readers might be offended by this
“callous” or “barbaric” stance, but I ask that judgment be made only after considering the
following. I am not seeking to judge people in this project. I hope to take what they told
me, compare it to my research and other interviews, and point to similarities, differences,
inconsistencies, and potential points for education and advancement. The fact that I am
trying to remain objective does not mean I do not deplore what some individuals
advocate and have committed in terms of violent and political acts. However, as I point
out in the foreword and introduction of this paper, I am also seeking to challenge instant
condemnation of violence without first looking to examine and understand acts that are
repulsive and offense to may in their very nature. To do so, I must also hold myself to
the same standard of trying to understand that which I might otherwise immediately
reject. This does not mean the reader, or myself, should accept or support the
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philosophies or actions in question, but that we should base our rejection and
condemnation on the strongest possible arguments.
Finally, I will assume and expect at the very least a basic knowledge of the
Troubles in Northern Ireland. This is not a paper which should be read as an introduction
to Loyalist paramilitaries, the UVF, Loyalism and Unionism, and least of all the Troubles
in general. This project was undertaken after several months of intense study and
examination of the Troubles on a variety of levels. I would recommend that a reader seek
to at least have a solid background understanding of the conflict, its various players and
developments before reading this piece.
Essentially, what I want from my readers is an understanding that this is a
somewhat controversial work in progress. I have not addressed all of the Loyalists
community, let alone much of the Unionist community or any of the Republican and
Nationalist communities. I consulted very few academics and professors personally even
when they were recommended to me by various sources. I have left out an entire
paramilitary organizations on both sides of the sectarian divide. Although I will make
some conclusions and offer some analysis, it is speculative at best, given what I have
been able to do. If we are ever to understand a topic as broad as violence, politics and
paramilitaries, many more view points will be needed, in addition to years of analysis and
consultation from and with a variety of sources. I invite my readers to once again call
into question not only what I say, but also what I do not say and what was said to me. It
is through such careful reading and questioning that projects like this will prove
especially helpful to those who read them.
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Introduction:
Conflict resolution as an objective often pits violence and peace against one
another as mutually exclusive options. In terms of definitions peace is usually described
at the very least as the absence of violence. However, are peace and violence mutually
exclusive or far more interconnected than one might initially suppose? Can violence
bring about peace? It seems this is the very idea of violence in the form of war. As
Dawn Purvis said to me, “Soldiers fight wars to bring peace, so at some point the war has
to end and peace has to be made.” Through an examination of the Ulster Volunteer Force
(UVF) I have come to believe that a greater understanding of violence in relationship to
politics and peace leads one to believe that peace and violence are far more
interconnected and related than one may care to imagine.
The UVF is an organization whose existence has encompassed a drastic change in
tactics, strategy, and objectives within the conflict of Northern Ireland. The group as
changed from a secret paramilitary organization with limited objectives and coherent
strategy, to a larger, politically minded, paramilitary group which attempts to balance
violence and politics while simultaneously working to disband itself. This has not been
an easy or logical progression but one that I believe can offer insight into the relationship
between politics, peace and violence
Very few people have ever made the claim that violence is the desired outcome of
a particular situation or conflict. This implies peace is the preferred outcome. However,
I believe that the experience of the UVF shows that violence is not excluded from the
peace process, and can even play an important role within it. Violence can assume the
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position of political motivator, vehicle of justice and retribution, voice of the unheard or
under-represented, and a means by which to highlight and change social conditions which
produce violence. An active exploration of violence and its relationship with politics is
useful then in developing more realistic, practical, and successful methods for resolving
that which inhibits peace. The UVF is a good case study as this group has undertaken
numerous strategies and tactics within both politics and violence, all in a bid to reach a
particular set of ends, which involve the peaceful continuation of the society of which
this organization is a part.
Violence is usually deplored and condemned but little more, and seldom ever
enough, is done to understand the very thing peace activists are striving to eradicate. A
casual dismissal of violence is potentially deadly to any peace process, and at the very
least can significantly slow it down. The very fact that violence repulses most people and
is identified as something to be avoided, seems to indicate that a careful examination of
situations where individuals and organizations go against these norms is valuable in
preventing and addressing the conditions which gave rise to the violence. The UVF and
its attempts to influence and direct the political and peace processes of Northern Ireland
are a good example of the dangers and delays associated with a casual dismissal of the
complex role which violence has to play in both.

Body:
History and Timeline of the UVF
The UVF as an organization has its roots in the Ulster region of the island of
Ireland long before the Troubles ever occurred, or the Republic of Ireland (ROI) was ever
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established. The original Ulster Volunteer Force was created by Sir Edward Carson in
1912 although elements had already begun to come together in 1911. It was established
for the purpose of resisting the proposed Home Rule legislation which was being debated
in Westminster at the time. The group consisted mostly of Protestants who opposed
Home Rule for Ireland which they saw as at the very least as a step towards establishing a
Catholic Irish state. The group was made up of primarily working class citizens, but did
receive a large degree of support from the middle and upper classes in terms of leadership
and financing. Their objective was to defeat the Home Rule legislation by creating an
army which would take over the northern counties of Ireland in the event of Home Rule
being established. It is estimated that the UVF had tens of thousands of soldiers and was
well armed especially by 1914. (The Red Hand, 8-10).
World War One interrupted the question of Irish Home Rule and armed rebellion
lead by the UVF as a result. To enlist the help of this group in fighting Germany, the
British government promised that Home Rule would not come into effect until after the
war. The 36th Ulster Division was formed and many of the UVF soldiers joined its ranks.
They were a notoriously well-trained and skilled fighting group winning particular
distinction during the Battle of the Somme in 1916 when they were one of the only
groups to achieve their objective and at a terribly high cost of life. To this day, the Battle
of the Somme and the 36th Ulster Division’s role in WWI are important symbols and
reminders of the devotion and sacrifice to Britain many Ulster Protestants feel (although
a number of Catholics also served in this division as well and are remembered proudly).
As a reward for this sacrifice, Ireland was partitioned with six counties of Ulster
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remaining part of Britain and the other twenty-six counties forming the Irish Home Rule
state in 1920 (The Red Hand, 10-11).
After this, the UVF largely ceased to exist as an organization although large
numbers of its members stayed active in “defending Ulster” through organizations like
the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). As civil war rocked the ROI and the Irish
Republican Army (IRA) began to mount a campaign to regain the six counties which now
were Northern Ireland, many Protestants began to feel that state security forces were not
enough to protect them or the region and a call was put out by some to reform the UVF.
However, the response ended up being the formation of the Ulster Special Constabulary
(USC) which was a state run and funded organization designed to supplement the
security efforts of the police. Eventually, Ulster and the ROI were deemed stable and
safe enough that the USC could be retired except one category of Special Constables, the
B Specials, to supplement the RUC (The Red Hand, 11-13).
In 1966, there began to be rumors of a new organization drilling and training with
automatic weapons in the border areas of Northern Ireland. Soon a number of murders
targeting Catholics and members of the Republican movement began to occur. One of
those arrested early on in connection with these crimes was Augustus “Gusty” Spence, a
former British soldier from Ulster with strong family connections to Protestant
associations like the Orange Order (a Protestant group dedicated to preserving and
promoting Protestantism and its traditions) as well as the B Specials. The Home Rule
Minister for Northern Ireland Terence O’Neill announced that a new group had formed
itself, taking on the title of the Ulster Volunteer Force, but was dedicated now to
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paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland against “helpless and innocent civilians” and as
such was made an illegal organization. (The Red Hand, 14-15).
The illegal status did little to stop the growth of the UVF. As IRA violence
around the region increased, and Protestants became more unsettled about the status of
Northern Ireland as part of Britain, support began to rise for organizations which were
seen to be more capable of defending Northern Ireland than states forces such as the
RUC. In fact, as UVF and IRA violence increased and intensified with the backdrop of
the civil rights campaign, Terence O’Neill was forced to resign as he was seen to be “too
soft” and capitulating with Catholics and the Republican movement. Upon resigning in
1969, O’Neill said, “Either we live peace or we have no life worth living.” Northern
Ireland would not know peace for almost the next thirty years with paramilitary groups
like the UVF and IRA undertaking violent campaigns to further a variety of political,
personal and ideological ends but all of which centered around the constitutional status of
Northern Ireland (Cusak and McDonald, 28)
During the late 1960s and early 1970s, the UVF aim was to take the fight on the
constitutional status of Northern Ireland to the ROI. This was done largely through
bombing electrical sub-stations and other public works in an attempt to dissipate the
ROI’s actions regarding the increasing unrest in Northern Ireland as they were seen to be
sympathetic to Republicans and Catholics (Cusak and McDonald, 29-31). At this point
the group was still largely secretive and small, but that was soon to change. As violence
continued to increase and Protestant working class communities felt progressively more
under attack, the British government appeared paralyzed in its responses, so more and
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more support was given to organizations like the UVF in their campaign to defend these
communities and take the fight to the Republicans. The UVF tried to remain a more
discrete and selective group, allowing community defense associations to form which
would eventually be combined into the Ulster Defense Association (UDA), another
Loyalist paramilitary organization (The Edge of the Union, 3-4). However, even the UVF
began to grow substantially, and with growth came the ability and willingness to do
more, “For God and Ulster” as the group’s motto states.
What followed was a period stretching from the early 1970s through the 1980s of
increased paramilitary violence on the part of all paramilitaries active at the time,
including the UVF. UVF killing during this time fluctuated between targeted murders of
IRA members and supports as well as those associated with the Republican and
Nationalist movements, and the killing of innocent civilians with minimal, if any, ties to
the Republican movement other than their being Catholic (Cusack and McDonald, 120124). As the UVF became more prominent and active, support for the organization and
its tactics throughout Northern Ireland began to fluctuate. Many Loyalist communities
wholeheartedly supported what they saw to be their community defenders while others
viewed them as little different in tactical or moral terms than the IRA. Particularly brutal
murders committee by groups like the Shankill Butchers, and murders that were
increasingly wanton, untargeted and sectarian decreased support for the organization
even within its own communities, but was counteracted by similar actions on the part of
the IRA and Irish National Liberation Army (INLA).
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Increased violence brought increased attention in the form of policing by the
British. As the UVF was fighting to support Britain, this made it difficult to counteract
policing measures against it, as violence against police and army would not be well
received in most cases. Also, there have been constant allegations of collusion between
state forces and the UVF throughout the group’s existence, but most often when it
executed a “job” which seemed to be out of its league or capability. The UVF also
struggled to find support outside of Northern Ireland in the form of groups and
individuals willing to supply them with money and arms. Unlike the IRA, the UVF
found it difficult to find those who were willing to support them ideologically. The
ability to fight as pro-state terrorists and find support for its operations would plague the
UVF through its entire existence as a paramilitary group, unlike its original form in the
early 1900s.
The 1970s and 1980s also saw the group’s first experiments with politics. The
UVF first entered the realm of politics with the Ulster Loyalist Front (ULF) in 1973.
This group would promote, through Member of the Legislative Assembly (MLA) Hugh
Smyth, the right of Ulster Loyalists to bear weapons in defense of the region, prisoner
rights and release, worker’s rights, and the defeat of the IRA. All of this would be done
through law and politics. Issues such as prisoner release, socio-economic discrepancies
between classes, and the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would be reoccurring
themes in the political efforts of the UVF. Political moves were often encouraged by
ceasefires or a reduction in violence, but if they were deemed to have stalled or damaged
the Unionist/Loyalist position, often resulted in violent campaigns of an even greater
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magnitude. A good example of this exchange is found in the actions of the UVF in
relationship to the Sunningdale Agreement (Cusak and McDonald, 126, 129-132). This
period is an excellent time to examine how the UVF tried to balance violence with
politics, and what events precipitated support for one or the other.
From the mid 1980s into the early 1990s, it became clear that the UVF was
looking for a way to end its campaign of violence. Although violence remained at
intense levels (often times being much more deadly and effective given the experience
and skills which had now been acquired), the UVF became more vocal in its political
aspirations and its desired role in a peace process through the Volunteer Political Party
(VPP) which would eventually become the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP). Often
consisting of candidates who were former prisoners who had been imbued with a new
sense of political ideology through the education efforts of Gusty Spence and others in
the prison system this would be the first major “successful” political campaign linked to
the UVF. These groups were not associated with the UVF’s military campaign, but did
seek to represent the political aspirations of its members, offer political analysis, and help
the organization become involved in the peace process. A major development was also
the efforts on behalf of the ROI and UVF through Chris Hudson to open channels of
communication so that a better understanding could be reached, which would hopeful
facilitate a reduction in violence.
The was also the time when internal fractures began to occur around issues
regarding continued campaigns of violence, the UVF’s role in the peace process, and
other politically contentious positions. Billy “King Rat” Wright, a notorious operator
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within the UVF would eventually disagree so much with the rest of the UVF Command
Staff that he would break away from the UVF to form the Loyalist Volunteer Force
(LVF). During this time tensions between the UDA and UVF would also begin to show
through in feuding over territory and influence, as well as disagreements about what
constituted legitimate targets, and what methods (violent or political) were most
effective. However, the Combined Loyalist Military Command (CLMC) which was
comprised of the UVF and UDA would continue to work together to provide a united and
congruent Loyalist paramilitary front on both the military and political fronts.
The mid 1990s to 2000 were dominated by major events and developments in the
Northern Ireland peace process. Ceasefires by Republican and Loyalist paramilitaries
began to look like really possibilities. The UVF was open and willing to enter a ceasefire
but was hard pressed to do so before the IRA campaign was ended. Shortly after the IRA
ceasefire of 1994 was declared, the CLMC announced its own ceasefire in the interest of
developing a political peace process which could deliver lasting peace to Northern
Ireland. The Omagh and Canary Wharf bombings by the IRA, which ended their
ceasefires, and retaliatory violence on the part of the UDA and other Loyalist
paramilitaries jeopardized the entire process, but the UVF did manage to preserve its
ceasefire. The result was a peace process being initiated which indirectly involved the
UVF through the PUP. The Good Friday Agreement (GFA) produced and ratified in
1998 singling a time period of significantly reduced violence on the part of paramilitaries
across the board, and initiated the process of disbanding (and in some cases
decommissioning) these groups, including the UVF.
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However, events since 2000 have put pressure on not only the disbanding and
standing down process of the paramilitary organizations, but also the peace process in
general. Infighting within the Loyalist paramilitaries often spilled over into open street
violence. The UVF embarked on a campaign to “clean up” what it deemed to be a
dangerous and violent group in the LVF. Because of the connections of the LVF to
elements of the UDA and tensions already existing between the UVF and UDA on the
peace process, territorial control, and local disagreements, a feud between the two
organizations exploded on the Shankill Road in 2001, and continues in a suppressed form
to this day. A result is a substantially slow down in the disbandment process of the UVF.
The politics of the UVF have also suffered. Support for the Democratic Unionist
Party (DUP), a party which firmly stands against paramilitary involvement in the
governance of Northern Ireland in any form and is unhappy with the GFA, has grown
significantly and even found support in communities representative of the UVF and its
members. The PUP has experienced a major loss of public support, dropping from three
MLAs to just one in the National Assembly. Prisoners released under the GFA are still
denied political prisoner status which carries difficult financial and social implications
with it. Increased levels of crime associated with the paramilitaries have also attracted
negative public scrutiny from a variety of sources and discredited these organizations in
the public eye making many unwilling to support them in any political or community
activities they undertake.
The preceding has been a very abbreviated history of the UVF and its tactics,
policies and strategies, as well as their results. The information was taken from books by
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Jim Cusak, Henry McDonald, Steve Bruce, and Henry Sinnerton listed in the
bibliography of this project. A solid understanding of the history of the UVF is crucial to
understanding the organization and being able to analyze its actions and policies. Due to
space and time constraints, a detailed report on the subject is not possible. However, any
of the books listed above, particularly UVF by Jim Cusack and Henry McDonald, provide
excellent histories of the UVF which the reader would find helpful if they wished to gain
further knowledge on the subject.
Reasons for and criticisms of the UVF’s campaign of violence
A central question to this project is why the UVF took up a violent campaign?
Was there any legitimacy in these reasons? In my interviews, I found a variety of
opinions on the subject.
Most former and current UVF members I spoke with told me that a major reason
for joining was the sense that they had to defend their communities. Increased campaigns
of violence by the PIRA on Protestant working class areas created a demand for
defenders and along with the sense that something had to be done in this regard (The Red
Hand, 39-43). Media reports and constant scenes of violence heightened the sense within
particularly the Protestant working class community that it was under attack by the
Republican movement, and that anyone could and would be targeted (Sinnerton, 23).
Roy Garland of the UUP echoed this sentiment to me, “What has happened is that the
working class during the conflict believed that we were under attack by the IRA, so they
fought a war as they saw it against the IRA.” David Ervine of the PUP and a former
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UVF member described, “When asked why I did what I done, I didn’t know what else to
do.” A UVF Commander gave another reason,
“I joined for what now seem to be to be naïve and foolish reasons. Unionist
politicians where scare mongering at this time about a potential re-rising of the
Irish Republic in association with the celebrations for the 50th anniversary of the
Easter Rising of 1916. I was young, impressionable, and excitable, so I wanted to
do something to counter this ‘threat’ and I did through the UVF.”
A related reason given was the desire to strike back or retaliate for actions
committed by Republican paramilitaries. Eddie Kinner, a former member of the UVF,
credits his decision to join the UVF as “for the purposes of retaliating,” (Reflections on
Violence, 7). The UVF Commander describes those joining the UVF in the post 1969
period as seeking revenge against those communities which had committed injustices
against their own. With this came a sense that the best defense, and the surest way to get
justice, was through violence and attack, in a sense a strong offense. David Ervine
describes this mentality as the “arrogance and foolishness of youth” but says it made
sense to him in his youth and at the time. In fact the desire for retaliation is one shared
not only by members of the UVF, but also the communities which they were purported to
serve. Chris Hudson suggested support of the UVF, “In the more working class areas,
those on the margins, would see the paramilitaries as their people and acting on their
behalf. They might not have immediately or directly agreed with them, but saw them as
necessary in getting their retaliation in against Republicans.”
Years of intense interaction and experience with violence and suffering have
obviously branded themselves onto the thinking and reasoning of some I spoke with.
David Ervine told me about celebrating his 19th birthday as bombs exploded around
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Belfast, injuring many and killing another individual named David Ervine who lived not
too far from him. All he could think of was that it could just as easily have been him who
was killed. Dawn Purvis, although never member of a paramilitary organization, related
stories to me about how growing up in a society where soldiers kicking down your door
and taking you out to the street because there was a bomb nearby seemed to be a normal
occurrence. Through the stories I heard, and the destruction and damage caused by
sectarian violence I witnessed first hand on Sandy Row and the Shankill, I began to
question my own ability to resist joining a paramilitary organization and engaging in
violence in such a situation.
Others go even further by using these feelings to make calculated justifications
and rationales for the violence and retaliation they and the UVF employed. Tom Roberts
stated, “I feel that the justification for Loyalist violence came from the fact that the IRA
was inflicting violence on our community as we seen it and we reciprocated in kind.”
The problem with this sort of argument is that is assumes a number of things. First, it
assumes that it can be determined who acted, or struck first. This very question actually
has numerous subsets such as who was struck, what they were struck for, whether the
blow was bad enough to deserve retaliation and to what degree, making it far more
complicated and subjective than it was in original form. Second, it assumes that
members of large groups like the IRA and UVF always follow orders precisely, are in
agreement with those orders, and constantly are able to push aside their personal
vendettas, biases and feelings. Obviously, as is the case with most groups even outside
the UVF, these are impossible to guarantee (The Edge of the Union, 6-9). Besides, it
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seemed to me when I was in Belfast that enough animosity exists between Republicans
and Loyalists even now, and certainly during the height of the Troubles, to create
justification for violent action purely on deep seeded distrust and hatred. To this day,
groups like EPIC and its partner group Alternatives work with other community
organizations and political parties like the UUP and PUP to address and quell violent
outbursts along interface areas which are often sparked over small and seemingly
insignificant occurrences. Each of these groups gave me examples of such instances.
The emphasis on retaliation lead to tit for tat killings between Loyalist and
Republican paramilitaries which escalated the violence of the Troubles. David Ervine
wondered about the influence he had on perpetuation the violence when he questioned,
“One of the questions I think that is very painful to try and answer is that if there were an
engine that encouraged me, or enhanced my move towards paramilitary involvement,
how many engines did I become, or enhancement for young Catholics and Republicans
did I create by my actions?” Chris Hudson said that while the UVF never intended to
encourage random sectarian killings, it “began to mimic Republican violence and
explanations, especially in terms of defining legitimate targets. The UVF saw the PIRA
definition of legitimate target as encompassing pretty much the entire Protestant
community and then responded in similar ways.”
Many of these accounts have the common characteristics of fear and feeling under
attack or threat of attack. I think it is also significant that even the critics of the UVF do
not seem to deny this siege mentality. In fact Unionism and the Protestant community
are often characterized throughout the Troubles and into the present as feeling under
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siege. The civil rights campaign of the late 1960s and early 1970s was seen to quickly
turn from a campaign of “British Rights for British Citizens” into a vehicle for the
Republican movement with an objective of Catholic power (Sinnerton, 26). The UVF
Commander elaborated and corroborated this view when he said,
“Although the original civil rights protest may have been a different story, I think
it is clear now, and I have had several IRA men admit this to me, that the IRA
hijacked the movement as a vehicle for the Republican cause. I guess it means
that both Loyalists and Republicans were right in how they viewed the civil rights
campaign.”
Certainly, the Republican campaign embarked on by the IRA and its associated
political party, Sinn Fein was about establishing a united Ireland, thus dissolving the link
with Britain, not only destroying a union which Unionists and Protestants valued, but also
providing an unacceptable alternative in what was seen to be an exclusive and
inhospitable Irish state. Chris Hudson, Roy Garland, David Ervine, and Christopher
Stalford all spoke about how they believed the Unionist connection with Britain, while
not always articulated in the best manner, is legitimate and positive for the most part.
Each also viewed the ROI as historically exclusive to Protestants and Unionists, and even
today remained questionable in its willingness and ability to accommodate Protestants
who did not consider themselves Irish citizens. Chris Hudson said to me,
“The ROI has always claimed it held no grudge or discriminatory practices
against Protestants. For the most part, and especially in the last few decades, I
think that is true. However, the ROI needs to ask itself some serious questions in
regards to this stance. First, how can it be so certain of this when Protestants
make up only three percent of its population? Second, how is it treating new
immigrant populations and is this something that could be seen to represent how it
would treat a larger Protestant population? Finally, why is it that if the ROI is so
accepting of Protestants, the vast majority of them feel they must live in a tiny
corner of the island which isn’t part of the ROI?”
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Even outsiders can be subject to this siege mentality, which appears to manifest
itself through a certain level of distrust and closed community in many Loyalist areas.
During my time on the Shankill Road and Sandy Row people of a variety of ages would
often stare at me suspiciously. I certainly stuck out in this environment given my
backpack, dress and occasional use of a camera to take pictures of the area, but the
attention I received I believe was of a kind and degree attributable to a community with a
long tradition of feeling under attack, and thus being suspicious of outsiders. It would
take me getting the opportunity to introduce and explain myself before people would
open up to me in most situations. However, I believe this siege mentality may be
dissipating somewhat as people did become accustomed to my presence and at times
were quite inquisitive and open with me.
The break in ranks seems to come when the question of how to address the threat
of violence is asked. Northern Ireland has and has always had an established police force
throughout the Troubles in the RUC and Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), along
with the British Army and its special branch in the Ulster Defense Regiment (UDR).
With these legal and thus more legitimate options available, it has always been hard for
the UVF to justify its existence. This is the crux of the problem facing groups which
participate in what Bruce defines as pro-state terror, or illegitimate and unsanctioned uses
of force to support a government body and/or system. Bruce says,
“The modern state claims for itself a monopoly of coercion. The anti-state group
has a relatively simple and sensible task. The power of the state is such that it is
very unlikely to win, but, provided enough members of the subordinate
population are sufficiently alienated from the state, an organization using violence
to destroy the state can prosper…In contrast, the project of pro-state terrorism is
far less simple and far from sensible…If the government does a little blind eye
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turning, the pro-state terror group is advantaged, but if the government insists on
maintaining its monopoly on coercion, the pro-state organization is in the position
of the corner store competing with the multinational,” (The Red Hand, 287).
However, many of those I spoke with made it clear they did not see the state
forces as being able, and sometimes willing, to defend the communities from which the
members of the UVF came. For Tom Roberts, his decision to join the UVF was not only
fueled by the fact that several of his friends who were part of the security forces were
injured and killed in Republican attacks, but that he felt the UVF was better able to carry
out a campaign against the IRA as it did not have the same restraints and pressures on it
as the security forces. He also pointed to the hypocrisy of many of those, even in his own
family but also in the greater Unionist community, in supporting the “state sanctioned
slaughter and repression of people” but not when it was done by the UVF. The UVF
Commander pointed out,
“For me the very fact that many members of the security forces were also
members of paramilitaries points to the fact that legal measures were limited in
what they could do against the IRA. The security forces were not going to be
effective against the IRA if they were handcuffed in their efforts. Obviously, the
UVF does not have that problem.”
Bruce points out “there is (or at least was) a suspicion in Loyalist and wider Unionist
circles that the government is not trying to win (the war against the IRA),” (The Edge of
the Union, 47).
This mistrust and suspicion extends to within the Unionist community as well.
Some people were of the opinion that mainstream Unionists (those who typically vote for
the UUP and DUP, are from middle class or affluent status, and do not support
paramilitaries on any side) had used, abused, and abandoned the Loyalist community in
regards to the UVF. Tom Roberts said, “Mid-Unionists (the DUP and UUP primarily)
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are hypocrites and have abandoned, sold out and turned against the very Loyalists they
formally encouraged and supported.” The accusation of mid-Unionists encouraging and
using groups like the UVF is one which is hotly contested. Christopher Stalford told me,
“First thing I would say is that the Ulster Unionist Party and the DUP aren’t in any way
linked to paramilitary organizations.” In the academic community, the issue of just how
much encouragement and support was given to Loyalist paramilitaries is heavily debated.
Early actions and involvement by individuals like Dr. Paisley with groups like the Ulster
Protestant Volunteers (UPV) whose membership consisted of many UVF members,
raises questions about how divorced mid-Unionists have been from the UVF. However,
this support certainly did not extend into the political, financial, or direct membership
realms. For an extensive look at this topic, see Bruce’s The Red Hand.
The UVF Commander summarized the connection between the UVF and more
mainstream Unionist politicians as such, “Unionism has largely used and abused the UVF
for its own political gains. We have been the big stick in the mentality that, ‘You can
either work with us, or deal with them.’ However, when we made good on that threat
through violence, we were almost completely abandoned, and absolutely so publicly.”
Dawn Purvis said of the DUP’s and UUP’s unwillingness to work with the UVF or
groups like the PUP associated with it, “It’s double speak, you know, it is total hypocrisy.
At one time they were totally associated, they couldn’t get any closer in the bed beside
them.” During my time in Belfast, Reverend Kennaway, a Presbyterian minister and
member of the Orange Order I had met with earlier in my travels, published a book
detailing various things he saw as shortcomings and flaws with the management of the
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Orange Order. One of these he details in depth is the use of UVF and UDA protection
teams for Orange Order parades. The Orange Order and other “legitimate” groups have
denied thoroughly having any involvement with the paramilitaries, but there seems to be
a body of evidence to suggest otherwise, and even that members of the UVF and other
paramilitaries may have been joint members of these organizations (Kennaway, 10-11).
According to members of the Orange Order on Sandy Row, not only is Kennaway not
correct in these opinions, but he is also in serious trouble with the organization.
Some also suggest that violence was a medium through which those that were
unheard or under represented in the political process could have their voices heard. Ken
Gibson, founder of the VPP said that the violent men his party represented had a voice
that must be heard. These were men who were not just gunmen, but enlightened citizens
of Ulster who wanted to create peace but had to be heard. If political structures in
Northern Ireland could not create peace, or would not give credence to their positions,
then they would have no choice but to fight for it (Cusak and McDonald, 143-144). The
UVF Commander expressed his opinion to me that by fighting, and escalating the
Troubles in Northern Ireland, organizations like the UVF had prevented the British
government taking “the easy road out” by simply acquiescing to the demands for a united
Ireland against the wishes of the Protestant majority. He also pointed out that, “It wasn’t
the intention, but I believe violence probably made politicians on both sides compromise
on subjects and at speeds they otherwise would not have.”
David Ervine pointed to political distancing that had occurred throughout the
Troubles and into today, “This ‘Loyalist paramilitary’ label almost makes them apart
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from the society from which they come which clearly does not make any sense. They are
from the communities which make up Northern Ireland and yet somehow they are an
illusionary process that Nationalists, Unionists, and above all the media seek to set apart,
but of course they are not apart, they are very much a part there of.” Christopher Stalford
made his distinction between those in the Unionist mainstream and groups like the UVF
and its supporters by saying,
“Unionists believe in the rule of law and believe in non-violent political methods.
I don’t like the use of the word Loyalist to describe paramilitaries because I think
that demeans the word Loyalist. Loyalists are loyal to the Queen and they are
loyal to the United Kingdom and as such abide by the rule of law and respect the
rule of law. People that have taken the word Loyalist to describe themselves are
not necessarily loyal to anything other than…some of them I think it is a question
of lining their pocket with ill gotten gains from crime. I think the main distinction
that can be draw between parties like the DUP and the Ulster Unionists on one
hand and the PUP and UPRG on the other is that mainstream Unionists believe in
the rule of law and that the police, the army, and the institutions of the state are
the sole arbiters of law and order, the sole route by which justice can be
dispensed.”
The interesting point is that it makes little difference which position ends up being correct
as it is perceived to be the case by almost every former and current paramilitary member I
spoke with that this sort of political disassociation and under representation has occurred
and continues to occur. The UVF Commander stated, “Perceptions are almost always
more important than the truth so what people have perceived as the reasons behind the
violence at various times have always taken precedence over the actually facts.”
Political disenfranchisement, defense, retaliation, a sense of not knowing what to
do (flight or fight), the feeling that security forces were unable and or unwilling to protect
them and their communities, encouragement and support from a variety of sources, and a
true and deep seated fear of a united Ireland all seem to have played a part in why the
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UVF mounted its campaign of violence during the Troubles. There are other reasons
which I was given as well for the violence, and especially the more criminal violence
which is occurring presently. However, I will discuss criminality in more depth later, and
the reader should examine the transcriptions in Appendix B for more full and detailed
accounts on the subject of violence by each individual. David Ervine also posed the
question to me, “Why do people hate people they don’t know?” which I believe strikes at
a number of psychological questions as to how and why individuals are willing to commit
violence against one another. Unfortunately, I have not the time, space, or knowledge
required to delve into these topics.
The move from violence towards politics: motivations, successes and difficulties
Speaking about the move of the UVF from violence to politics is difficult and
somewhat misleading. Many people do not consider the UVF to have made the move at
all. When explaining my project to the host family of another student who I was studying
with, the mother replied, “The UVF has moved from violence to politics? I think they are
still pretty violent.” Certainly there are elements of this organization which still do
employ violence for various reasons. I will discuss these instances later in this section.
The other slightly misleading part is that many UVF members and ex-members
are not politicians or politically active. Also, the UVF as an organization does not see
itself as a political group, and certainly does not field political candidates. Reasons for
this will be discussed later in the section. However, I do believe a conscious decision
was made by the UVF and much of its membership (the precise date is probably
impossible to pinpoint) to move away from violence and towards political and peace
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processes. It is this move and my interviewees’ opinions on it that I would like to
examine.
The first motivation which seems to be significant in inciting this move is the IRA
and its cessation of violence in the pursuit of a united Ireland. Tom Roberts stated, “if
the IRA are genuine in ceasing their armed struggle and inflicting causalities on our
community then we will reciprocate, or at least I would like to think that is what we
would and have done. All the evidence has shown this to be the case.” Chris Hudson
said that although at points it appeared the UVF may declare a ceasefire before the IRA,
it was easier for them to do so afterwards as it fit with their, “You stop, we stop”
mentality.
It should be noted though that this motive is shaky at best but was an important
one in the thinking of the UVF at the time according to many of those I spoke with.
Bruce points out even before the GFA it seemed bizarre for the IRA to stop its campaign
of violence when it appears to be winning, or at least to be unbeatable, and equally
unlikely that Loyalists paramilitaries like the UVF would accept anything that could be
taken as a sign of defeat (The Edge of the Union, 95-97). David Ervine, Dawn Purvis, the
UVF Command Staff and Tom Roberts all spoke to me about what a difficult “sell” the
GFA was for both Republican and Loyalist communities, as they had to simultaneously
convince their respective supporters that they had won. David Ervine pointed to the fact
that other Unionist political parties hampered this process, “When the PUP was very,
very core to creating the Loyalist ceasefire, the DUP described that ceasefire as, ‘Hard
men gone soft.’ That is the same DUP that will give you total vilification of
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paramilitaries; but that is the definition that gave it, hard men gone soft. But people don’t
seem to remember that.”
With this came a change and drop in community support for the UVF and its
violent military campaign. The UVF Command Staff I spoke with were adamant that the
UVF had always been of and for the communities from which its members came. Thus,
as those communities began to ask for peace and dialogue, the UVF responded
accordingly by trying to provide for those requests. Chris Hudson pointed to the fact that
throughout the UVF’s existence, the group had been experimenting with politics and
political initiatives, and had become quite versed in how the political system would work.
According to Hudson,
“They (the UVF) had made the decision that something was happening within the
Republican community that would lead to the IRA’s campaign being brought to a
closure. They felt they too should be in such a process but weren’t at that point in
time. In a way, my job was to help them create this process. It didn’t have a
strategic goal as such, other than to bring around a Loyalist ceasefire. But I like
to think of myself as a strategic thinker, and I tried to encourage them to do the
same so that we could gently and steadily move forward through what was being
said. What the UVF needed to know was that there were no secret deals between
the Irish government, the British and the IRA, to be sure that they would not stand
down only to be forced through back alley deals into a united Ireland.”
The UVF was first able to deliver a ceasefire to allow the political process to proceed
without the backdrop of violence and then become a behind the scenes player in the
peace process which followed, receiving and critiquing the political analysis given to
them by David Ervine and the PUP, and helping to sell and support the GFA when it was
produced.
The idea of being community representatives was also a contentious one.
Christopher Stalford pointed to the fact that support for political groups associated with
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Loyalists paramilitaries met with only limited success even directly following the GFA
(which he and others considered to be the “peak” of their support levels) and that support
as, “melted away like snow off a ditch.” His assessment of the political success of groups
like the PUP is shared by David Ervine, the only remaining MLA for the party out of an
original three in the National Assembly. Chris Hudson notes that in his work he has also
found that many Loyalist community members who support the UVF as a paramilitary
are unwilling to support it politically.
Ervine sees the struggles of the PUP as related to its democratic socialist policies
as well as the hesitancy many people have with voting for a party which maintains ties
with the UVF. Roy Garland adds that the PUP, although it picks up some cross
community and cross class support for its liberal stance and progressive policies, it also
loses some of what may be its strongest supporters in the Loyalist community because
they hold right leaning positions on social policies and the constitutional issue (such as a
feeling the GFA is not longer the appropriate means by which to govern Northern
Ireland) and thus vote for other parties like the DUP and occasionally the UUP. Stalford
agreed that the DUP offered a consistent and strong position on numerous issues, was
seen to be working hard for its constituents, and had broadened its base of support within
Loyalist communities as a result. Chris Hudson agrees but sees it as more complex,
“People in Loyalist areas might also be looking at the work done by people like
Peter Robinson (the deputy leader of the DUP and an MLA) in East Belfast,
which are now quite prosperous and making major strides, and be thinking, ‘Well
maybe they will do the same for us.’ There is no doubt that Loyalist areas have
suffered from a variety of social ills. I think that the British government may also
be trying to maneuver the DUP into governance with Sinn Fein by allowing
money to go into Loyalist working class areas through the party, which boosts
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their support. At the same time though, I am sure David Ervine is in there trying
to get this funding for people as well.”
However, this (politics) is not the only way of the UVF and other paramilitary
organizations represent their communities according to some. The UVF Command Staff
stated, “Unfortunately, the support for the UVF does not reflect itself in votes. But if you
go to a UVF commemoration parade, and you see the streets lined with thousands of
people, those people aren’t made to be there and I think it gives you and idea of the sort
of support our organization has.” I attended a UVF Battle of the Somme commemoration
parade while in Belfast and can attest to the fact that not only were there several dozen
“blood and thunder” bands participating (with at least several dozen members each) but
there were also thousands of people cheering and lining the streets. Dawn Purvis pointed
out that most paramilitary members are and were uncles, brothers, fathers, and friends,
not some strangers who had entered the community to fight, so it was hard not to support
them on some basic level because you tended to be directly connected to them personally.
Both Tom Roberts and Billy Newman gave me numerous examples of how ex-prisoners
and even current paramilitary members were having significant impacts on their
communities through work at a community and family level. Newman went even further
to say, “It is frustrating because often times, at least in this community, community work
is well ahead of politics, but politics dictates where funding goes and can have enormous
power over people’s thinking about, and reactions to, community work.”
A major point of contention leading up to and during my time in Belfast was
criminality committed by Loyalist paramilitaries. The Belfast Telegraph ran several
stories over the course of my time documenting the conflict within the leadership of the
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UDA over criminality committed and encouraged by some of its members. Since the
GFA especially, pressure as been put on politicians, police, and the paramilitaries
themselves by the community of Northern Ireland to end criminality within their ranks
and criminality has been a key term in political dialogue. Most people regard
racketeering, robberies, theft, and punishment beatings to be forms of violence, and while
not all involve physical harm being done, it raises the question of what exactly constitutes
violence. For the purposes of this paper, and for the society of Northern Ireland though,
it is not about technical definitions, but rather what people perceive and believe to be
violence which is important.
Dominic Bryan raised two excellent questions in my discussions with him about
criminality. How much of this criminality existed throughout the Troubles but was seen
to be “politically” motivated and thus acceptable on the part of the community? Does the
fact that crime rates have gone up indicate that the Police Service of Northern Ireland
(PSNI) are better able to do their jobs because the paramilitaries are not longer
controlling and dealing with community policing, or is there an actual crime increase?
Cusack, McDonald, Edwards, and Bloomer in their respective works all point to the fact
that activities such as racketeering and robbery have been part of the Loyalist
paramilitary experience throughout these organizations’ existences. Not only did these
activities generate support within the community (the UVF Commander admitted to me
that he believed some support for the UVF may have been due to fear) but it was also
necessary for the purchase of weapons, welfare support of prisoners’ families, and a
variety of other operations.
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Now that the military operations and welfare part of the UVF’s activity is over,
the question becomes why that activity continues. Roberts openly admitted that
criminality had been and was part of all paramilitary organizations (this admission was
significant as the UVF has at times tried to deny it had criminal elements). However, he
qualified that by saying that the UVF does not, on any official level, support or condone
criminality. Roberts also said,
“No one is saying the criminality is acceptable, but I think that it can be
understandable in some cases. If society and the state already label these
individuals (ex-combatants and prisoners) are criminals, and if this label prevents
many from finding employment and the means to provide for themselves and their
families, or adequately do so, it isn’t hard it imagine how some might turn to
criminal activity using the training and structures they gained access to in the
paramilitaries.”
The UVF Commander agreed with Roberts on his assessment that those who have
joined the UVF since the ceasefires, and especially since the GFA tended to be drawn
towards the more criminal and gang-like potentials and opportunities afforded by the
UVF. He asked that I make sure to mention that the UVF was no longer officially or
actively recruiting as a result of this trend, and in an attempt to address the issue of
criminality. However, he also argued that the core ranks of the UVF were politically
minded, and not intent on becoming criminal Mafia style leaders. According to him,
“I want to make this very clear, the UVF does not sanction or condone criminality
on any level, full stop. However, we cannot account for every member of our
organization, just like no other group outside the paramilitary realm can do so
either. The British government, the Irish government, the political parties of
Northern Ireland, the PSNI, all of them have criminal happenings and members
but they never receive the same sort of attention because they do not have the
background of the UVF, but in actuality the circumstances of that crime are not
all that different.”
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Others are far more skeptical of the reasons for criminality activity on the part of
the UVF and other paramilitaries. Stalford felt very strongly on the subject and I believe
his own words summarize his position most accurately,
“Paramilitary organizations continue to exist because it is a very profitable
business for the people who are members of them. I think the days of these
organizations representing any political ideology or signing up to any particular
cause are gone. I think these organizations now are effectively organized crime
syndicates and they have evolved into that because of the policies of the British
government which allowed their continued existence and allowed them to
continue in their criminality. I think that is the main reason that paramilitary
organizations continue to blight our society. Particularly on the Loyalist side,
businesses are being bleed dry paying protection money, companies are being
forced out of business for what? It is not for any Loyalism or any Unionism, it’s
for lining the pockets of people who are doing it.”
To an extent David Ervine, Dawn Purvis, Chris Hudson, Henry McDonald, Roy Garland,
Tom Roberts, and the UVF Command staff agreed that criminality was a problem and
that it was to at least an extent motivated by profit and no specific political or military
goal, a consensus which I believe is significant as not many issues came close to that sort
unanimity.
Internal and inter-paramilitary feuding in the Loyalist community has also caused
a shift from violence of one sort, to violence of another, setting back the ability of these
groups to enter the political mainstream. Sinnerton’s biography of Ervine does a good
job of covering the feuding between the UDA and UVF which broke out in 2001 and
continues to this day. Chris Hudson explained it was the policy of the UVF that it could
not allow splinter elements like the Loyalist Volunteer Force to exist as the destruction to
the peace process and community they caused would be unacceptable. Although not their
preferred method, they were willing to employ violence to achieve these ends. This sort
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of disagreement over policy, territory, and power also dominates the feuding between the
UDA and UVF and is well documented in not only Sinnerton, but also in its more
historically sense is covered in both books by Bruce and recently reexamined by Edwards
and Bloomer.
Dawn Purvis, a recent appointee to the Policing Board of Northern Ireland,
cautioned me that simply labeling people as criminals had been tried already in the 1970s
and 1980s in reference to the UVF and other paramilitaries and had not worked. In fact,
all it does is leave people behind to cause further trouble down the road. I wondered if
this was hinting that current criminality could be the result of the peace process not being
through enough in involving and committing the entire population of Northern Ireland?
Although I suspect it is not the direct cause, it may be a subconscious or indirect
contributing factor. Mrs. Purvis, given her own personal history as well as involvement
with the PUP and the Policing Board is well versed on the subject of criminality in
Northern Ireland. I asked her several question regarding that topic and her responses are
work examining in Appendix B of this paper.
The UVF has definitely made a commitment to ending its campaign of violence
and has taken steps to do so. However, the political aspirations of this group if coherent
and unified ones exist, are difficult to extract. David Ervine said to me in talking about
the PUP, his status as a politician and how it related to the UVF, “Maybe we aren’t really
politicians at all. Maybe we are just paramilitaries who came out of the
darkness…having come out of the darkness we don’t want anyone to follow where we
were, so therefore we have to challenge them.” Also, the steps being taken to reach a
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final state of disbandment and standing down (the objective of the UVF as expressed to
me by Tom Roberts, David Ervine, Henry McDonald, Chris Hudson and the UVF
Command Staff) are proving problematic as they often resort back to violent tactics or are
met with a variety of community and political objections and rejections.
The UVF truly believes that the campaign of violence by the IRA is over, the
communities from which its members come from are safe for the moment, and the union
with Britain is also secure. As a result, the organization is looking to stand down and
move on. To what exactly is unclear. There have been successes in the political realm
for people like David Ervine, Billy Hutchinson, Gusty Spence and the PUP, but they are
now being challenged heavily in their political support by other Unionist political parties.
Community groups like EPIC and the John McMichael Center are also providing outlets
for former and current paramilitary members to have an influence within their
communities but through the power of dialogue and persuasion rather than violence.
However, these groups also face challenges of funding (political backing), consistent and
continuous community support, and proper legal recognition (of things like political
prisoner status) that would allow them to better assist their communities collectively and
individually. There have also been set backs in the disbandment process through internal
feuding, crime, disenfranchisement with politics and community, and announcements by
the British and Irish governments which call the sanctity of Northern Ireland back into
question for some (most generally this is talk of a “plan B” option should Stormont fail to
reassemble). Still, in the end it seems that the UVF has taken significant strides towards
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a complete abandonment of violence and continues to do so although admittedly with
varying degrees of success and speed.

Conclusion:
How can I end this rather disjointed, complex, and somewhat controversial paper?
Through my project and this paper, I have encouraged the reader and myself to
reexamine violence and its effects. Instead of deploring violence, tossing it aside, and
focusing on those subjects and tactics which are more morally appealing to me, I tried to
see exactly how violence can impact those very non-violent, political and peaceful
strategies I wish to spend time on and adopt. Whether I was successful in this endeavor
is up to my readers; if they feel more informed on the UVF, the reasons for its violent
methods, its transition to politics, and the motivations, successes and difficulties it
encountered along the way, then I will consider this project quite useful if only in a broad
and introductory sense. Certainly it has helped me to examine topics and organizations
which I was unfamiliar with, and confront issues I may otherwise have passed over and
made false assumptions about. If the readers of this project leave with a desire to more
fully and critically examine the role of violence in society, politics and peace, I will be
extremely happy. This paper is very much a beginning and not an end. Perhaps a
conclusion which draws heavily on those even more committed to this exploration and
analysis than myself would be helpful.
Chris Hudson said to me, and I think rightly so, “There are often more egos in the
peace movement than in the paramilitaries of Northern Ireland.” To me, what this
suggests is that a history of violence, coming out of the darkness so to say, allows one not
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only to come in touch with what they truly believe and need, but often also with a new
resolve to keep others firmly in the light. Such understanding may be hard, but not
impossible, to reach without approaching the human limits (morally and physically)
which violent action demands. Hudson also had a practical message for me to share and
one which provided me a new resolve for addressing difficult topics such as violence.
“Peace work has to be symbolic and substantive. It must deal with what is
actually going on, the reality of the situation, and how to make the violence stop;
not just whether the violence should have taken place to being with. People have
to be realistic when it comes to peace work. This doesn’t mean that we can’t
dream and be hopeful, but it does mean we have to be willing to accept that our
dreams are not as close, and sometimes not as practical, as we may like them to
be. I don’t want any utopian dreamers knocking on my door unless they are first
willing to deal with the situation at hand. Resolving what is at hand is the only
way we can ever hope to make the dreams anything more than dreams.”
Violence is a force which, rightly or wrongly, demands to be dealt with. It is the
ultimate ultimatum. If we are to challenge it and defuse it, we must first recognize and
know it. The consequences of not doing so are too numerous and detrimental for us to
hide behind a shield of self-righteousness and simplicity in not addressing and
examining, in a critical yet understanding manner, violence as a force. I sincerely believe
there is hope in this endeavor as well. I will end with a quote from the CLMC Ceasefire
Statement of 1994 found in the Truth Recovery document put out by ex-prisoners,
Loyalists community members, researchers, and current paramilitary members which I
hope will give the reader an idea of just what strides can be made in coming out of the
darkness.
“In all sincerity, we offer to the loved ones of all innocent victims over the part
twenty-five years abject and true remorse. No words of ours will compensate for
the intolerable suffering they have undergone during the conflict. Let us firmly
resolve to respect our differing views of freedom, culture, and aspiration and
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never again permit political circumstances to degenerate into bloody conflict. We
are on the threshold of a new beginning with our battles in the future being
political battles fought on the side of honesty, decency and democracy against the
negativity of mistrust, misunderstanding, and malevolence, so that together we
can bring forth a wholesome society in which our children and their children will
know the meaning of true peace.”
Note: The preceding pages have been a very brief, somewhat scattered and
incomplete summarization and analysis of my interviews and reading for this
project. Even in the process of writing I came to realize that much of what I hoped
to cover would have to be abandoned or significantly stunted for the sake of time
and space. However, I would again highly recommend that any reader take the time
to read the transcriptions of my interviews and daily observation journal as it will
offer a much broader and more complete picture of the UVF, Loyalism, Unionism,
violence, politics and peace. The information contained within those interviews is
far more valuable to anyone wanting a snapshot of these topics than my analysis can
every hope to be, especially in the time and space provided. I also believe they are
helpful in challenging some of my claims, and gaining valuable counter arguments
to much of what I, and others, have said.

Appendix A: Daily Observation Journal and Field Notes
April 18th, 2005:
-Made contact with Chris Hudson who was a leader of the Peace Train movement, the
primary contact between the Irish government and loyalist paramilitaries, and a Unitarian
reverend in Belfast. I had met him a few months ago at the Dublin Unitarian Church and
he gave me his business card. Unfortunately, on my first trip to Belfast, I was far too
busy to contact him. I felt awkward trying to remind him who I was and calling him out
of the blue (if I had it to do again, I definitely would have contact him earlier). However,
I was lucky and he was generous to agree to meet with me over the weekend. I suspect
this willingness to be flexible and personable is what made him appealing to groups like
the UVF and UDA who are known for being secretive and careful whom they speak with.
-Arrived in Belfast via bus from Dublin.
-I feel like I am returning to a somewhat familiar place. Within a few
minutes, and without a map, I am able to locate where we are, how to
reach the hostel, and how to get from there to our QUB accommodations.
-I do not feel home here. It feels almost like a test area, where I am an
observer. I suspect this has much to do with my intentions in coming here
(I am here to conduct a observation based research project). Still, I can’t
help but wonder if maybe people who live here all their lives, or certainly
those that move here, might also feel disconnected. I suspect that many
who live in the interface areas (but also in more of the affluent regions)
probably feel a sense of belonging and connection with their specific
region, but a strong disconnect from the communities a short distance
from them.
-Short physical distance, enormous ideological and socio-economic
divides.
-Housing at QUB is interesting. We area living in what looks like an old house which
has been converted to dormitory style housing. It is broken into sections, with each
section having a similar layout, with three floors, each with kitchen, laundry and
washroom facilities. Rooms are pretty spacious in comparison with my single room in
Beloit (measuring about 12x9). There appear to be only a few other residents in the
whole house, maybe 10-12 total plus the SIT students. Every one of the other residents I
have met is a foreigner (primarily from Europe, but almost all continents are represented)
either working for QUB or studying there. All of them are very outgoing and seem
interested in meeting other foreign students, especially Americans. The house is located
about 4 blocks out of the city from QUB’s main building, on Malone Road.
April 19th, 2006:

-Walked to City Hall and took a tour of the building. It was an abbreviated tour has a
major exhibit about the Titanic was taking up much of the building. I found it bizarre
that most of the historical items on display were for sale. A few weeks before, the first
draft of the Irish national anthem was sold to a private bidder. Why are items that seem
to hold an enormous amount of significance for the entire country allowed to go up for
sale to private bidders? In the USA, many items of such significance are held in
museums and never come up for public auction. Is this the result of true free market
economics (you can buy anything)?
-I found it fascinating to see the variety of reactions of people on the tour as the
guide made an effort to explain the politics of the city and its violent past. When
sitting in the council chambers, we were told which party section we were sitting
in. Two residents of Belfast acted with disgusted when they found they were
sitting in the Sinn Fein section. When an American family found they were
sitting in the DUP’s section, and our tour guide made special mention that Paisley
was associated with that group, they looked at her blankly, obviously not
understanding the significance. Later, I heard them asking question which
betrayed the fact that they had little to no idea the Troubles had ever happened.
-Politics are definitely divided at the municipal levels just as they are at
the national level. The same parties, with the same general platforms are
the major players. However, I did find it unique that the Lord Mayors of
Belfast had included a wide range (especially in recent history) of people
from Sinn Fein, the UUP, the DUP, and the Alliance Party.
-The very structure of the building shouted its British influence, which
certainly makes sense given the British commissioned it far before even
the troubles of the early 1900s (it was designed by British architect in
renaissance style which was highly popular for British administration
buildings around the empire at that time). Still, I imagine members of
Sinn Fein and the nationalist community would probably alter the
emphasis given to Britain and the crown in many of the buildings statues
and mosaics, should they ever gain power.
-Took a taxi to the Shankill Road. This was the Tour de France of being an outsider.
The taxi driver did not understand my accent at all, and had no idea what road I was
talking about. I will need to try and get this right as it is a rather infamous area of the
city, with the correct pronunciation being part of its identity. Then, I realized I had no
idea what address I was going to. I gave him the name of a number of structures on the
Shankill which I thought were obvious (the EPIC Center, Alternatives, the PUP office,
the Aleese Center, etc) but was met with blank stares. I imagine this gentleman was not
from the Shankill area himself, thus explaining why he was not familiar with the area.
Finally, we agreed that he would just drop me on the lower Shankill. To say the least, he
looked surprised at my request. I imagine he does not get many Americans (who he
probably assumes are tourists) requesting to go to this area. I hope that as I establish

myself in this area, I begin to feel more comfortable in my activities there. I hope this
confidence is noticed by residents of the area with the result being more open doors.
-Once on the street, things did not immediately improve. The first problem was
that many of the centers and organizations I was hoping to visit were closed. I am
not sure if this is still in recognition of the Easter holiday or simply the way these
places operate. It was in the early afternoon, so if I return again and find them
closed, I think I will try to make contact first by phone and see if maybe they are
open by appointment or special occasion only. However, it was not just the
centers that were closed. Many restaurants and stores appeared closed and
shuttered as well. I wonder if this is an indicator of the economic difficulties this
area is experiencing?
-Still, I was able to find the physical location of these sites and get their
telephone numbers which will be helpful in establishing contact.
-I stood out like a sore thumb with my backpack on, pen in hand, writing down
telephone numbers and standing outside closed buildings. This did not make a
good first impression and I received some very strange looks. Especially given
the society I am trying to gain access to, maybe simply meandering around is not
the best idea, or could be done in a more casual and less conspicuous way. I do
not blame them for being suspicious and guarded. Strange people have quite
often meant trouble, especially in the past. If I were to do this again, I would have
made some phone calls before hand and try to establish at least one organization
that I was intending to visit while I was there.
-To try and “break the ice” I decided to stop in two stores. The first was a
small sandwich shop and ice cream store. When I walked in, there was no
one out front, but I could hear people in the background. I waited, and a
man in his early 40s came out. He was built like a boxer, short with
bulging arms that had tattoos all over them. I doubt this man had been just
an ice cream server all his life. He looked at me suspiciously for a
moment before he even asked what I wanted. I asked about one of his ice
cream flavors, and then on his recommendation, ordered a cup. In this
short exchange, his entire demeanor towards me shifted. By the end, he
was telling me other places I could find good ice cream in the city,
smiling, and telling me to come back any time. This was a good lesson in
how even small gestures, and being polite can really break down barriers.
I plan to return and try to develop this relationship if for no other reason
that establishing myself as a figure in the community.
-The second store was a small news shop. I came in and asked the
attendant and a customer if there was a local newspaper for sale. Bother
were women in their late 30s to early 40s who obvious knew one another
at least casually based on their conversation and demeanor towards one
another. They pointed out a Shankill community paper and told me I

could take it for free and even take several if I new other people who
might be interested. I thanked them for their help and said I would stop
back in again to get the next issue. I also took several copies for other
people in the group. I hope this gave the women the impression that I was
interested in the area. I will stop back again, and in addition to getting
another copy of the local paper, I will buy something to give the store
some patronage.
-I had never noticed the changing “territories” on the Shankill until I
waked its entire length today. Lower Shankill appears to be largely UDA
territory based on the murals and graffiti. Middle Shankill is very mixed,
with UVF, LVF, and UDA represented. It is also the location of many of
the community centers for the area, and the PUP’s office. Upper Shankill
is UVF territory. This is also the location of the Orange Order Lodge,
leisure center, and the DUP’s office. EPIC and Alternatives are located on
this stretch of road. I wonder if loyalist feuding prevents some residents
from accessing certain services because of their location and nature?
-The entire road is showing the signs of economic depravation. Graffiti
and garbage are literally strewn everywhere, especially in any open space.
There are many empty lots, and buildings which look as though they have
not been open in many years. I was surprised to see many buildings with
operating business occupying the first floor, and the upper floors being
burned out shells. It doesn’t appear there are any major development
projects going on, or any attempts to clean up this area.
-I was also struck by the lack of police presence. During the entire hour
and a half I was on the Shankill, I did not see one police officer or cruiser.
In contrast, I saw three police officers between the Shankill and city hall
building. This might have something to do with a mural declaring the
residential area off the Middle Shankill a PSNI “no go” area. If the police
aren’t in control, who provides protection? Are the paramilitaries still
acting as community police?
April 20th, 2006:
-I made my first contact today. I have a meeting with Tom Roberts at the EPIC Center
for this coming Monday. Even the process of calling him and the short conversation we
had taught me a few things.
-The numbers advertised on the outside of buildings and in some publications are
often not the full number. Most will need you to add 028 and 90 to the front of
them before you can successfully dial. This is because it is assumed that most
people who would be calling these places are from the area and thus familiar with
the need for these additions. However, for myself as an outsider, it was
confusing. I wondered how this group made its contact information available to

organizations and individuals outside its community. I found several studies
published by the group and sure enough, the full telephone number was there. I
also noticed there are two different addresses for EPIC. Mr. Roberts explained
that one in the community center in Shankill and the other is more the “public”
and research base. I will try to visit both to see how they differ in presentation,
work, and feel as I suspect the contrast will be telling.
-I was concerned that many of the organizations I was hoping to contact were
open only during very select hours because of their being closed yesterday in the
early afternoon. Mr. Roberts explained that many businesses were closed for the
Easter holiday until the Thursday following it, and some were closed for the entire
week. After this time, most are open during normal 9-5 hours.
-I was struck by how open Mr. Roberts was to meeting with me. I had only
briefly explained who I was and what I was doing (which I do not think I even did
a good job communicating) and he suggested that we meet. I suspect I am not the
first person to make such a call to his organization. I wonder how the services
and reception I receive from him differ from a community member who contacts
EPIC (our reasons for contacting the center are probably quite different). How
does EPIC divide time and resources between local and non-local sources?
-I went to the Linen Hall Library today as well. Earlier in my studies, I had wondered
exactly what role academics could or should play in the conflict and its resolutions. My
host father in Derry had said that academics did not understand the conflict as they were
too far removed from the actors and situation. As a result, the solutions they offered were
unrealistic and off base. However, I am finding academic sources very helpful in my
investigation. If I am to make the best use of my time and those that I interview, I need
to come in armed with a good knowledge of the organization and topic I am researching.
I could not accomplish this without academic sources like the CAIN website and Linen
Hall Library. The variety of sources and perspectives they consolidate into one location
also allow people to begin “understanding” the other side without even meeting them.
Although at some point this personal interaction will need to occur, it cannot hurt to come
in prepared and armed with background knowledge just as in my situation. Given the
Linen Library’s prominent location and extensive resource base, I am guessing that
others also see the benefits of this organization (or at least the benefits of being seen to
support it).
-Thinking on the question of academics being removed from the conflict made me
wonder just how close politicians are in contrast. Certainly some, like many
members of the PUP were directly involved in the conflict. However, I wonder
just how close some MLAs in parties like the UUP and DUP ever were to the
violence and side effects of sectarian combat. Besides, what exactly defines
closeness? Certainly most of the current politicians lived during the time of the
troubles, and likely lived in cities/areas that were affected in some way or another.
Much of the literature I have read talks about the “street credibility” ex prisoners
carry, especially with youth and their immediate community members because

they have done the time and been as close to the conflict as one can come.
Certainly, most politicians lack this connection, but does that have an effect on
the peace process and/or why people vote for the parties they do? Why are
groups like the PUP losing support, or at least not gaining more, if they can put
forward this sort of credible and trusted candidate?
April 21st, 2006:
-I traveled back to the Shankill Road today in an attempt to contact more organizations
and individuals, as well as become more familiar with the area. It was a good trip if for
no other reason than that most organization and businesses were open (in contrast with
Wednesday). I was told that Easter vacations and closing usually lasted until at least the
Wednesday after, but often for the entire week. I hope that as the holiday season moves
on, I am able to gain more immediate access to those groups I wish to speak with.
-Alternatives is a center located at the very top of the Upper Shankill Road. It
was established in conjunction with the Ex-Prisoner Interpretative Center (EPIC)
as a restorative justice program which aimed to discontinue punishment beatings
by paramilitary groups by offering alternatives to violence. Since then, it has
branched out to offer a wide range of youth activities, many of which are directed
and lead by ex-prisoners in an attempt to steer youth away from violence and
towards community involvement. Alternatives continues to work closely with
EPIC as well as a variety of Athletic and Cultural centers in Belfast to develop
programs for youth in the area.
-Much of the building is covered in graffiti which was put up by local
youth in an effort to give them an artist outlet that did not involve violence
or vandalism.
-The building was not open, but I was unaware of that when I rang the
bell. After a short time a women named Jennie answered the door. She
was a victims’ support worker for Alternatives and was in the office
preparing for next week, which is when the center actually reopens.
However, she was happy to speak with us. She said that normally the
project manager would have spoken with us as well, but he was currently
talking with several youth from the community. The way she said it gave
me the impression that something violent, or potentially violent, had
occurred and that this was a delicate situation that could not be
interrupted. I suspect Alternatives, given the community it service and the
fast pace at which delicate and dangerous situations can develop, is
seldom really closed. Just in the ten minutes I was there, two other people
also arrived to speak with Jennie. Jennie seemed to agree, and said she
was looking forward to an upcoming vacation when she would not be on
call. Whoever works in such an environment must truly be devoted to the
“cause” as I doubt the pay or benefits draw many in.

-I am not sure how helpful Alternatives will be to my project specifically,
but I was happy I made the visit. Jennie took down my contact
information, who I was, and what I was studying and said she would
circulate it around her contacts so that people knew who I was and what I
was looking for. I am hoping this will help me break further into this
apparently tight knit community.
-My next stop was the DUP office on the Upper Shankill Road. This office is
located directly next to the EPIC Center and immediately across from
Alternatives. I could no help but feel this was slightly ironic in that a political
party such as the DUP, who has used such fiery rhetoric to oppose prisoner
release, paramilitary activity, and criminals in the community, located itself next
to two center who deal directly with these individuals. The office was quite
small, but had a well maintained façade and sign, which was in contrast with most
other organizations and businesses in that area. Inside, it was also quite stylish.
Leather sofas and arm chairs were available to waiting visitors in addition to a
small kitchen area with tea and biscuits. The carpet looked and smelled new, as
did the paint, and the smell of cigarette smoke was strangely absent. All these
things confirmed my feeling that the DUP was, and purposely gave off the
impression that it was a party of the working class (because of its location) but
removed in some very important ways.
-When I entered, a young (mid 20s) female worker was assisting a very
old (at least late 70s) lady with a concern she wanted addressed by the
MLA for the region, Diane Dodds. I could not quite figure out what the
concern was, but both women seemed to agree it was something that Mrs.
Dodds would need to address immediately. I was glad to see politics in
the region were still at work even with Stormont not being in session.
However, I noticed that the elderly women was also dressed quite nicely,
and drove off in a Mercedes sedan (of which I have seen only a handful in
the Shankill area). I wonder how representative she is of the Shankill
Road district and its political opinions/needs. How far outside the
Shankill and its immediate residential areas does the electoral district
reach? Would a member of the more immediate community receive such
a warm welcome and immediate assistance?
-A young (early 20s) man named Mark came down from upstairs and
asked if he could help me. Mark, as well as the other female employee
were also dressed in designer clothes, and had a style about them that I
could not find in other Shankill residents I passed on the street or met at
other organizations. Again, I wondered if these two were from the area.
However, I was interested to see such an apparent youth involvement with
the DUP (which I had considered to be a party which attracted older parts
of the population rather than younger). How close are the politics of Mark
to Ian Paisley? Will this new generation of the DUP bring with it new
policies and tactics?

-Mark was very friendly and helpful, and seemed excited about my
project, which I presented as unionist political activism and community
dynamics in the Shankill area. Although Diane Dodds was still on
vacation for Easter, he told me she would return next week, and he would
do his best to get me in to see her right away. I wonder if constituents of
Mrs. Dodds are able to gain such quick and easy access to her, or if they
are, whether they choose to do so. Does the DUP, through its policies and
rhetoric create a strong divide between members and the “others”?
-I had lunch at a small café on the Middle Shankill. The owner said it was a family
business, and that very few foreigners ever came in. I do not find that hard to believe.
The only other obvious outsiders I have seen are on the tour buses, which occasionally
pass through the area. I doubt those people ever get off in this area. I cannot help but
think how limited the view they get of this area must be from the top of a tour bus. By
the end of my lunch, the owner (an elderly women in her mid to late 60s) and her
daughter (who was in her early to mid 30s) were both quite friendly to me. They said
they hoped to see me again since I was going to be in the area. Even through these
relatively minor experiences, I am feeling like I am making progress in being coming
recognized and accepted by the Shankill community. Although my “outsider student”
vibe can be awkward to handle at first, I imagine many people actually want to tell their
stories, and give an account of their area in their words. People on the buses are not
looking for this sort of close contact, so an outsider who is genuinely interested may be
well received.
-I then visited the PUP office on the Middle Shankill. It had been closed when I first
walked by at 10:30AM that morning, but by noon it was open. I saw several people
coming in an out, most of them being young (20s-30s) males. Inside, I met John who
was a heavyset man who worked as a PUP community advisor and receptionist for Hugh
Smyth, who is the PUP city councilor for that region. He gave off the impression that
while he was quite open and generous with his time, you did not want to be on his bad
side. I was also interested in how he was respectful of the young men coming in and out
with various complaints, messages and errands, but also firms with a “take no guff”
attitude. The office itself was quite casual, with a small lobby area, dominated by John’s
desk and some waiting chairs. The whole place smelled strongly of cigarette smoke and
looked as if it could us some general repair work (the stair case leading up to the second
floor did not appear very stable and I worried John, should be god up, might do it in).
However, I believe that this environment was one that John, the young men, and many
other supporters of the PUP in the are would be use accustomed to, and likely made them
feel they were in a familiar space.
-John directed me to contact the East Belfast PUP office once he heard I was
looking to do research work. I hope that by going through that more typically
contact to the PUP, I may be able to return to the Shankill office and meet some
of its politicians and supporters. John was very nice and called the East Belfast
office, introduced me over the phone, gave me the address and directions, and

suggested I ask them particularly about the youth leadership programs that were
currently being set up.
-I do wonder why the PUP does not have a stronger presence on the Shankill
Road. Given that the upper part of the road, and the entire region, as traditionally
been a source of strong UVF support, it seems that many of those supporters
would vote for the PUP. I also believe that until fairly recently, Billy Hutchinson
was a PUP MLA for this area. Why did they lose the seat? Is their political
support stronger at a local rather than national level?
-On my way home, I stopped by the UUP office of Michael McGimpsey on Sandy Row
to see if I could not also get an interview with that party. Again, the exterior and interior
of the building looked significantly better maintained that those structures around it. I
also thought its location, immediately adjacent to the John McMichael Center for exprisoners and community work with paramilitaries was ironic. In our meetings with
Mark Neale of the UPP, he has said that the UUP was not in favor of working with
criminals and undesirable individuals. It seems to me that a large section of the Sandy
Row community is made of exactly this sort of individual, and those who do not fit these
categories are more amicable towards them. How does the UUP gain its support in this
region then? Is there more interaction between the party and organizations like the John
McMichael Center then they let on?
-Inside, I found a young (late 20s) man and an older (mid to late 60s)
gentleman conversing in a joking manner. Upon my arrival, they both
were eager to help me. It made me question just how much work was
getting done in this office. If the community was not coming to them,
shouldn’t they be going to the community in an attempt to make
themselves known and be able to better represent their constituents? Was
the fact that they jumped at the opportunity to help me so quickly a sign
that their office had little interaction on a daily basis with the community,
or was it a sign that they were happy to see a new/foreign face (and what
does that say about their community relations)?
-I informed them that I was looking at unionist political activism and the
efforts of unionism to present a unifying and inclusive platform from the
1990s to the present. Both stared at me and I thought I had stumbled into
some unknown taboo. Then, the older gentleman (whose name was Rob)
asked jokingly if I had any suggestions for him because he had been trying
to figure that out for years, along with the rest of the party. I have heard
this sentiment expressed before and it makes me even more curious why
Unionism has not made efforts to present a coherent front until relatively
recently (and even then with questionable tactics and success). I am
excited about returning for another meeting with Rob on this subject, and I
hope he might give me some valuable insights into the political strategies
of Unionism, and maybe the relationship they have with Loyalism and the
paramilitaries.

April 23rd, 2006:
-I went to All Souls Non-Subscribing and Dissenting Presbyterian Church today. The
church is located at the end of Elmwood Avenue, just down from the main gate of
Queen’s University. The church was built in 1896 and is one of three congregations of
this faith in Belfast. The building its self is modeled after the Scottish Anglican tradition,
with a large central cathedral, two small wings connected to the cathedral running parallel
to it, a bell tower about 30-40 feet high, and a memorial garden encircling the church.
Chris Hudson is the minister for this church, and he is how I came to be aware of the
church and was invited to attend services. There were about 35-40 people in attendance,
with the vast majority of them being over the age of 60. The service lasted about an hour
and fifteen minutes and included singing from the choir, readings by members of the
congregation, a children’s story read by Mr. Hudson, and two short sermons by Mr.
Hudson.
-Upon arrival, I was a little nervous. First, I was walking into a completely new
environment on the invitation of a man I barely knew and was trying to get close
to for the purpose of his connections and knowledge. Second, I was under the
impression that this was a Unitarian Church, and from the sign outside, I was
confused as to exactly what faith was represented here. I really did not know
what to expect walking through the doors, and that made me a little
uncomfortable. Luckily, upon entry my fears evaporated and I was really pleased
I had the opportunity to experience this service and space.
-I was greeted by two elderly (mid 70s) gentlemen. They seemed a bit
shocked to see a new face, and were particularly taken aback by my
accent. Still, this generated a great showing of curiosity and hospitality on
their part. As I was early, I had a cup of tea with them and they asked me
about who I was, where I was from, how I had come to this service, and
what my religious background was. They then gave me a tour of the
church and explained to me what the faith of the congregation was about.
It became clear this was a Protestant church which was acutely tied and
devoted to the ideals of the Reformation and Martin Luther. Because it
placed a great deal of emphasis on individual interpretations of, and
relationships with spirituality, it did closely parallel the Unitarian Church.
In fact, these two gentlemen explained that many members of the
congregation also considered themselves Unitarians, and when they were
in the States attended Unitarian services. Having talked with them, I
began to really feel welcome and at home in this setting. It felt familiar,
much like my church at college and the one I was raised in.
-The men said that the church prided itself on being progressive
and accepting of all faiths, especially those within the Christian
tradition. Its minister are known for being influential, well
educated, highly motivated to effect change, and devoted to peace

and understanding. I could see, even through my limited
interactions with him, why Chris Hudson was now the minister for
this congregation. This progressive tradition was also seen in the
history of the members. Many families had been attending this
church for generations.
-Chris came and said hello to me just before the service started. He asked
if it would be ok for him to introduce me and if I might say a few words.
Wanting to be friendly and make a good impression, I of course said that
would be fine. After his introduction (which was terribly kind and
generous, especially given how little he knew about me) I said who I was
and what I was doing in Belfast. I also said what congregation I was from
in the states and said they were all very welcome to visit me there should
they be in the area. I was giving a rousing round of applause afterwards
and several members came and shook my hand as I was sitting down,
which really made me feel welcomed and at home.
-Chris’ sermon was very interesting given his background. Chris was born
and raised in the Republic of Ireland in a family which he described as,
“nationalist bordering on republican,” in political ideology. He became
interested in trade unions and labor organization and began working as a
trade union organizer in the Republic. Given his cheerful and amicable
personality, his quick smile, and motivation (according to those I spoke
with in the congregation), he became well known and respected in
working class communities. Soon, his work and connections took him to
Northern Ireland. There, he began to meet Protestants in working class
areas like Sandy Row and Shankill Road and earn their respect as well.
Through these connections, several loyalist paramilitary groups knew him
as a person from the Republic who could be trusted. Soon, it became clear
that the loyalist paramilitaries and the Republic could gain from
interaction and communication with one another. A trusted mediator and
facilitator was needed, and quickly it was agreed that Chris would be a
good candidate. He became the primary contact between the South and
the loyalist paramilitaries. He also worked as an organizer and facilitator
of the Peace Train movement, which gathered groups of people together to
travel by travel back and forth from Dublin to Belfast to prove the connect
and good will of North and South. Chris is credited by many academics,
politicians and paramilitary members as being a key factor in the peace
process.
-Chris’ sermons focused on the fact that today is St. George’s Day
and the national day of England. He went on to describe how
proud he was of his English nationality and was proud to declare
that, although it would be unheard of for nationalist/republican to
do so. The message was that one can be proud of their heritage, or
at least connected with it, even without unequivocally supporting

what that heritage stood for. It was a sermon about understanding,
acceptance, and intelligent questioning and development. I really
thought he did a great job making his point by combining his
personal history, humor, current events, mythology, and religion
into a delivery mechanism which was easy to listen to, and
promoted those who heard it to continue questioning themselves
after they left.
-I could not help but think about how this sort of charisma and
diplomacy were probably the reason for the trust a variety of
groups and individuals put in Chris. He preached a message about
identity which allowed and even encouraged the listener to
embrace themselves and their identity, but to do so in the spirit of
how immensely complex that identity is in each of us. Loyalist,
who appear to have had difficulty vocalizing exactly what their
identity is and allowing that identity to co-exist peacefully with
others, likely found Chris’ ideology to be welcoming and helpful.
I believe that republicans, while more in touch with what they
perceive their identity to be, could do with taking a closer look at
really makes up their identity, and how its complexities can make
it more compatible with others.
-After the sermon, I drank more tea with the congregation and had several
more tours by people who gave their own personal accounts of their
involvement with the church and its history. I thought it was interesting to
see Chris’ sermon already at work as these people embraced a wide
variety of national backgrounds, religion practices, and political
ideologies. I also met Chris’ wife Isabelle who was very kind to me and
said that Chris had spoken about me quite a bit recently. She was striking
and had an elegant aura about her, without appearing standoffish in the
least bit. I had heard she and Chris worked together quite a bit, and I saw
how the two of them could make quite an impression on almost anyone.
Everyone I spoke with invited me to come back and wanted to help with
my research project. I was struck by how similar this reaction was to that
of my congregation back home when we meet foreign visitors. This
friendly and welcoming atmosphere is one that seems to be lacking from
many circles in Northern Ireland. Party policies like that of the DUP,
UUP, UKUP, and to an extent Sinn Fein do not seem to work towards
inclusion, but instead exclusivity. I wonder what gains could be made,
and have been already, if this welcoming and accepting atmosphere was
extended to loyalists and the paramilitaries.
-One gentleman I spoke with said he believe that this particular
church and its members and let down the public a bit during the
Troubles, certainly before the arrival of Chris, because they had
not done more to stand up to people like Paisley who preached

exclusivity. He believe that people were so worried about coming
under attack from Paisley and his followers, that they “stayed low”
in an effort to avoid criticism being turned on them. But the very
fact people were so willing to attack people preaching something
outside what they were acclimated to may signal that policies of
inclusion may not be successful on their own, or even appropriate
in every specific situation. In the present, it seems like the
philosophy of this church is a good one, and one that many people
may be willing to examine and adopt, partially or entirely.
However, this might not have been the case three decades ago.
-Another gentleman spoke with me about he felt like the
underlying social issues that caused the Troubles were shouldered
out of the spot light of public attention by the sectarian and
nationalist issues of the Troubles. He believed that the really
battles being fought were based around subjects such as the violent
nature of man kind, socialism, working class rights, and the
distribution of resources. Instead, people were glazing over these
issues by seeing the conflict as sectarian, colonial, and in the
“best” cases identity based. Just as Chris had said, identity is
certainly the root of who we are and why we act as we do, but it
must be closely examined which the labels of national/republican
and unionist/loyalist do not accomplish.
-Chris came up to me afterwards, having personally spoken to almost
every member of the congregation before they left, and thanked me for
coming. He also informed me that he was looking forward to seeing me
again, and would do all he could to help with my project. He promised to
contact some people within loyalist paramilitaries about me speaking with
them, and was also open to me interviewing him as well. I suspect this
friendly and confident attitude is what made him so popular are accepted
by a variety of sources, from paramilitary to government based. Chris
gives off the impression of someone who is friendly, confidential, and
truly desires to accomplish those projects he undertakes.
-That evening, the entire group in Belfast went to Martyr’s Memorial Free Presbyterian
Church, the church established by Dr. Ian Paisley and also the specific location he
preaches at. It is in East Belfast on Ravenhill Road. The building is quite large, taking
up about a city block on its own and being several stories tall. It is made of red brick, has
two large box shaped sections with a smaller rectangular section connecting them, does
not have a bell tower of any sort, and is surrounded by a parking lot. On the inside, there
is a very large, vaulted cathedral area in the box section closest to Ravenhill Road. It has
enough seating for at least 1,000 people or so, and some seats are located stories above
the ground and pulpit. The pulpit itself is very large, with several terraced layers to it
made of a light colored wood and red carpet. The very top is at least 20-25 feet off the
ground and this top section is where the preaching occurs. The organ is located just to

the left of the pulpit on the ground level. On the left hand side of the pulpit is the union
jack, and on the right hand side is the flag of Ulster. On the walls around the pulpit are
several plaques commemorating those who gave their lives for Ulster and Great Britain at
various times. The entryway is made largely of marble with several offices leading off of
the main foyer area. After entering the revolving doors and passing through the foyer,
you pass through another large set of wooden doors at which point you are in a small
hallway which encompasses the main cathedral area. Here are bibles and hymn books
which you can take before entering the cathedral. Outside lighting comes in not through
stained glass, but a combination of patterns made up of frosted and etched glass.
-There were about 55-60 attending the evening service. Those individuals
in attendance were all dressed up. Men wore suits with a tie, while women
all wore skirts (of a length which went beyond their knee at least) and
fancy hats of a variety of designs and types (they reminded me of
Victorian dress hats which were worn by the middle and upper middle
classes). This dress code was also applicable to children above the age of
5 or so. There were very few exceptions to this style of dress. As a result,
our group stuck out quite a bit, mostly because the girls did not have hats
on and they were the only females not to have their heads covered. Most
of those in attendance were over the age of 55-60 with many people
appearing to be well over 70. Most of the young attendees where married
couples between the ages of 25-35 and some had children with them.
However, I was struck by the fact that there were only about 3-4 children
below the age of 18 present. Also, there were no other attendees of the
“student age” outside of our group. The children were all below the age of
12 or so, and the closest adults in age were at least 25.
-The sermon itself was relatively uneventful and pretty typical of
Protestant services I had experienced before. I noticed a large number of
similarities between this service, and services in the southern Baptist
tradition of the United States. The style of fire and brimstone preaching,
with an almost larger than life minister, combined with a large amount of
music (which even had a southern, almost African-American, vibe to it)
was all very representative of that tradition. However, there were a few
differences. First, it was clearly pointed out at many points that the gospel
used by this church was the original King James version of the bible.
They had a high level of distain for any other versions, claiming they were
trying to pervert the word of God. Second, the sermon, and in fact all
parts of the service were very long. The whole thing took well over an
hour and fifteen minutes. Third, I was a bit confused as to the content of
Dr. Paisley’s sermon. It seemed to be one more appropriate for Good
Friday as it focused solely and completely on Jesus dieing for the sins of
man, and his time on the cross. Forth, Dr. Paisley did not let me down on
the expectation I had of his preaching style. He is a large man, at least six
feet three inches tall and very broad in the shoulders. Especially given his
age (80 years old) I was taken aback by his sheer physical presence.

However, he was starting to show the signs of aging as his hair was pure
white, his skin was very wrinkled and sagging, and he also had a rather
developed slump to his shoulders. One thing that did not seem to be
suffering the effects of old age was his voice which was booming and able
to carry like few others I have ever heard. He had a microphone during
the service, but I believe he could have done just fine without it. At times
he would raise his voice to such a level that it actually cased me to sit up
and back in my sit because of its sheer force. I can see how people are
attracted to the simple physical nature of Dr. Paisley as he had an effect on
me in just the short time I experienced him.
-After the service, we were approached by a number of young adults in the
congregation. They welcomed us, asked where we were from, and what
we were doing in Belfast. Then a gentleman named Gary, who I assume
has a working relationship with the church given his knowledge about it,
access to all its areas, and access to Dr. Paisley asked if we would like to
see Dr. Paisley himself. Of course we said we would, so we were then
lead back into a small room behind the pulpit. The room was covered in
Ulster banners, photos of famous scenes in British and Ulster history, and
pictures of British and Ulster politicians and Protestant ministers.
However, the dominant aspect of the room was the large number of
pictures and portraits of Dr. Paisley. At first I found this a rather conceded
move, but as I thought about why Paisley would have chosen this style of
“decoration” I think I came to a better understanding. Dr. Paisley is a
cornerstone of this congregation. He founded it, and he himself is very
much part of its history and appeal to many members. Throughout the
evening, many members talked about Paisley in an almost mythical way,
and everyone was of the opinion that he was a great man and individual. I
suspect many of the portraits were actually gifts to him by enthusiastic
followers and were hung in this room as a sign of appreciation as well as a
move to enshrine the importance of Dr. Paisley.
-When Dr. Paisley came in, I was even more struck by his shear
physical size. He is larger than I am, in height and weight, and
must have been even larger when he was younger. He was very
kind to us, shaking each of our hands and chatting with us about
the US and our studies here in Ireland. One thing he said really
stood out for me; “I have been a leader of the opposition all my
life. I was a leader of the opposition in the Protestant faith; I was a
leader of the opposition before Stormont was first disbanded. I
was a leader of the opposition during direct rule. I was a leader of
the opposition during the restart of Stormont and I have been in the
opposition during its second suspension. Now, as it looks to
restart, I will again assume the position of a leader of the
opposition of a shadow assembly and a power sharing executive
which acknowledges and encourages criminals and terrorists!” I

thought Dr. Paisley was forgetting something in this speech. He
and the DUP were now the largest party in Northern Ireland.
Being an opposition party when you are also the majority makes
very little sense. I wonder if Paisley and the DUP have become so
entrenched in their ways and ideology of being in the opposition,
that they are struggling to find a platform on which to stand that is
based on something outside being the opposition?
-The whole meeting was no more than a few minutes, but I
was still very glad to have actually met the man I had heard
so much about. Face to face, and speaking with him, I had
conflicting feelings. I had heard from many people that in
a personal setting, and especially those that did not directly
involve politics or religion, Dr. Paisley was a very
charismatic and charming person. I certainly got that
feeling when I met him, and I could understand how he
received the support he did. However, I could not escape
the fact that I knew this was the man who had preached
hate for decades and lead opposition to initiatives and
processes which may have saved the lives of hundreds of
people. How do those who follow him so ardently look
past these facts? Is his personal character so strong that
they are able to look by the negative aspects or give them
an unwarranted positive skew? Or do we, as the outsiders
and those who do not know them man all that well, have it
wrong? Maybe, Dr. Paisley is simply very misunderstood
by many people, especially those outside Northern Ireland
and his influential circles. I doubt this, but it is still a
possibility.
-After meeting with Dr. Paisley, we were given a tour of the church. I was
struck how, from the outside the building looks quite big, but it is actually
much larger than one would expect when you enter into it. The entire
“second” building, which is attached to the church itself, is filled with
smaller cathedrals, classrooms, and meeting rooms, all of which are rather
substantial in size (the smallest we saw was about 35 feet by 40 feet). The
whole building was remarkably clean and very well decorated. I wonder
how much it cost to build this facility and where the money came from?
-During this time, we met Mrs. Paisley. She is actually an American from
South Carolina and seemed happy to meet other Americans. When she
found out we were all in school, she said she had a daughter going to Bob
Jones University in South Carolina. Bob Jones is an evangelical Christian
school which is one of the only unaccredited universities which operates
in the US. It is nationally known for its intolerance of many people,
especially homosexuals, and questionable policies in regards to women

and ethnic minorities as well. What does the daughter of the Paisley’s
attendance at this school, and Dr. Paisley’s known connection with it, say
about the ideology of the Free Presbyterian Church, its members and
leaders?
-Our time at the Martyr’s Memorial Church ended with us listening to a
short after service speech by Dr. Paisley and having tea with many
members of the congregation. Paisley was far more relaxed during his
short speech, and even spent the last few minutes telling jokes (which
were rather entertaining). Just before he departed, he said that all the
members should come and welcome the students who were visiting from
America. I suspect this was simply a suggestion on his part, but it seemed
to carry quite a bit of weight with it. Suddenly everyone in the room
flocked around us to say hello and ask polite questions about who we were
and why we were there. I overheard some members saying, “Well, now
we have to talk to them!” after Paisley made the suggestion. Why was
this? What had changed, and why did Paisley’s suggestion imply that it
was actually an order?
-We did meet Christopher Stalford, a DUP city councilor for
Belfast. He was very friendly and offered to take us on a tour of
city hall the next day. He also said he would be happy to give me
an interview, and even show me around his constituency. Mr.
Stalford was quite young (no older than his mid 30s) and I was
interested to see the “younger face” of the DUP. I also wonder if
all DUP politicians are also members of the Free Presbyterian
Church? If this is the case, it raises some concerns about the
separation of church and state in my mind. The conflict in
Northern Ireland in my mind is only slightly connected to religion
because of its ties to identity, but if in the development of Northern
Ireland politics precautions are not taken to keep church and state
separate, it could quickly morph into a religious dilemma as well.
April 24th, 2006:
-While on the Shankill today, I stopped into a chocolate and sweets shop I was told to
visit by another student’s advisor. The reason for the visit was that many considered the
women who worked in the shop to be the “gate keepers” to the Shankill area, or at least
the lower and middle portions. The shop was small (about 25 feet by 10 feet) and there
were two women, one middle aged (late 40s) and other elderly one (mid to late 60s)
working when we (Katie and I) arrived. The store was packed, ceiling to floor, with an
enormous range of candies and chocolate from around the world. There was barely room
to walk about. It was the first time anyone on the Shankill had directly asked me about
my accent outside the organizations I ha approached about my project. Both women
were interested why we were there, what we were studying and where we were from.
They seemed genuinely interested in us and when they said we were welcome, I truly felt

like I was. Whether or not these women truly do have a network within the community
which us informally “check in” with was expected or not, I was glad to have made myself
more visible and explain myself a bit. I feel that on the visibility front, I have been very
successful, but many times I do not explain who I am and why I am there, which is
understandably inhibiting my ability to be accepted
-During my cab ride back from the Shankill, I spoke with my driver who declared that he
was a Catholic Nationalist. He asked if I was vacationing and I replied that I was actually
studying. He nodded, and replied, “Trying to see what makes Northern Ireland tick other
than bombs?” When I told him that I was researching loyalism and unionism in an
attempt to decipher the variety of opinions and tactics with in those groups, he replied,
“Let me know if you every figure it out because it has always been a mystery to me!” I
thought this was a good example of how loyalists and unionists have struggled to convey
a message which is easy to understand and adopt by a variety of people, and also able to
remain relatively constant through changing political and cultural climates.
-The cab driver went on to say that the ones who confused him most were
the DUP and Ian Paisley. To him Paisley was living proof that, “certain
leopards not only can change their spots, but they become more successful
by doing so.” This was a not a positive statement, as it was made in
reference to Paisley’s support, through word and deed, of inflammatory
and even violent action on the part of unionists, and then his refusal to
work with any group that had paramilitary ties. However, he reiterated
what I had heard from a variety of people in that Paisley as a person was
different than Paisley the preacher or politician. Why this separation
between individual and ideologies/practice? The cab driver was of the
opinion that once Paisley passed away, not only would the DUP adopt a
less hard line stance, but that they would also lose community support.
Where will this community support go however? It seems unlikely a DUP
voter would vote for any nationalist party, and their support falling behind
the PUP seems unlikely as well. The UUP is the most likely candidate it
seems, so what do they plan to do with this support? With their
unwillingness to interact with the PUP, I worry the consequence will be
the UUP adopting a more exclusive stance towards other unionist parties
in an attempt to consolidate power within the unionist community, while
adopting more liberal policies towards nationalist and republican groups to
prove they are capable of moving forward where the DUP was or is not
able.
-My driver also suggested that the unionist community was fearful of the
nationalist community because the tables, in terms of population
percentage, would soon be turned. I am not certain this will happen as
quickly as my driver predicted, but signs do seem to point to a population
trend which supports the theory. “Soon, the unionist are going to be
asking for exactly what the nationalists were, and won’t that be a pickle
they are in!” He went on to describe how nationalists had not taken their

minority status sitting down, and the whole time, through a variety of
channels (violence, politics, education, etc) were preparing themselves for
when the tables did turn. According to him, now that the day was fast
approaching, unionists were becoming increasingly worried what this
meant for their future in Northern Ireland. This contradicted what Mr.
Roberts had said to me earlier, in that loyalists for the most part believed
the union to be safe, but supported his point that the nationalist community
was one that unionist should, and in fact had to work with. . He went on
to explain how not only were the population proportions changing, but so
were the socio-economic situations, especially in housing (nationalists
now out “bidding” unionists). What I worry about is how the nationalists
handle their newfound majority status when it does arrive. If they pursue
a united Ireland, or react in any sort or revenge based manner, it seems
they will encounter a large minority (a position they themselves have
occupied for some time) which simply will not accept this, and has shown
it is willing to fight and die for the cause. If more interaction on the
grounds of promoting conflict transformation and creating a shared sense
of future identity is not undertaken, I worry the result could be a return the
political and violent conflict of the Troubles. This fear is made worse by
the fact that those unionist/loyalist groups willing to engage in such
conversation (EPIC and the PUP for example) are marginalized by the
communities and parties which represent the majority of unionist voters.
-I wonder if parties such as the PUP could ever reach out to nationalists
such as my cab driver and gain their political support. If the PUP is still
determined to maintain the union with Britain, and it represents the most
progressive and “liberal” wing of unionist thought on how this should be
done, I worry the dilemma is that nationalists are equally unwilling to give
up their desire for a united Ireland. If this is true, it lands the whole
situation right back where it all started, in two political ideas that are
simply incompatible with one another and neither side satisfied until its
plan has “won”. Unless one side can sell their plan to the other, I see no
way to actually diffuse the situation, and given that the currently political
environment represents how unwilling these groups are to even interact
with one another, let alone adopt each other’s ideas, the hope of this
happening is slim at best.
-I was also troubled by what my driver said, since it seemed to echo
sentiments I had heard from other nationalists and republicans, and also
read in several sources. The general feeling espoused by these groups is
that their victory is immanent, and as such unionist/loyalists should be
prepared for the change. But I think they underestimate the strength with
which unionists of all backgrounds are opposed to a united Ireland.
Technical victory for nationalism may indeed be the outlook for the future,
but what sort of “victory” this is I think can be debated. At what cost are
nationalists willing to achieve a united Ireland, if their other requests (such

as an end to discrimination and a representative voice in politics) can be
met without a return to violent conflict?
-Christopher Stalford, a DUP city councilor I met at the Martyr’s Memorial Church on
Sunday, gave me a tour of Belfast City Hall today. During the tour, he introduced me to
the Lord Mayor of Belfast (also a DUP member) the Deputy Lord Mayor as well as a
SDLP councilor. I was struck by how light hearted these four individuals were when I
was meeting with them, given their rather differing political views and the fact that just
before, Mr. Stalford had not seemed to enthused about nationalist political attitudes. I
was also struck by his admission that the political environment of Belfast was very close
between unionists and nationalists. He referred to “how things use to be” with a tone and
manner which I could not decided signaled his wish that those times would return, or that
it presented an enormous challenge to the DUP which it would soon have to face.
April 25th, 2006:
-Today as I was waiting to meet Chris Hudson in front of QUB, I was struck by how
much of a “university town” Belfast, at least in this region, really is. I felt very much like
I was back in Madison, Wisconsin where university students make up almost 40% of the
town’s population. This feeling was in contrast to my time on the Shankill, where I was
struck by the lack of schools in the area, children in school, and sensed that much of what
I had read about the lack of adequate education facilities for these communities and the
limited use of those establishments which did exists was true. I wonder if there exist any
scholarship programs that try and interest children from disadvantaged areas around
Northern Ireland in education by taking away the cost barriers of those institutions? I
also wonder if involving ex-prisoners and paramilitary members in the education process
(as advisors, teachers, or mentors) would work to encourage kids to steer in other
directions than violence and criminal activity?
-During my taxi ride out to Stormont, I had another very interesting conversation with a
cab driver. This seems to be a come thing that many other SIT students are experiencing
as well. I think a great ISP topic could be cab drivers in Belfast and any aspect of their
lives.
-This gentleman was a man in his late 30s or early 40s who had grown up and
lived all his life in Belfast. He was from a Catholic family and considered himself
a nationalist who supported the SDLP. However, he said the majority of his
friend in the cab company where Protestants who voted for either the UUP or
DUP. More interesting though, was the fact that in elections for his district MLA
(he is from East Belfast) he always voted PUP as his second choice behind the
SDLP. He was a strong supporter of the idea that more center leaning nationalists
were missing out on gaining support from the unionist community by not giving
more direct support to those unionist groups that promoted progressive ideas. O
David Ervine he said, “I don’t know what Mr. Ervine was doing in prison, but at
some point he must have eaten a couple of dictionaries, ‘cause I barely understand
much of what he is saying. That man has more complicated and sophisticated

political ideas than many teachers or professors I know! Still, I have enormous
respect for the man, more so than many SDLP candidates. Any time the peace
process looked like it could unravel, or when Northern Ireland had its back to the
wall, Mr. Ervine was always the first to put himself in harms way to save it. I
mean shit, how many politicians do you know who are repeatedly willing to
attempt political suicide for the better of their constituents and even those that
hate them? In my mind, that means this man is genuine in what he does, and
that’s what we need.”
-My cab driver also said he believed the sectarian politics and
constitutional issues of Northern Ireland were causing other important
political issues to be ignored or inadequately addressed. He was
particularly flustered about education for his children and issues regarding
taxing. “All we ever hear about are what the parties say about the peace
process and devolution. What I want to see is less talk and more action.
Lets get our government back in the hands of people in Northern Ireland,
address the issues that are effecting us all regardless of what party we vote
for, and that whole time we can keep slowly working on the sectarian
issues ‘cause that is the only way anything is ever really going to be taken
care of.”
-He also agreed that many people voted for Sinn Fein and the DUP out of
fear. “They (Sinn Fein and the DUP) come in and scare people by saying,
‘If you for them, this will happen,’ or, ‘If you don’t vote for us, this will
happen,’ when it reality it is all a load of crap and they know it. But that is
the only way they can keep people voting for them is to scare them. Well,
I don’t buy it and that’s why I support the SDLP and PUP.”
April 27th, 2006:
-I attended the launch of a new book entitled The Orange Order: A Tradition Betrayed by
Reverend Brian Kennaway. We (SIT) had met Rev. Kennaway before during our
meeting with members of the Orange Order at Dan Winter’s cottage. During that
meeting, most people were very turned off by the Orange Order, its members, and what
they had to say. Although I do not agree with many of the sentiments and opinions held
by the Orange Order, I was not as offended as some people in our group. As a result, I
was glad to have another opportunity to examine the Order and its members.
-The launch was being held in the Library of Union Theological College, which is
located immediately behind the main building for QUB’s library. The building
was quite impressive, resembling in some aspects a toned down and smaller
version of Stormont. It has a large, slightly recessed entryway with large white
pillars on either side of the door. Once in, there is a grand staircase that branches
of in opposite directions about halfway up its length. The library itself was a
large room (about 100 feet by 75 feet) with a vaulted ceiling and was filled with a
collection of seemingly very old books (based on their appearance) which were

primarily on religion and theology. The center of this room had been cleared and
at one end, a podium with copies of the book for sale and a microphone were
placed. In the middle of the room were several display cases with various pieces
of Orange Order (OO) memorabilia, commemorative material, banners, books,
and controversial cartoons/posters.
-At its peak (shortly before David Trimble and Brian Kennaway spoke) there
were probably about 80-90 people in attendance. Most were well over 60 years
old, and I saw maybe a handful of individuals below the age of 25. There were
also only about 6-8 women I saw in attendance. Almost everyone was dressed up
in a suit and tie or dress and I noticed very few wearing the color orange or any
other item that may have distinguished them as Orange men. I recognized a few
people, including Mark Neale and the other Orange man we had met at Dan
Winter’s, as well as Roy Garland of the UUP who I was to speak with the next
day. Chris Hudson and his wife Isabella were also in attendance. I thought I
recognized other famous political figures at the launch, but simply could not place
my finger on who they were.
-David Trimble was the first to speak. He emphasized that this book spoke, “the
simply but correct truth about the Orange Order and its recent history.” He
suggested that the book singled a need for the OO, especially its senior leadership,
to take a careful look at what their institution stood for, and how it represented
those views. He also was critical of the fact that the book pointed to members
within the OO using their position within the organization to sabotage peace
efforts and misrepresent information and happenings on a variety of subjects. In
the end, Mr. Trimble (who is a member of the OO) said the OO was a proud and
respectable organization, but that it was going through a period of crisis. How it
handled itself over the next few years, he predicted, would determine how the
Order was perceived locally and internationally, as well as what the organization
stood for and supported for generations to come. “Such responsibility,” he
cautioned, “is not something to be taken lightly. This book is a wonderful
opportunity for the Orange Order to reflect long and hard about the principles and
practices which it stands for.”
-Mr. Trimble’s speech was met with much applause and seemed very well
received by those assembled. I thought that Mr. Trimble’s speech, the
book, and the dilemma the OO is face are very representative of the trials
and tribulations many groups and individuals are being forced to confront
throughout Northern Ireland. As a society, culture, region and country in
change, NI is filled with people trying to reassess and acclimate to the
ever-changing space in which they live. Without a doubt, this must be a
difficult task, and much of the conflict, trouble, and disagreement we see
is likely a result of that difficulty. Open conflict is seldom simple or
straight forward, but I believe that often times the period following the
cease of open conflict can be far more complex and diverse not only in
tactics and politics, but those who are getting involved and why.

-Rev. Kennaway spoke next. Primarily, his speech focused on thanking
the numerous people who had helped him write the book. However, he
did make clear that, “This book is not one which condemns the Orange
Order. In fact, it is one that I hope champions and illuminates the
honorable traditions and values this organization was founded on.
However, in that spirit, it does point to recent troubles and difficulties the
Order has come across, which have resulted, in my opinion, with the
leadership and certain members losing sight of those ideals. This is a book
meant to promote dialogue and reflection in an organization which I am
proud to call my self a member, and I hope to continue to do so.” He went
on to say something else I found very interesting, “The Orange Order must
decide if it is an institution based on faith with a political element, or a
political institution with an element of faith. I believe the Orange Order to
be an organization based on faith, not one based on a particular culture.”
-The way I had always had the Orange Order explained to me was
that it was an organization centered around the preservation of a
lifestyle and culture. Here was a member of the OO calling for it
to return strictly to its faith-based roots. It has always seemed to
me that the OO and its activities are more about supporting and
asserting a culture and tradition, rather than a religion. Would a
return to faith be beneficial for the OO in terms of its position in
the conflict? How would it retain its membership, since many
consider it a cultural protector and icon? Regardless, I think the
OO and its struggles are a perfect example of how it can be hard to
maintain institutions within the ideologies with which they were
established given the changing and complex nature of history.
-Katie and I went out for dinner and a drink after the book launch and come across
Northern Ireland’s imitation of American culture. We ate at a restaurant called Tony
Roma’s which was styled after an American BBQ rib establishment. They were playing
old American sit-coms on the television, playing swing music, and had pictures of
American pop icons all around the walls. The palace was filled, and very busy the whole
time we were eating. I wonder what the draw of such an establishment is? The food was
not bad, but it certainly could not have been the reason for Tony Roma’s popularity.
Belfast to me seems like a city with enough of its own history and culture, along with a
variety of ethnic flavors, that it should not be so enamored with American pop culture.
Maybe I am biased however, having grown up in that environment all my life. Still, it is
strange to be an American abroad, but never really escape my home culture and country.
April 28th, 2006:
-During my interview with the UUP at its Sandy Row office, I was struck by something
that I had actually noticed at all the political offices I visited in Belfast. They really do
appear to be open environments, which are very accessible to the public. People appear to

drop in on a fairly regular basis, without any appointment and often to bring up very
personal or small matters like blocked drainage ditches and noisy neighbors. At every
office I have visited, at least one person has come in while I was there, and numerous
phone calls have come through. In my limited experience with political offices in the
US, this is not how it works. Meetings are all by appointment, which usually take weeks
if not months to schedule, and are certainly not about issues like noisy neighbors. It is
very interesting to see how democracy and representative government work in a situation
where there is a more equal representative to constituent ratio. I imagine this situation is
also assisted by Stormont being suspended, allowing representatives to spend more time
with their constituents. However, I wonder what this is teaching them about “small”
politics and their importance to people opposed to “large” issues like the constitutional
status of Northern Ireland? Also, I wonder if there are any clashes between city
councilors and Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) treading on one another’s
political “territory”? What will happen to this availability when Stormont reactivates?
-I attended a meeting this evening at All Souls Church in Belfast. Henry McDonald was
reading excerpts of his latest book Colours which is about his experience growing up in
Belfast and how his political and social ideologies have changed and why. Mr.
McDonald is a well known author and journalist on the conflict in Northern Ireland and
security issues around the world. Mr. McDonald was a personal friend of Chris Hudson
and they had worked together with loyalist paramilitaries before. The meeting was
attended by about 25-30 people, all of whom were over 55 years old. I was the only
student and person below that age present. Afterwards there was wine and crackers
served, and the vast majority of those present stayed to chat and continue discussing what
had been said.
-Chris obviously has a very high opinion of Henry. Henry approached him for an
interview about his work with loyalist paramilitaries when times were particularly
tense and difficult. Chris said he was hesitant, but heard good things about Henry
and decided to risk it. In his words, “Henry handled interviewing me
impeccably.” They have been friends ever since and have done quite a bit of
work together in various fields.
-Henry had some great quotes, both from his book and during the question
and answer session that followed.
-“Belfast is the last city in Europe that carries the dubious
distinction of being walled, and not in a historical sense.”
-“The nationalist/republican community have only seen one side,
the negative one, of what being British means.”
-“Truth and personal liberties are the corner stones of successful
society.”
-“My Uncle John once said, ‘Imagine if kids see that (a peace
wall). It would be seared in their wee minds forever.’”

-“There is a draw and allure of sectarianism, especially for youth,
because of the desire to be part of the ‘in’ crowd, or just a member
of a group. In Northern Ireland, this draw is added to by the
excitement of the potential danger that comes along with sectarian
feuding.”
-“Northern Ireland has been the stage for personal tragedy
colliding with momentous world events.”
-Being able to meet the man who I had read so extensively in preparing for
my ISP, hear his background and its effects on him, listen to stories from
his career, and speak with him personally added a new dimension to what
I had read. I suppose this is the case with most such situations, and one of
the great values on field study based learning. By making the connection
personal, and examining things in context of the larger situation, person,
community, region, etc you come to a new and more knowledgeable
understanding.
-Henry was born and raised in Belfast. He was from a Catholic
family which had a nationalist tradition to its politics. He was a
Marxist-Leninist for some time in his late teens, but eventually
swore off that political ideology along with his Catholic faith. He
was a member of a punk rock band for some years in his yearly
adulthood before turning towards journalism. He has been a
broadcaster for the BBC as well as a writer for several major
newspapers in Ireland, England, and the world over at one time or
another. Currently, he is the Irish editor of the Observer. He is
also widely published as an author on Northern Ireland and
especially the loyalist paramilitaries.
-The reaction of the audience to Henry was mixed, but over all very
positive.
-Two Catholic women who had grown up in Northern Ireland and
had both experience personal trauma and suffering during the
Trouble were very indignant at his estimation of unionist political
strategies, and especially the credit he gave David Trimble for his
role in the peace process. They believed Henry was too critical of
the nationalist side, and did not demand enough of the same
criticism of the unionist side. They were especially angered when
he suggested that there were many good things about being British.
I wonder how representative these women were of the nationalist
community. To me, it seems that both nationalists and unionists
have a difficult time articulating and communicating their positions
and identities, especially to the other side, in a way which makes

sense and can be respected. These women were not open at all to
Henry and Chris’ suggestions that self examination and criticism
of nationalism (or unionism such as the work of Rev. Kennaway in
his book) from with in was not only health for ensuring the
movement stayed in touch with what was important to its
members, but also in showing the other side that they could be
worked with and were flexible. I suspect you would find similar
sentiments on both sides in unionism, but which ones are dominate
and prevailing?
-Another couple spoke up to say that as working class Protestants
they had never really felt represented by any political party in
Northern Ireland. This put them in a frustrating and difficult
position, as it left them no one to vote for, and even when parties
like the Alliance Party came close to their values, their power was
overshadowed by the sectarian divides written into the government
structure. I would have liked to ask them why they did not vote for
the PUP? I imagine it had to do with the fact that they are either
not unionists in the sense of wanted to preserve the union, or that
they did not agree with the PUP’s ties to the paramilitaries, or both.
If it is the latter, I think it is representative of a large pool of
potential voters which are almost within reach of the PUP, but held
at bay because of the paramilitary issue. How can they erase this
unease and gain those working class Protestant votes with their
socialist and democratic policies?
-I spoke with another elderly (late 70s) gentleman named Harry.
Harry was from Portadown, had grown up there, and raised his
own family there as well. He was a strong proponent of integrated
education, having sent his youngest child to an integrated school.
In his opinion, this was the best way to end the sectarian mindset
that plagued many in NI. To him, the rest of the family had
become integrated through his daughter’s experience and
friendships. I thought this was in a way a solution to David
Ervine’s question, “Why do people hate people they do not
know?” The question still stands, but through education people get
to know the “other” of their society and nullify the hate which
accompanies the unknown in many situations. However, I wonder
if this in and of itself is a complete solution. One of the Shoukris
brothers (notorious criminals within the UDA who are currently
under pressure from within the organization to stand down)
attended integrated school and obviously is still filled with hatred.
But maybe his hatred is more indiscriminate than that which
typically accompanies the Troubles of NI.

-According to Harry, paramilitary organizations were now
nothing more than organized crime syndicates. “Any
political ideology they might have had is gone now. The
people who are involved have become accustomed to a
criminal lifestyle and the financial benefits of being a
godfather. They don’t want to lose that, so they hide crime
behind a political veneer.”
April 29th, 2006:
-I paid a visit to the Sandy Row Loyal Orange Lodge (LOL) today on the invitation of
Mr. Christopher Stalford, a DUP city councilor I had met at the Martyr’s Memorial Free
Presbyterian Church. Mr. Stalford is a member of the LOL and often uses the space as an
office for meeting with his constituents in the area, of whom many are also members of
the LOL. The building is located on Sandy Row, close to where it connects with Lisburn
Road. It is a large, three story red brick building, which was then in the process of
having a new roof put on it. Inside, I was greeted by a Belgium brass band which was
using a meeting room to practice for an upcoming brass band contest. Chris was in a
meeting room which was adorn with pictures of LOL members and historic moments in
Ulster’s history like Carson in 1912 and the Battle of the Somme in 1916. In the corners
were the infamous orange collarets and bowlers caps. Another member of the LOL was
counting and organizing a large pile of coins on one end of a rectangular oak boardroom
table. I was never formally introduced to this man, but he was obviously a fixture of the
LOL, being in his late 60s and proud of his membership since boyhood. I also had the
impression that he was a leader within this LOL because of the way in which Chris
interacted with him and how involved he was with a number of the activities the Lodge
was engaged in. He gave me a tour of the LOL and a history of the OO in general, as
well as a slightly questionable history of the USA. During the tour, I was struck not only
by what he was saying, but the Lodge itself. It really did feel very much like a fraternity
back at my home institution in Beloit. There were men, mostly in their 40s and 50s,
hanging about a small bar area which was located within the Lodge, and well as working
on a variety of repair projects. There were lounge-like spaces, clearly designed so that
men could gather, be social, and play games like snooker and darts. I was also shown a
number of the Lodge’s banners, al of which were based on historical achievement by OO
members, or biblical passages. I saw no controversial banners related to the Troubles in
Northern Ireland. What I did not see was any area directly related to religious worship. I
wonder if Brian Kennaway, and his claim that the OO is and should be a religiously
centered organization is not a bit out of touch with what these Lodges have become.
-This gentleman was very keen on impressing on me that history was not always
as simple as it was made out to be.
-“The Orange Order has been a target of the Republican terror campaign,
especially since the early 1990s. Yet we are made out to be the oppressors
and bad guys because of our parades.”

-“The USA has an enormous number of connections to Ulster. The
American Revolution was a continuation of the Williamite Revolution.
Eleven of the USA’s presidents were of Ulster Scotch background.”
-It seemed this man had a hard time associating the
American Revolution with the OO, as the American
Revolution was all about throwing out the very grown, and
destroying the very union that the OO is so faithful to.
“The crown and the Queen are good figure heads…good
symbols of the British people. They shouldn’t be in charge,
but they aren’t so I don’t understand what the problem is.
A constitutional monarchy is a fine political system in my
eyes.”
-“King William never rode a white horse. The paintings of him on a white
horse were done because it was a symbol of the royal family at that time.”
-“The drums that the Orange Order are so well known for were actually
Roman Catholic instruments. In fact, they were used by King William’s
own personal bodyguards, The Royal Dutchmen, who were all Roman
Catholics themselves. Now, right here on Sandy Row, there is the largest
maker of drums which are used by Roman Catholics and the Orange Order
alike.”
-“People always want to point to any anti-Catholic aspect of the history of
the Orange Order, but they never give credit to those positive interactions
which did, and still do, take place.”
-I am not certain how true what he said was, but I do feel that he truly and
honestly believed it. The conviction with which he spoke was apparent,
and he seemed determined to show another side of the story to an outsider.
-This same man also made other statements which I believe are worth
quoting. They need no explanations, but I believe add to the context of
my time at the LOL, and the basis of some of the opinions I found there.
-“Nobody is going to make me be friends with anybody, and that is
exactly what the Good Friday Agreement is trying to do. I have
Roman Catholic friends of my own who I respect and like quite a
bit. But no one is going to force me to be friends with anyone else
outside my wishes to do so.”
-“The amount of money the government throws at things like the
paramilitaries is disgraceful. This whole welfare state mentality
detracts from the work ethic which people in Ulster have always
been known for and proud of. That money should be spent

attracting business and getting people the opportunity to work for a
living.”
-“Belfast use to be a city which ran itself through business and
industry. The government kept its hands off and everything was
better off for it. Now, the government is taxing everything and
there is nothing to show for it. The businesses always reinvested
in the community. Now the government is ruining everything they
get their hands on.”
-“The most important majority is the majority of one.”
-“I think the United States will break up in the near future. With
all the Mexicans in the country now I think it is inevitable. All
those wetbacks will change the whole country.”
-“Reverend Kennaway is not a popular guy within the Order at the
moment. In fact, he is in a lot of trouble because of that book he
wrote.”
May 5th, 2006:
-Today I had the opportunity to witness a parade commemorating the 90th anniversary of
the UVF’s involvement in the Battle of the Somme in World War One. I discovered that
the event was happening in an advertisement in the UVF connected magazine Combat
which I received on the Shankill Road a few days earlier.
-The parade started from four locations around Belfast representing the Protestant
communities in those areas. They were: Shankill Road, Sandy Row, Grove Tavern in
North Belfast and Albertbridge Road in East Belfast. These four separate parades would
begin simultaneously at 7PM and converge on the city center, where they would merge
and march around the City Hall building.
-As we traveled towards the Shankill, we were somewhat worried that we did not see
more obvious signs that a parade was to be taking place. When we first walked onto
Sandy Row, there were no visible bands or marchers and a PSNI presence of two officers
dressed in standard uniform who were doing nothing to direct traffic. However, within
minutes, bands began to appear from the surrounding residential areas. I was struck by
how the band members appeared to be dressed in traditional army band uniforms of a
WWI style with the exception that they had Ulster Freedom Fighter (UFF) patches
prominently displayed on their sleeves and shoulders.
-As far as I know, the UFF is a legally prohibited organization, so I wonder how
and why this band could so brashly wear the patches of that organization. Does
UFF stand for something outside its paramilitary connection much like the first

UVF, and its role in WWI are much different than the paramilitary UVF of the
Troubles?
-As we continued walking, we saw more and more people lining the streets. However,
the age range was much younger than I had expected. Most people appeared to be in
their teens or early twenties, and very few were older than their fifties or so. There were
also a number of families with small children who had come out to watch the event.
-As we approached the Shankill and the parade began, the PSNI presence became much
stronger, with at least several dozen armored Land Rovers out and about one hundred
officers I saw dispersed around the area. There were also at least a dozen PSNI officers
on motorcycles working to block traffic and escort the parade as it moved. In addition,
there were two helicopters in the sky, one appearing to be a news chopper and the other a
police chopper (due to their markings).
-Each band was also accompanied by at least two uniformed parade marshals who
appeared to be in constant communication with the PSNI organizing how and
where the parade would go. The marshals themselves appeared to be from the
same communities the bands were, given their interactions with the members and
audiences and appearances (especially dress) as well. What does this says about
the supposedly more “problematic areas” of Shankill and Sandy Row when they
are so willing to openly work with the police to conduct the event when more
“respectable” organizations like the Orange Order refuse to work with the PSNI
or Parades Commission?
-In total there were about three dozen different bands. Each was similarly comprised of a
lead element of flag bearers who carried the union jack, UVF flags, and the flag of Ulster
(some with wreaths of poppies as well) followed by a small number of boys who were
twirling and throwing batons. Behind this lead element was the band which most
generally was comprised of several snare drums, one large bass drum, and twenty to
thirty flutes or fifes. Almost all the bands were exclusively male with members ranging
in age from about 15 to 50 years of age. However, there were bands which included
females, boys and girls as young as about 5 or 6, and men as old as their late 70s and 80s.
Each band had a unique uniform, but they all resembled some form of British military
garb from the early part of the 1900s.
-I thought it was very interesting that I saw a number of band members with UVF
and paramilitary tattoos, but there was no direct reference to the paramilitary UVF
anywhere in the formal festivities. Also, there was no counter demonstration I
witnessed from any group, let alone Republicans. What does this say about this
commemoration in particular and the general tolerance of Belfast to such events?
I suspect such a parade would have been fiercely contested back during the height
of the Troubles, if it had even been allowed at all. Has the more subdued nature
of Belfast caused this celebration to tone down, or did the toning down of the
event cause tension to subside, or some combination there of?

-The music which was played is difficult for me to describe as anything other than
military marching music especially classic of the 1800s in America and Great Britain. It
focused on choruses by the flutes and heavy percussion interludes, especially at the
beginning and end of the piece. I imagine this is very classical of the “blood and
thunder” bands we have read so much about as it really did sound like thunder when the
drums were all playing. In fact, the base drum, which was always played by some
enormous man, was usually played so hard that its sides began to cave in and a second
drummer had to walk along side the drum, waiting his turn to relieve the current player.
-Had I not been an outsider in this town, I can definitely see how this event could
have struck fear into people who found it an act of intimidation. However, to me
it was quite exhilarating and entertaining and the crowds who were watching
seemed to share this feeling. However, I wonder how much of this was patriotic
pride and how much was a celebration of identity and full fledged attack at those
not part of, or not sharing in, that identity?

-Following each band along the sides of the road were what appeared to be local
supporters and family members of the band. These groups followed their specific bands
from their starting point through the entire parade route until the very end when the band
disbanded. Most of these groups were primarily made up of young women between the
ages of 14 and 30 who appeared to be the girlfriends of many band members. These
groups cheered on the bands, waved flags (which could be purchased from a number of
street vendors selling UVF flags and union jacks) and generally seemed to be celebrating
the event much like those who attend parades in the United States do.
-However, I did notice that an enormous number of people, especially the young
girls, were incredibly drunk. Often it was to the point that they could not walk
straight or even fell over in the street. I saw no police action about this
intoxication although I am quite certain that a number of those I saw were
underage and several of the area were designated as alcohol free zones. What
does this say about the drinking culture of the communities taking part and also
the role of the police in controlling (and being willing to do so) such events?
-The entire event went on for well over two hours, with the bands making several laps
around the city hall building before marching back to where they had come from. All in
all the organization of the event appeared to be very good, there was no open violence or
intimidation that I saw, relations between the bands, parade marshals, crowds and police
seemed very good and eve amicable, and the even seemed to be a big hit for many
residents of the city.
May 6th, 2006:
-I had an interview today with some of the command staff of the UVF. It was arranged
by Chris Hudson and given the exclusive and secret nature of those individuals I met with
and the manner in which it occurred, it was definitely a defining and eye opening moment

in my entire SIT experience. It was a look into the world and minds of a group I (and
most others) had never had a first hand introduction to.
-Unfortunately, due to the fact this meeting was so unique in content and context, and on
the request of those involved, I am unable to write about much of what happened for
reasons of respect and confidentiality. The reader should examine the corresponding
write up of my interview for more of an idea on what was said and the reasons for this
limited account.
-During my cab ride back from the meeting, I spoke with my driver who was a former
British Army soldier who had done a three year tour of duty in Northern Ireland in
Belfast. In fact, he had been stationed at a barracks that had been located directly across
the street from our accommodations at Queen’s. When I asked him about what it was
like to be a member of the security forces, he had some unexpected things to say.
-“It really wasn’t that bad. I was personally involved in two bomb explosions,
one while I was at the base, and another while I was on patrol. It kept you on
your toes and made life exciting, so it wasn’t all that bad. Besides, the drinking
and craic were good so they kept your mind off of it all.”
-I wonder how many people have this feeling about the Troubles? Most of
those I have met feel strongly that it was a terrible time and an overall
negative experience. I also wonder that if this man had personally lost
family or friends to the Troubles whether his attitude would have been so
care free? It struck me as well that this attitude might be a coping
mechanism from some in dealing with what they saw and experienced.
-“Belfast has changed a lot over the last 15 years, and I think most of it is
for the better. Its more peaceful now and people can live normal lives.”

Appendix B:
Note: The information below does not necessarily encompass the entirety of what
was said and discussed during a given interview. In some cases, I have recounted to
the best of my ability and memory what was said by an individual and thus it is not
verbatim. If I have drastically misquoted any one, or misunderstood what they
were saying, please accept my sincere apologies.
April 24th, 2006: Interview with Mr. Tom Roberts of Ex-Prisoner Interpretative
Center (EPIC).
Biography of Mr. Roberts:
-Former life sentence prisoner who served 13 years from 1980-1993 for a
conviction he received while a member of the UVF.

-Joined the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) for personal, and not political or
religious reasons. Several friends he had grown up with who had subsequently
joined the security forces were injured or killed. The politics of the Troubles
would factor into his thinking later, but not when he initially joined.
-His family did not support his decision to join the UVF because of its illegal
status. This caused a major rift between him and his family. However, he
describes his family as more radical in ideology than he was or has been.
-Joined EPIC in 1996 as an information officer and has since progressed to
become director of the organization.
Background of EPIC:
-A group of ex-prisoners and Quakers who were concerned about the
reintegration and social issues of ex-prisoners and their families formed EPIC in
1991.
-EPIC focuses specifically on Loyalist ex-prisoners, but was formed in tandem
with groups who work with Republican ex-prisoners.
-The work of EPIC has changed notably since the signing of the Belfast
Agreement. Originally, its focus lay mostly in helping to facilitate the rights of
prisoners (before and after their release), and then helping them to reintegrate
back into the community upon release. After the initial influx of prisoners
released after the Belfast Agreement, the group’s work changed to helping
maintain and consolidate the peace and provide social services for prisoners and
other community members alike.
-Some areas that EPIC is involved in include: welfare rights, housing, state
benefits, employment (which is important as many jobs in Northern Ireland (NI)
are public sector, and a criminal record prevents many ex-prisoners for accessing
them), community transport, loyalist political and community initiatives, and
research efforts on a variety of loyalist issues.
-EPIC is involved with cross community work with similar Republican groups.
However, these relationships have taken a hit in recent years due to questionable
activities regard espionage on behalf of the Republican movement. However, the
ties still exist and are frequently used.
-EPIC is also directly associated with several other loyalist community groups in
the Shankill region. They include Alternatives (a group directly commissioned by
EPIC to investigate alternatives to punishment beatings by loyalists), and the
West Belfast Cultural and Community Center (which is run by and employs many
ex-prisoners and does a large amount with youth and athletics in the community).

EPIC has also worked directly with the PUP, University of Ulster, and Queen’s
University Belfast on a variety of political, academic, and community initiatives.
-EPIC was founded by loyalists (especially ex-prisoners) for loyalists, because
state agencies were inadequate and unsatisfactory in the services they provided
and how they were presented. Those that existed forced ex-prisoners who used
them to admit, even if indirectly, their criminal status. This was unacceptable for
many loyalists. Thus, EPIC offered a place that ex-prisoners could trust and rely
on to adequate assist them in a variety of areas.
On the political status of prisoners/combatants:
-Currently, ex-prisoners have only a criminal record, with no mention or category
of the political nature of their crime.
-“The biggest proponents of this policy are other Unionists in the
Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), and
the United Kingdom Unionist Party (UKUP). Unlike in the Republican
community, Loyalists do not have the political representation, or
community support in some cases, to fight this label. The closest thing we
have is the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) which is a relatively small
and minor party in the politics of NI.”
-The lack of political status also means that ex-prisoners are not entitled, in many
cases, to compensation from the state in the event of a fire, case of vandalism, or
other act which can, rightly or wrongly, be seen as connected to their previous
combatant status.
-“Who would want to entire into a new business venture with an exprisoner if by doing so potentially endangered the success of the business,
along with restricting access to funding and compensation? This knocks
out another area (self-employment) where ex-prisoners may be able to
support themselves and their families.”
On criminality within paramilitaries:
-Mr. Roberts could only speak indirectly for the UVF, but believed it was widely
known and accepted that criminal elements now existed within all paramilitary
organizations.
-“The paramilitaries are still very political at the core and for the most
part, but there are now offshoots of criminality attached to them as well.”
-“No one is saying the criminality is acceptable, but I think that it can be
understandable in some cases. If society and the state already label these
individuals (ex-combatants and prisoners) are criminals, and if this label prevents
many from finding employment and the means to provide for themselves and their
families, or adequately do so, it isn’t hard it imagine how some might turn to
criminal activity using the training and structures they gained access to in the
paramilitaries.”

-“Anyone one who joined a paramilitary organization after the ceasefires of 1994
and the Good Friday Agreement (GFA) of 1998 should have their motivation in
doing so closely scrutinized.”
-Paramilitaries, by their nature, lead themselves to criminality so avoiding this
requires careful monitoring of groups objectives and means, as well as
membership and promoted ideologies.
On current activities of the UVF:
-“The current focus for the UVF is changing the organization from one with a
military focus, to one with a political focus. Unlike many Unionists, most
members of the UVF are fairly confident the IRA is abandoning its campaign of
violence. This is not to say they are disarming, because that has never been a
demand of the UVF. As David Ervine once said, ‘Rust is the best method of
decommissioning.’ The UVF was formed because the IRA embarked on a
campaign of violence against the loyalist community, and such a paramilitary
response was deemed the only thing which could stop it. If the IRA has given up
this violent campaign, the need for a militant UVF disappears. The progression
from a military focus to a political one has been ongoing over many years, and
can be seen in the development of the PUP and the statements and policies of the
UVF leadership.”
On other Unionist groups:
-“Mid-Unionists (the DUP and UUP primarily) are hypocrites and have
abandoned, sold out and turned against the very Loyalists they formally
encouraged and supported.”
-Mid-Unionists were the first to use rhetoric about conflict being inevitable and
promoting violent means to defend the union against Nationalists and
Republicans. People like Ian Paisley relied on the existence of paramilitary
groups to make good on his “you talk to me or you deal with them” stance. When
the paramilitaries became more progressive, and more intent on seeking peace and
conflict transformation, it threatened the primacy of these parties in Unionist
politics. As a result, they turned on loyalists and set out to vilify them in the
public eye. Nationalists and Republicans naturally found it hard to trust Loyalists,
so Loyalists relied on Unionists to support them, and when this support base was
stripped from them, the mentality developed that they were being abandoned and
ostracized by all sides.
-“Especially the DUP, but other Unionists as well, utilizes fear voting to gain its
support. They realize if they scare people enough, they can gain their support. If
they want to practice politics in such a manner that it frightens people and makes
their situation worse, that is their choice; but I prefer politics that try and gain
support by making people hopeful and committed to changing a given situation in
ways which will benefit everyone involved.”

-“The DUP and other Unionists were, and to an extent still are, willing to
slaughter and discriminate within the law, but not outside it. Thus they shun the
paramilitaries and do their best to demonize them in ways which are not fair or
accurate. I believe this was a similar mentality to that of my family when they
supported my brother joining the B-Specials, but had serious problems with me
joining the UVF.”
On what he would like to see done by the government in relationship to ex-prisoners and
the loyalist community:
-“I would like to see the removal of all legislation that inhibits ex-prisoners for
being able to live their lives like normal citizens. The result will be sweeping
benefits not only for those individuals, but their families and communities as
well.”
April 24th, 2006: Interview with Chris Hudson
Biography:
-Grew up in the Republic of Ireland (ROI) in a Catholic family whose political
views could be described as nationalist/republican. He was a practicing Catholic
until he was about 14-15 when he lost some of his faith.
-Mr. Hudson’s first real job was as a women’s hairdresser in Britain. For a time
while he was in Britain he was a member of the British Communist Party.
Describes himself as being very left thinking and leaning at that point.
-When he returned to the ROI his political ideology was changed drastically from
when he had left. He joined the Democratic Socialist Party, which had influence
and contact with the Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA), and began working
on the peace process as well as worker’s rights and trade unions. He became a
trade union organizer in 1988. It was his work within labor disputes that he
credits as giving him the ability to work with the government of the ROI and the
loyalist paramilitaries.
-“I quickly lost the naïve idea that forcing a united Ireland was an
acceptable or practical political ideology.”
-“However difficult and seemingly impossible to reconcile the conflict in
Northern Ireland may appear, I can promise you there are and have been
more complex and irreconcilable problems in labor disputes. Those
disputes have eventually been transformed and/or resolved, so I honestly
believe the same can be done in Northern Ireland.”
-“ I am not a peace worker or a politician; I am a negotiator and that is
how I have always tried to approach what I do. My role in Northern
Ireland has been to help explain the actions and opinions of the ROI to the
loyalist paramilitaries and vice versa in ways which help the groups

correctly understand one another. My job hasn’t been to create positions,
or draw up policy, but try and show that everyone acts with multiple
intentions and “faces”. If I am successful, people can see that their
positions are not so far apart or irreconcilable.”
-“I like to think of myself as a good communicator and hairdresser, that’s
all.”
-In 1988, Chris was a leader in the Peace Train Movement. The idea was to
promote the democratic right of people to be able to travel between Northern
Ireland and the ROI, and indeed, anywhere in the world. The idea was to bring
negative press and public scrutiny to the IRA’s campaign of bombing the rail line
between Belfast and Dublin. This was accomplished by loading a train full of
people and riding it from Dublin to Belfast and back again. If the train was
stopped, or the rail line damaged, they would remain on the train until it was fixed
and they were able to proceed. The movement was also set to the background of
the Berlin Wall coming down and the collapse of the Soviet Union which had
created similar dispute over the movement of people. Thus, the Peace Train
Movement picked up momentum and received international press, none of which
was expected by its organizers. It also received a very large amount of support
from workers’ movements all over the island of Ireland, as well as liberal minded
people from a wide variety of backgrounds and political ideologies.
-“When people got on the train, we told them to leave their politics at the
door and we really meant it. There was nothing more political about this
than everyone on the train believing it was the right of the people to be
able to travel freely and without fear. I imagine we had Republicans and
Loyalists sitting side by side for days on end as we waited on the train
(because of a bomb scare) without either one knowing the other’s political
views on Northern Ireland. These were people who were suppose to have
nothing in common but obviously they did.”
-Chris first came in contact with loyalist paramilitaries when he met and began
political debates with David Ervine of the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP). Mr.
Ervine and Mr. Hudson agreed that they would take this debate to the Ulster
Volunteer Force (UVF), which Mr. Ervine had been a former member and still
had contacts with, for the sake of giving its members a medium through which
they could challenge and strengthen their ideals and arguments. Chris was well
received by the group and was asked to return on multiple occasions. When the
ROI was looking to make contact with the UVF, that group declared they would
speak to and through Chris Hudson. From that point on, Chris became the main
contact between the government of the ROI and the UVF.
-“When I walked into the first meeting with the UVF, I admit I was
scared. I knew these guys could be dangerous and that I was putting
myself in a potentially bad situation. However, I felt like I had to give it a
try, and if nothing else I could say I had done that. When I came back out,
I said to David, ‘I hope they don’t think I am just some liberal peace-

knik,’ to which he replied, “I really don’t think they do.’ After that, things
just kept progressing and I had more contact with the group. I think I
began to understand them and they began to understand me, and as that
happened, we found our contact mutually beneficial on a number of
levels.”
-Especially through the early 1990s, and especially 1994, Chris Hudson is
credited with being very influential in securing the Combined Loyalist Military
Command (CLMC) ceasefire through his work with the UVF. He is also credited
with saving hundreds of lives throughout the 1990s as loyalist groups struggled to
develop, implement, and maintain their ceasefire by convincing them to maintain
the peace, and not resort to violence even when provoked.
-“I have heard that some say I saved hundreds of people’s lives. I am not
sure how true this is, but to be honest, it doesn’t affect the way I look at
what I did. I was trying to take a violent and destructive situation and turn it
into something that everyone could be satisfied with and benefit from. If I
saved lives along the way, I am terribly happy to have done so, but that
wasn’t my specific intention when I entered into my work with the
loyalists.”
-“Chris would probably never admit this, but I can tell you personally that
he is responsible for saving many people’s lives. Whether that is what he
set out to do, or a by-product of his work makes no difference, he deserves
credit for it and should be proud of that accomplishment.” David Ervine

On the IRA:
-“The IRA’s strategy was to make Northern Ireland (NI) unworkable and
ungovernable for the British. A big part of this was provoking the British into
overacting to IRA actions and thus soil their image locally, nationally, and
internationally.”
-“The IRA made the decision to return to war in 1996. This was a decision they
consciously made; no one forced them to do it. I think the fact that the loyalists
paramilitaries attempted, and largely succeeded, in holding their ceasefire is a
testament to their devotion to the peace process.”
On peace work and peace activists:
-“There are more egos in peace movements than the paramilitaries in Northern
Ireland.”
-“Peace makers have to be the protagonists, not any of the parties involved. If
one party is seen as the protagonists, it sets the whole process up to fail, as it is
seldom acknowledging the complexity of the situation, and puts other groups on
the defensive as well as excludes them.”

-“Peace work has to be symbolic and substantive. It must deal with what is
actually going on, the reality of the situation, and how to make the violence stop;
not just whether the violence should have taken place to being with.”
-“People have to be realistic when it comes to peace work. This doesn’t mean
that we can’t dream and be hopeful, but it does mean we have to be willing to
accept that our dreams are not as close, and sometimes not as practical, as we may
like them to be. I don’t want any utopian dreamers knocking on my door unless
they are first willing to deal with the situation at hand. Resolving what is at hand
is the only way we can ever hope to make the dreams anything more than
dreams.”
On violence and politics:
-“Once violence the violence started, the politics couldn’t work. Political things
could and were still happening, but violence added a whole other dimension
which caused political progress to be stunted and derailed in many cases.”
-“The Good Friday Agreement (GFA), if nothing else, stopped the violence. It
allowed the politics another chance to work without the background of violence
further complicating the situation.”
-“With all its imperfections and short comings, politics in the form of democracy
works and is the best system. It isn’t perfect, but no system I know of is, and the
politics of democracy allows for mistakes and corrections which is hugely
important for maintaining peace.”
On his work:
-“I was not engaged with the UVF to promote non-violence, but to get them to set
goals, establish their bottom line, and see what they were and were not willing to
compromise.”
-“My job was to establish trust with both groups (UVF and the ROI) so that they
knew each other’s intentions and bottom lines. This trust and understand is what
was deeply lacking between the two groups.”
-“I had to be very careful not to overstate what was happening. I had to be very
certain I knew exactly what each group was telling me and not distort that
intention when I was relaying it.”
-“Some people have suggested that I could have forced the UVF to take more
action more quickly but I disagree completely. I would have broken any trust I
had with the UVF if I had forced them in any direction through any means.
Besides, I wasn’t there to force them into anything (even if it could have worked,
which I highly doubt). What ever steps they took, they had to take on their own
accord.”

-“A big part of what I did was to help show both the ROI and the UVF that their
actions and words often carried multiple meanings. I got them to understand that
just as they were under pressure from their supporters to tow the mantras ‘not an
inch’ ‘no surrender’ and other ideologies not conducive to negotiation, so too was
the other side. Once they understood they were under the same pressures, they
began to see the subtitle changes in policy and action on the part of the other
party, even when much of what was taking place seemed to mirror what had
happened before.”
On what the loyalist paramilitaries want:
-“The loyalists wanted three major things out of the ROI. First, they wanted to be
included in the peace process. They knew the IRA, the ROI and Britain were
talking and they did not like being left out. Second, they did not want the ROI to
put Britain too much on the subject of Northern Ireland, particularly on that of the
status of the union. They were concerned that ROI pressure on Britain could give
an unfair and unrepresentative advantage to those calling for a united Ireland.
Third, they wanted a show of respect on the part of the ROI for the union between
NI and Britain. It was hard for them to trust a government whose constitution did
not acknowledge their right to exist and staked claim to them and their land.”
-“Joint authority in NI puts in question the union. If it is going to work and have
the support of much of the loyalist community, it has to be made clear that the
union is still intact and secure for the influence of the ROI.”
-“The loyalist paramilitaries would not, could not, will not and should not be
pushed forward. When they were/are ready, had/have the support of their
communities, and feel satisfied the union is safe, they would/will move forward.
This was true then (in the 1990s) and it is true today.”
On identity, Protestants, and the ROI:
-“Ulster Protestants are typically religiously liberal and socially conservative. But
this social conservatism is largely a reaction to Republican social liberalism.
Ulster Protestants know they do not want to be Republican liberals, and so much
of their social policy is generated in opposing terms; the result is that not all of it
is really reflective of the population’s opinion on the issues so much as it is a
reflection on their desire not to identify with a specific group.”
-“Here (NI) it is about identity and not religion or theology.”
-“I think that the view many people hold, of the NI conflict being about the
Republican revolutionaries being crushed by the bigoted Loyalists and Unionists,
is largely incorrect. Certainly, there have been serious issues of discrimination
and unfair treatment, but those have largely been dealt with. Still, many see the
Protestants as a domineering and discriminatory people which is a totally
unjustified view of the vast majority of the population. If they were so close-

minded, why would some of the ‘radicals’ (the paramilitaries) have asked me, a
former Catholic from the ROI who is a social democrat, to speak with and for
them? Why would they have asked me to come a be a minister at a church in NI
if they were so bigoted?”
-“The ROI has always claimed it held no grudge or discriminatory practices
against Protestants. For the most part, and especially in the last few decades, I
think that is true. However, the ROI needs to ask itself some serious questions in
regards to this stance. First, how can it be so certain of this when Protestants
make up only three percent of its population? Second, how is it treating new
immigrant populations and is this something that could be seen to represent how it
would treat a larger Protestant population? Finally, why is it that if the ROI is so
accepting of Protestants, the vast majority of them feel they must live in a tiny
corner of the island which isn’t part of the ROI?”
-“Loyalists are not ideological in the way Sinn Fein and the IRA are. They have
always been about defending the status quo. The problem is that some things
about the status quo were not good to be defending. Through parties and groups
like the PUP, ideas and beliefs such as socialism and working class rights are
making many loyalists realize that certain things did need to change. However,
while they know things can not and should not go back to the way they were, they
do want the union to stay intact.”
April 28th, 2006: William (Billy) Newman of the John McMichael Center
Background:
-I first met Mr. Newman when the SIT group paid a visit to the John McMichael
Center during our time in Belfast. He, along with Jackie McDonald (a current
brigadier of the Ulster Defense Association (UDA)) spoke with us at that time
about the center, community work, ex-prisoners and their role in the community,
being a loyalist and that identity, as well as a number of other subjects.
-I came to him on this occasion hoping that he could suggest someone who would
speak to me about the politics of paramilitaries. He suggested Jackie McDonald,
but we also had a short conversation about the John McMichael Center and other
efforts like it as they related to politics.
-Mr. Newman is a project coordinator with the Center and a leading spokesperson
to a variety of other organizations and political entities for the work which it does.
On community work in comparison to politics:
-“It is frustrating because often times, at least in this community, community
work is well ahead of politics, but politics dictates where funding goes and can
have enormous power over people’s thinking about, and reactions to, community
work.”

-“We try not to be a political organization as in we do not aspire to get a candidate
elected to parliament or anything. However, we are well aware of the fact that
much of what we do has political consequences.”
May 6th, 2006: Interview with UVF Command Staff
Note: Due to the sensitive nature of this interview, many details concerning the
people involved, locations, and descriptions of various events are left out at
the request of the interviewees and as decided on by myself. I am quite
certain of the credibility of these sources as I was introduced to them through
Chris Hudson and Henry McDonald.
The meeting:
-I am certain this meeting could not have occurred if it was not for the help I
received from Chris Hudson and his willingness to introduce me to the UVF. All
the men involved had a very high opinion of Chris and his work. I can only
imagine how long it has taken, and how careful and precise he has had to be to
earn this sort of respect and trust. I also believe it points to the secrecy which is
still vital to members of the UVF in retaining their positions within the
organization and avoiding legal troubles.
-This meeting was held in relative secrecy due to the nature of those who were
involved. Although everyone involved was very polite, it was quite obvious that
this was to be kept quiet and discreet. It took place in a bar in East Belfast which
was relatively small (maybe space for 40-50 people) and in a working class
residential area. People in the bar appeared to be familiar with the gentlemen to
whom I was speaking and I suspect from this that bar is a place they come
regularly. They also appeared, through their actions and mannerisms to be
familiar with the lay out of the bar and those working there, as well as the
clientele.
On why he joined the UVF:
-“I joined the UVF pre-1969 in 1966 when I was 17 years old. This makes me
somewhat unique as at that time it was still a very small and secret organization,
and did not have the small ideologies, tactics, or goals that the organization would
later develop. In fact, when I first joined, most people thought the UVF was just a
myth. No one knew I was part of it, not my family, my friends, or anybody.”
-“I joined for what now seem to be to be naïve and foolish reasons. Unionist
politicians where scare mongering at this time about a potential re-rising of the
Irish Republic in association with the celebrations for the 50th anniversary of the
Easter Rising of 1916. I was young, impressionable, and excitable, so I wanted to
do something to counter this ‘threat’ and I did so through the UVF.”

-The civil rights movement was seen as part of the rising and revolution which
they had been warned about.
-“Although the original civil rights protest may have been a different
story, I think it is clear now, and I have had several IRA men admit this to
me, that the IRA hijacked the movement as a vehicle for the Republican
cause.”
-“I guess it means that both Loyalists and Republicans were right in how
they viewed the civil rights campaign.”
-“For those joining the UVF post 1969, and I imagine for those joining the IRA as
well, it was about hitting back at the other side, and that I what the mission of
those two groups became. I think for most members of the UVF it was about
vengeance and defense first, and politics came later.”
-“For me the very fact that many members of the security forces were also
members of paramilitaries points to the fact that legal measures were limited in
what they could do against the IRA. The security forces were not going to be
effective against the IRA if they were handcuffed in their efforts. Obviously, the
UVF does not have that problem.”
-However, this gentleman made it clear that no official collusion took
place between the UVF and state security forces. He admits that some
individual transactions and assistance may have occurred (which makes
sense in his mind for both paramilitaries and security forces to engage in
such activity as it was mutually beneficial) but it was never sought or
condoned on an official level.
On the changing mentality of those joining the UVF:
-According to him, those who have joined the UVF since the ceasefire and
especially the Good Friday Agreement, have been more attracted to the criminal
potential, feeling of membership in a group with power, and group mentality in
general of the UVF. Those who joined before this time tended to be more
interested in defense, revenge, and politics.
-He announced to me that as of the last few months, the UVF is no longer
actively or officially recruiting any members.
On how the UVF has changed over time, and support for the organization:
-A major difference is that the organization has gone from very small and
secretive to large and more public.

-“As more people joined and the operations undertaken became larger, discipline
and secrecy suffered as a result. Our members became known to their
communities and beyond sometimes, and we lost the image of a stealthy militant
group.”
-He pointed out that with the relatively small population size of Northern
Ireland and Belfast it was easy for everyone to know one another, even
across the sectarian divides.
-Community support has always existed for the UVF, to varying degrees
depending on things like the success of the group in defending the community and
the political climate of the time. However, he is certain that fear of the UVF also
generated some of its support, especially as criminality became a larger problem
and more of a public focus.
-“Unfortunately, the support for the UVF does not reflect itself in votes.
But if you go to a UVF commemoration parade, and you see the streets
lined with thousands of people, those people aren’t made to be there and I
think it gives you and idea of the sort of support our organization has.”
On whether the advances and progress made in the peace process and political scene of
Northern Ireland would have been possible without the violence:
-“If nothing else, the violence which exploded in Northern Ireland prevented
Britain from taking the easy out and allowing a united Ireland.”
-“It wasn’t the intention, but I believe violence probably made politicians on both
sides compromise on subjects and at times they otherwise would not have.”
-He was of the opinion that some politicians used violence as a fear and rhetoric
tactic to gain support.
-“To some it was always, ‘Either you talk to us or you deal with them,’
while for others they used the violence to scare people into voting for
them through exaggeration.”
-“Perceptions are almost always more important than the truth so what people
have perceived as the reasons behind the violence at various times have always
taken precedence over the actually facts.”
On why the UVF moved from way from violence and towards politics:
-This gentleman was adamant that the UVF had always been of and for the
communities from which its members came. Thus, as those communities began
to ask for peace and dialogue, the UVF responded accordingly by trying to
provide those things.

-“We didn’t parachute in from Mars. We have always been very much
part of the communities which gave rise to our members.”
-“We had to convince our communities that the union was safe while the
Republicans did the exact opposite. Doing that simultaneously was not easy, and
presented a tough political challenge to the UVF.”
-“In my mind, our military campaign was more successful than our political one
has been thus far. Politics were relatively successful after the ceasefires and
though the Good Friday Agreement but faltered afterwards.”
-“People in our communities like the PUP but because it is so small,
consider a vote for it a wasted vote.”
On what the UVF is currently trying to do as an organization:
-“We are trying to move off the stage.”
-According to him, since politics was the road of the future, there was no
need for an active military association like the UVF. However, this did
not mean that changes in the political situation could not altered and
impede this process by making the need for such a group (even in the
future) seem more apparent. For instance, British and Irish statements
about a plan B if Stormont did not succeed have had a negative impact on
the standing down process as they make some members uneasy.
-“Every member, and I mean every member, has been consulted in the process of
trying to stand down as a group. We do not intend to leave anyone behind who
can be brought along with us in this process.”
On the relationship between Unionism and the UVF:
-“Unionism has largely used and abused the UVF for its own political gains. We
have been the big stick in the mentality that, ‘You can either work with us, or deal
with them.’ However, when we made good on that threat through violence, we
were almost completely abandoned, and absolutely so publicly.”
-“Now politicians from Unionism are beginning to talk with us again behind the
scenes. They want to be able to claim victory and credit for the eventual standing
down of the UVF, or be able to claim that they can ‘deliver’ the UVF in a political
situation. No one, and I mean no one, can claim or deliver Loyalism but
Loyalism itself.”
On criminality:

-“I want to make this very clear, the UVF does not sanction or condone
criminality on any level, full stop. However, we cannot account for every
member of our organization, just like no other group outside the paramilitary
realm can do so either. The British government, the Irish government, the
political parties of Northern Ireland, the PSNI, all of them have criminal
happenings and members but they never receive the same sort of attention
because they do not have the background of the UVF, but in actuality the
circumstances of that crime are not all that different.”
-When I said that some people have suggested the UVF was not doing all it could
to control or stop criminality within its ranks I received a very direct answer.
-“How can they make that claim? We have taken people’s lives because
they were involved in crime. I would say that points to us being more
committed than many others to ending and controlling criminality.”
-He also pointed out that when widespread and full-scale conflict comes to an
end, often times criminality creeps in. Crime can be very lucrative and as a result
attracts many individuals to it.
-“Drugs were never an issue in our communities until the UVF began to stand
down. Its hard to balance the standing down process with continuing to maintain
discipline and police your organization, let alone your communities.”
On how the ceasefire came about:
-“It was really very simple. Our communities wanted peace so we had to ask
ourselves if what we had been fighting against, and defending, was safe. The big
issues were whether the IRA was genuine in its ceasefire and whether the union
with Britain was safe. The evidence for both seemed to suggest that they were,
and we used that as the basis to create our ceasefire. If this hadn’t been the case,
there would have been no ceasefire.”
On being genuine in intent:
-“There is a tendency for the media to suggest that we are not genuine in what we
are doing, in standing down and maintaining the peace. But I think they forget or
over look the fact that we are the ones who have maintained our ceasefire all this
time and played an active role in the peace process.”
Miscellaneous comments:
-“I am Irish and British and proud to be both.”

-“There are so many contradictions in history and politics that it makes it almost
impossible to pass any sort of legitimate judgment on events, people or
organizations.”

Direct Transcriptions:
-Partial interview with Tom Roberts, director of the Ex-Prisoner
Interpretative Center (EPIC), former member of the UVF and an exprisoner on April 24th, 2006:
Alec Chiquoine (AC): Do you believe that Loyalist concerns are properly addressed
within the current political situation now, or do you believe there is an under
representation of communities such as this or the people you work with?
Tom Roberts (TR): I feel there is an under representation of the people that really
represent these communities. The problem here is that people vote as a result of fear.
There is fear voting, particularly on the part of the DUP, which has been particularly
adept at rising people’s fears about the other community and I think they use that
quite…(long pause) I fail to find a word for it but they use it for their own benefit rather
than the benefit of the people they are representing. I think they are actually exploiting
people because if they keep that fear up, the vote increases proportionally. But whether
they do a job for the actual people on the ground is another story.
AC: Another aspect of what I am looking at in my research is, especially in the Loyalist
community, the move from violence to politics and grassroots community work within
the paramilitaries. In your opinion can any or the whole of Loyalist past violence be
justified and why have people now decided their needs and voices are better represented
by going through political and community means rather than paramilitary involvement?
TR: I spoke with you earlier there about that, but I feel that the justification for Loyalist
violence came from the fact that the IRA was inflicting violence on our community has
we seen it and we reciprocated in kind. And therefore, as I said before, if the IRA are
genuine in ceasing their armed struggle and inflicting causalities on our community then
we will reciprocate, or at least I would like to think that is what we would and have done.
All the evidence has shown this to be the case.
AC: I know that especially early on there was a very strong sense of commitment and
support between the paramilitaries and the communities that they were defending and
representing. Do you feel a lot of that connection between community and paramilitary
has disappeared now, has it changed, and what are the reasons for that?
TR: It has changed quite a bit, you know, and certainly in the 1970s, to a lesser degree in
the ‘80s they (the communities) would very much have seen themselves as under the
threat of armed Republicanism and there was a cohesion between the paramilitaries and
the communities from which they emanated. I suspect that post ceasefire some of the

people who joined paramilitary groups didn’t join it for the reason of God and Ulster or
the country, but for different reasons. A lot of these people then were responsible for
creating that criminal rung that I talked about that the community has responded to
negatively. The combination of the minority criminal element that exists and the fact that
there is no longer this Republican sort of domiciles hanging over their head, people don’t
see the need for paramilitaries any more. And I think that paramilitaries, especially the
UVF, recognize the fact that they need to transform as well to suit the changing
conditions.
AC: How do you think that groups such as EPIC and organization like the UVF are
going to…it seems that especially post ceasefires and post Good Friday Agreement that
what they have really come to represent are working class, socialist to a degree
demographics within this area. How do you think they are going about trying to move to
that being the focus, and away from community defense as IRA violence as dropped off,
to presenting more politic side of what they are doing?
TR: As I said, within Loyalism there is a greater difficulty getting involved in
mainstream politics because of the reluctance of Protestants and Unionists to give the
mandate to somebody such as them. But a lot of former paramilitary activists are
performing very good work within, in and around things like interface problems, the
marching issue, and a lot of former paramilitaries are involved in mediation processes
and using their context to bridge the divide through those situations. They are also
helping to develop their communities amongst various other things. There is a lot of
community activism, which is seeing the paramilitary activism being replaced by
community activism.
AC: If your organization were to sit down with the DUP and UUP and actually able to
have a conversation with them, what is your message to them, what is it you are trying to
get across to them in terms of support you would like to see between the various Unionist
and Loyalist parties?
TR: I think that if there was something I would want from the DUP it would be for them
to offer the same analysis to the people, in respect to the IRA, as what our analysis is,
which is that the IRA do not present a violent threat to Unionist and Protestants. But I
feel they would be reluctant to do that because the IRA is their recruiting source. You
know, I don’t have a great deal of time for people who put their politics before the well
being of their people. If you want to build a career on people’s misery… I think the more
positive thing for Unionist to do, mainstream Unionists to do, is to give a proper analysis
of where the IRA is going.
AC: If were to be looking at trying to figure out what exactly what the political message
of the Loyalist community is, and what the people here are really looking for out of their
politics and the sources, what ever they may be, where that comes from, are there any
questions I should be asking that I haven’t, or any organizations that I should talk to who
I haven’t?

TR: In terms of the UVF the message is relatively simple. They are prepared to bow to
the will of the people, provided that will is exercised democratically. They don’t have a
problem with anything else. Their problem is the constitutional position within Northern
Ireland which they deem to be safe at the moment. As long as the Unionist people are
able to exercise their democratic right that is what the UVF is about. The UVF is quite
different than the IRA in that every IRA man, to a man, would be a Sinn Fein voter where
as the UVF is a broad church. You have DUP, UUP and PUP voters within the UVF, so
you know I is much like Protestantism where there is quite a bit of diversity there, where
as in Catholicism there is a more homogeneous unit if you like. If you look at Protestants
really, if they don’t agree with what the minister is saying they go and build a tin hut and
start preaching themselves. I value that diversity and I think diversity enriches a society
so we should accommodate it.
-Interview with David Ervine, MLA for the PUP in East Belfast, ex-prisoner,
and former member of the UVF on April 25th, 2006:
Alec Chiquoine (AC): How would you describe the PUP and its constituents in contrast
to other Unionist and Loyalist political groups?
David Ervine (DE): Well, first of all I would describe the PUP as a socialist party but
when you say socialist party people connote Pol Pot, Stalin, etc. I think my definition
would be caring politics. But I am not so sure I could describe the PUP’s constituency,
because we are going through a process of change in the PUP. We burst on the scene at a
time of major change. So I think that those who perceive that we appeal to an expressly
working class Unionist populous must recognize that most of the working class Unionist
populous don’t vote for us, and that there are some middle class people who do vote for
us.
So it is rather a mixed bag of people who vote for the Progressive Unionist Party,
and in part I believe that has to do with the process of change. All the reasons I think we
do not do as well as people expected me might in the working call Protestant community
is because we are: one, telling them they were wrong, and people don’t like to be told
they were wrong, secondly, I think we are much quicker to continence dealing with the
devil. Now let me define devil. We only know how good our propaganda was when we
try to do a deal with those we propagandized. Our communities demonize one another.
When you have a process of exploration for peace, you then have a community which is
aghast when you want to be reasonable with the “demon.” There is a bit of that, and also
the politics have changed in that there is fear. Fear encourages communities to rush to
the lowest common denominator, very often the loudest voice. So, when someone for
instance shouts, “Sell out!” it takes a second to say and perhaps and hour to refute, so the
arguments are not of the weight. You could even argue they are not of the same validity
but certainly they are hard and difficult to fight against.
The Progressive Unionist Part I suppose is a strange animal in that it is immensely
liberal in its politics. It is immensely liberal in its politics for a number of reasons, but
one very serious reason is that measured against conflict regions, conflict regions are less
inclined to be reasonable about abortion, pro-choice, they are less inclined to be
sympathetic to gay and lesbian rights, they are less sympathetic to domestic violence

because the over arching nightmare of the conflict has suppressed their capacity for
liberalism. So in recognition of this, the PUP has been pushing the boundaries out, trying
to make up time for that which has been lost, crush beneath the nightmare of the conflict.
AC: In your mind, are the current things which are seen as different between Loyalist
and Unionists valid and also what are they?
DE: There are three definitions, Unionist, Loyalist, and Protestant and then there is
Nationalist, Republican, and Catholic. Now, the differences between Nationalist and
Republican are much more logical than those between Loyalism and Unionism. I would
argue the concept of Loyalism was invented to distance the Unionist from what were seen
to e the excesses of the Protestant working classes. So, given that they are all Unionists,
at least they are all pretty much Unionists, you wonder where the name Loyalist comes
from. A Loyalist is less likely to be wealthy. No matter how far back you go in these
Troubles, I argue that the word Loyalism and its definition were invented to distance the
Unionists from the excesses.
I have to say that I worry sometimes how these badges are worn. Let me give you
an example. Democratic Unionist Party councilor gets into a rift with the police. The
headline from the media’s point of view is “Loyalist councilor.” Of course, he is a
Unionist councilor for as long as he behaving well, but the minute he behaves badly or is
perceived to behave badly, he becomes a Loyalist. That is only one example of many.
For many in society, certainly in the media and within certain elements of Unionism, and
tragically, tragically, within the Nationalist community, Loyalists fit somewhere between
the heal and sole of one shoe, and smell terrible. And I think it is almost a form of
racism, the way the working classes Unionists are defined…they are Unionists. I am
almost pleased with Martin Maguinness, who is very high in Sinn Fein, when he talks
about Unionist paramilitaries, because that is what they really are. This “Loyalist
paramilitary” label almost makes them apart from the society from which they come
which clearly does not make any sense. They are from the communities which make up
Northern Ireland and yet somehow they are an illusionary process that Nationalists,
Unionists, and above all the media seek to set apart, but of course they are not apart, they
are very much a part there of.
AC: In your mind what are the most striking changes that have taken part in Northern
Ireland especially since the 1990s to the present, and how has the PUP adapted and
reorganized to reflect those changes?
DE: There are hundreds and hundreds and hundreds and hundreds of people alive who
would otherwise likely be dead. That is one of the differences. The other difference is
that for the first time ever, using the definitions which are afforded us by others,
Nationalist, Republican, Catholic…Protestant, Unionist, and Loyalists, all have made an
agreement for the first time ever, in junction with two global, and with George Mitchell
and Bill Clinton’s involvement you could argue three, governments. In that respect that
is a first, and that is new. What we’ve got is time and space for an exploration. And we
find ourselves even today in 2006 in a major political crisis where it is almost pleasurable
to experience the crisis because it is the first time, certainly in my lifetime, that such a

crisis has not be accompanied by violence. Something is happening to us. With that
respect I fancy that had we have the skills…three hundred years ago, or eight hundred
years ago, or 90 years ago, whenever this country began to tear itself apart, to go back
and begin to resolve that conflict. The problem is that we are not trying to resolve just
that conflict, but every subsequent day as well. The pollutant of violence is greatly
emotional and very, very difficult and means even greater PR and propaganda we are
trying to work against.
The PUP in most respects tries to tell it as it is. And that is probably a very
arrogant statement, because doesn’t everyone try and do that, so how dare I try and say I
tell it better than anybody else, but tragically I think we do. I think we do for a very sad
reason…and that is there is a pension in tribes and communities to almost like
chimpanzees touch each other’s anal parts for comfort. You know, fuel each other in the
rightness of where they are. Of course the truth is that I have never lived in a normal
society…I have lived in an absolutely abnormal society, and a society where one really
does have to question one’s self, “Did our society become polluted because paramilitaries
grew and existed or was it pollution before that which lead to the growth of
paramilitaries?” When you talk to the SDLP, the SDLP will give you a half way house
of, “Yes it was all wrong and then paramilitaries came along.” But they remove all the
focus the first part and focus on the paramilitaries instead. The DUP will focus it all on
paramilitaries. I mean they won’t even want to talk about their history. And the
Republicans will tell you it was all the fault of the Brits. Somewhere stuck in the middle
of all this is the PUP saying, “Now hold on a minute, we are an abnormal society and
abnormal societies must do abnormal things to work themselves towards normality.”
And it is therefore about telling my people not what they want to hear, but telling my
people, “Let us be honest with ourselves,” because if we are not honest with ourselves,
then we enter a situation of denial…and if we enter a situation of denial then there is
always the danger for others to do what we have already been through. So the PUP tries
to tell it as it is and, as many argue with some justification, to our own detriment. But
then again, maybe we aren’t really politicians at all. Maybe we are just paramilitaries
who came out of the darkness having come out of the darkness we don’t want anyone to
follow where we were, so therefore we have to challenge them. That is what I wish…I
wish there had been someone to challenge me when I joined a paramilitary.
AC: So there was no one to challenge that decision for you?
DE: No there wasn’t and that made it a much easier decision for me.
AC: It seems that one of the things I have always found difficult, given my background
growing up in a small town in the mid-west of the US, was that choice and decision to
join a paramilitary organization. To be willing to take up arms for a cause and be willing
serve long prison terms and even possibly be killed or kill as a result of that membership.
It is a commitment that I am unfamiliar with…I am not sure if I were placed in that
situation how I would react. How did you make that decision when you were younger,
and then how did it progress into this political ideology?

DE: Well I trust in universal terms for any one who joins paramilitaries there are a large
number who followed the same pattern as me. Up until I was 19 I avoided joining, I had
been…if you like targeted for recruitment and had always said no. Then it was my 19th
birthday and I was celebrating my 19th birthday as a series of bombs were going off
around Belfast killing people. One of the guys who was killed was called Ervine, and he
was 18 and he lived just a couple streets away from me and I thought, “That could have
been me.” It was then that I joined the UVF.
One of the questions I think that is very painful to try and answer is that if there
were an engine that encouraged me, or enhanced my move towards paramilitary
involvement, how many engines did I become, or enhancement for young Catholics and
Republicans did I create by my actions? I am clear in my own mind that was not part of
my thinking at that time. I don’t apologize for my actions. When asked why I did what I
done, I didn’t know what else to do. People sometimes think that is a cope out, but it is
as close to an honest answer as I can give…I didn’t know what else to do. When all hell
is breaking lose, when there are blood and brains in the street…flight or flee I suppose
was maybe in my mind at the time. Maybe it is the ignorance and arrogance of youth
where you believe attack is the best form of defense. I suppose that mentality is why we
are in Iraq and Afghanistan.
AC: I resonate towards what you are saying with that because I do think American has
had that same sort of reaction to a situation where you have your back against the wall
and you don’t know what to do…
DE: The only thing is that I would counsel today about having the reaction I had is that
violence is not an answer. Having said that, societies are frightened and when societies
are frightened, they do silly things…I did silly things and take responsibility for those
things. I am a completely different human being to that individual then. I am not a
completely different human being because I had an instant “road to Damascus”
conversion, but I am completely different because of experience, questioning,
challenging, and analyzing…all those things that come with pain.
I probably said it to your group before but why do people hate people they don’t
know? And again, it is all part of our PR propaganda process. It’s not a thought process,
it’s a taught process. Our society, I have said to you that I have never lived in a normal
society it was quite abnormal, had that hate process there long before paramilitaries ever
came along. I can remember vividly shouting at the age of 14, “We are the people!”
Totally unaware that meant some others were not the people. There is a tragedy about
this society… I am from the ascendancy don’t you know, I am from the Protestant
majority but the average national pass rate for an examination at 11 years of age is 27%.
In working class Catholic areas the pass rate is 12%. In working class Protestant pass
rate is 3%… that brings me to come kind of conclusion on the affairs of mankind in terms
of historical perspective. I could probably
Break in recording as tape had to be changed
DE: We are lead to believe that being one rung higher on the latter than someone else is
a great place to be. There is a lot to answer for in societies which foster difference, but

not only foster difference for their own gain. Doing so subjugates people, and you can
only subjugate a people so long. Sooner or later they will rebel.
AC: Do you believe there is a way, or that the PUP has been successful in
communicating that ideology to other groups because of your experiences…
DE: The DUP when the PUP was very, very core to creating the Loyalist ceasefire, the
DUP described that ceasefire as, “Hard men gone soft.” That is the same DUP that will
give you total vilification of paramilitaries; but that is the definition that gave it, hard men
gone soft. But people don’t seem to remember that. Not a lot of people seem to
remember Ian Paisley never mentioned criminality as a barrier to doing nice things in this
society when civil rights marches were being attacked; or indeed that the moderate
Nationalist political elements in society were always marginalized by Unionism who
wouldn’t trust them. You know, so constantly the more the Unionist community through
its leadership has refuted the right of the Catholic population to be heard so the Catholic
population offered them a different volume… a more strident and difficult problem. It
brings me to the conclusion that sometimes majorities that behave badly end up being
dragged screaming and kicking to logical places. And that’s been the history of
Unionism in Northern Ireland.
AC: There is a theory in international political economics that people are not willing to
undertake significant economic change until the negative effects of the current economic
system outweigh the negative effects or sacrifices people must make in the switch to a
new system. Do you believe that theory can actually be seen as applicable within the
context of the Northern Ireland politics?
DE: Well I think if we asked those who researched such work, one of the biggest factors
in that decision-making process would be fear…fear of loss. That is what this is about,
the concept of the fear of loss. My argument would be that it is fear of loss of an illusion.
No one in Northern Ireland had power, no one! All power was derived from
Westminster. I mean the United Kingdom is a nation of 60 million people and Northern
Ireland has only 1.7 million of those 60 million. We had no power, but the illusion was
that somehow in order to take power, you had to share power, and sharing power was
somehow a loss. You could argue that is you were allowed to have 58% of the power
that would be 58% more than you had. But somehow or another, people like the DUP
have constantly sold it has 42% of a loss…which doesn’t add up! I think that it is very
difficult to…maybe a psychologist is required…after you get your degree you can decide
to get another degree in psychology and come back and have a look at some of these
questions that I would like answered. Why do people not do that which is in their best
interest? Why do people hate people they don’t know? Why do people find themselves
in situations where fear…or the tragic existing conditions are considered substantially
superior to the potentially wonderful conditions? That is an issue of change and an issue
of fear…we know human beings are like that. The psychology of how the hell we got to
where we are is worth looking at, not just the violence but including the violence. I
would like an exposé on what happened to us as a people, not even to castigate
individuals, but in a collective sense, what happened to us?

AC: Along the idea of this fear of loss, I think one of the difficulties many of my group,
as American students had, was understanding the strong sense of identity within
Loyalism and Unionism that is related to the union with Great Britain. It is especially
confusing in that it appears that many of these individuals who feel strongly about this
relationship, have benefited the least from it and yet given the most to preserve it. What
is in this union, why is it such an important connection to make?
DE: Well I know that people do struggle to make that connection, but it’s rather strange
as we are closer to you than you imagine. Because contained inherently within
Protestantism was the comfort with the separation of church and state…and as a result a
historical abortion began to happen. For instance, my parents were born pre-partition and
were Irish until 1937 when the Republic of Ireland created a new constitution because it
had separated from the United Kingdom. The first page, the very first page of that
constitution was allegiance to the Holy See and the Pope. Now, this is Ireland, and Italy
is over there somewhere. Your constitution guarantees the separation between church
and state, so the mindset of this issue within Unionism is phenomenally closer to the
constitution of the United States. The Irish constitution has changed now by the way,
thankfully it has changed, but that was in 1937 the first page of the Irish constitution,
allegiance to the Holy See.
Another issue is the abandonment of all things British is getting rid of the union.
Even though you walk around Dublin, and tell me it isn’t like a British city. Walk around
Boston and tell me it isn’t a British city. The fact you are throwing the baby out with the
bath water was an indication for people like my parents that they didn’t want to be Irish.
If that is the definition of being Irish, than I can’t go there. So there was a retreat from
Irish identity by those who were uncomfortable with this.
You know, history has dealt us some terrible and interesting cards and that was
one pollutant, not withstanding the pollutant of violence which played a big role in the
conflict. And Protestants in Northern Ireland hold stronger affinities with and for certain
parts of England and sometimes an affinity for Ireland which is stronger than the
connection to Britain, especially in some sporting matches.
This connection is probably a safety mechanism and it goes back to our religion.
It goes back to the sense of the fear of the control of the state by the Catholic church,
which is bad enough if you are Catholic but radically difficult if you are Protestant.
Having said that, there was a degree of much more calamity played out here. It was a
Protestant state for a Protestant people and a Catholic state for a Catholic people and we
fed off the extremes of each other and that abortion history has been very detrimental and
difficult for us to reconcile. Take away the fear and we begin to see a different side of
people. Whether it is the haunting myth of de Valera’s constitution, which is now gone,
or the lingering doubt that somehow or another Catholics in life want something different
than Protestants but of course they don’t…they both want very much the same, this
almost illusionary difference begins to melt away. I think this difference again is very
much a taught process and not a thought process.
My own honest opinion is that the multi-cultural democracy which is the United
Kingdom is to be valued. But then Ireland is now becoming a multi-cultural society
although in only relatively recent times. Nothing is standing still.

AC: To switch the subject a little bit, if issues of discrimination and equal political
representation which have plagued Northern Ireland historically can be more thoroughly
addressed, do you think the idea of a maintained union can be sold to a portion of the
Nationalist community?
DE: I think it has almost always been the case that there are people within the
Nationalist community who faced with a seismic shift would say no. What logic was
there when Unionism attacked civil rights marches when Catholic people carried banners
saying, “British rights for British citizens,” and we said no? Now we would give our
eyeteeth just for them to say they were British. So, how much of the moderate portion of
Nationalism did we marginalize by saying no and only coming to logical positions
dragged screaming. We didn’t help moderate opinions within the Nationalist community.
I think that Northern Ireland clearly functions under a very straightforward situation at
the moment, Northern Ireland shall remain part of the United Kingdom so long as it is the
wish of the majority to do so. That is enshrined since the Good Friday Agreement. Of
course the reverse of that is that if Northern Ireland doesn’t want to remain pat of the UK,
whether one is an a la carte democrat. I am not an a la carte democracy, I will accept the
will of the people with one proviso…the concerns of the Nationalist community, many of
them were real so we are now not a society that must only be fair, but a society which
must be seen to be fair, so the degree of checks and balances is huge. Having filtered all
of those checks and balances in, if we were to find a greater number of people in
Northern Ireland wanted to be part of a united Ireland, I think I would have the right to
seek that society not only being fair, but also being seen to be fair.
AC: You expressed the opinion to my group when we first met that many Unionists
considered you and your fellow PUP members worse than Sinn Fein and the IRA. I have
also heard from many Loyalists ex-prisoners and ex-combatants that they feel very
excluded, shunned and ostracized, not only from the communities they once were
defending but also many political circles such as the DUP and UUP. What can be done
to combat this animosity and distrust within Unionism and its various sects?
DE: Well I think one of the things is actually coming to terms with who we are, and that
is this argument about what happened to us as a people. Find me five people who are
complicit in the state of this nation. You know the way President Bush gives an address,
well lets assume we are looking at the state of our nation…find me five people who are
not ex-prisoners who will say, “Yes, I am complicit in the bad state of our nation.” You
see, it is always someone else’s fault and its always someone else’s responsibility, and
with the excesses of Unionism that is why the DUP and the UUP don’t want to fix it on
the abnormality before paramilitaries, but only the abnormality after the paramilitaries.
They want to look at the effect and not the cause and that is a form of sanitizing
themselves.
AC: One of my final questions to you then is a question about the future. Where do you
see the PUP going in terms of political ideology and policies you would like to promote

not only within the peace process but also in the large political happenings of Northern
Ireland?
DE: Well there are tragically a cadre of political animals and they cut across almost all
the political parties and it guarantees almost that I can’t talk bout political policies, that
all I am allowed to talk about as far as the media are concerned are punishment beatings
and punishment shootings and the excess of the UVF. My views on education are not
sought at least not very often, and very seldom listened to. So we have some work to do
to fight our way into the mainstream. That is a very negative view I have offered you but
one of the things I think is of some significance is that you can love us or hate us but you
can’t ignore us, sooner or later we will be heard. One of the reasons why I am contested
within Unionism rather than the Nationalist community is because I might take their
votes. But I mean, in all honest I have to say that if my society finds peace, genuine
peace, and a price of that is the demise of the PUP, well then so be it. Peace is more
important.
But I think the Progressive Unionist Party can, if the media allows it…it does and
it can play a specific role. If we live in the market place and every time we are asked a
question in explodes in that market place like an Exocet missile and we rush into the
corner in our homogeneity of pain and victim-hood to be driven by the lowest common
denominator, it seems vital to me that within the market place we have debate that does
not get engendered from the outside. Instead of the debate coming from the outside
asking questions of Unionism, it is time Unionism was asking questions of itself. I mean
my definition of being a Unionist is I am and Irish citizen in the United Kingdom. Try
finding many people within my community that would describe themselves as such.
Some of them will tell you they are Ulstermen, some will tell you they are British, you
get this strange cobbled identity…you should ask Unionists to explain what they are to
you. One of the big questions is does Unionism mean to be anti-Catholic and I think the
logical answer to that is no. Does it mean to be anti-Irish and I think the logical answer
to that is no. So therefore why is it seen to be anti-Irish and anti-Catholic? What is
wrong with us in our own concept of that definition? What is it we are afraid of?
AC: Well I want to thank you very much for all the time you have given me. Is there
anything I haven’t asked that you feel I should have, or any points you would like to
make or clarify?
DE: While you are still on the island of Ireland, the Northern Ireland Assembly will
reconvene. It has been given a deadline of the 24th of November to either sink or swim.
My best guess is that it will swim. I think if I had any point to make, it is that whatever
our history may have been I am phenomenally more fixated on tomorrow than with
yesterday. I have been driven almost hamster like by history and the way to rework or
out work a history is to build a common purpose. We as a people may never find
common allegiance between those who advocate a united Ireland and those who
advocated a union with Britain, but there is sure as hell evidence all around us that there
is ample opportunity to find common purpose. The finding of that common purpose will
involve the building of relationships and the building of relationships will begin to map
out a new phase of peace. It is time we stopped talking about the Good Friday

Agreement and started thinking about the mundane delivery of services to the population
which is the purpose of parliamentary democracy in this building. Doing so will create
role models in our government and those role models will map out a path to the future.
-Interview with Roy Garland of the UUP, member of the UUP executive
council and UUP consultant in Sandy Row on Friday, April 28th 2006:
-Note: This interview is transcribed in abbreviated form.
Alec Chiquoine (AC): What does the title “Unionist” mean to you?
Roy Garland (RG): To me it means believing in the union with Britain. I thnk the
Unionist community represents a minority on the island of Ireland…it is so
complicated…but I think the Unionist community is a community that feels vulnerable in
the Irish context. We are a majority up here, but we have always felt vulnerable. There
is a fear within Unionism that we are in decline here like Unionism was in the Republic
around the time of partition. By rejecting imperialism and Britain, the Irish Republic was
rejecting us as well. Certainly things have changed recently, but I still feel that it is
implicit in the Irish mindset and even written into the laws and Constitution. The nation
talks about encompassing all the people of Ireland, but we feel it doesn’t include us and it
doesn’t include us. I consider myself Irish, but I don’t consider myself part of the Irish
nation and they don’t consider me part of it either.
To be Unionist means to value the British way of life and not to want
independence for Ireland. I believe in Home Rule for Northern Ireland and more recently
I support good relations with the Republic. But I believe there are benefits to be British.
AC: Other than the constitutional question, are there other political ideologies that make
Unionism distinct from say Nationalism?
RG: I think there are economic aspects of the welfare state that go along with the
Unionist position. Unionism to me means a community where different cultures co-exist.
The Irish Republic does not embrace this same sort of openness or at the very least, not
until recently…it was a Catholic, Gaelic, Republican state. Having said that there are
elements here within the Unionist community that are not open and inclusive in all the
ways that I would like to see. But I think in general we can be seen as a wider, broader,
more open society as opposed to the South which is more narrow.
AC: Why, given the alternatives within Unionist politics, do you believe people support
the UUP?
RG: Well the main parties are the UUP and the DUP. The UKUP is down to virtually
one man and the PUP is not very strong in this area (Sandy Row). The PUP would be
effective for some working class Unionists from Loyalist backgrounds and would
espouse left of center policies. The UUP is a fairly broad church. The DUP comes from
a narrow religious background. I would see the DUP as more akin to what we didn’t
want in the Republic in terms of religious dominance. Of course, the DUP is moving
away from that position, they are actually following us. The difficulty for us is that

within the party there has been a big squabble as to what we are. From the beginning of
the Troubles, the UUP tried to bring in changes that the civil rights association wanted,
while Paisley was out there protesting them. It was suggested that if we didn’t accept the
reform we might get revolution. It was crazy that we didn’t do more to accept the civil
rights reforms.
The DUP is stalling the current government with the claim that it does not want to
enter into power sharing with just Sinn Fein because it of its links with terrorism, but they
actually opposed power sharing when it was first introduced. You have to bear in mind
that they are changing now, but that they have the “old ways” in mind and that is really
the crux of the issue. Now they are having to decided what ways are going to be pursued,
and I think it will end up that the DUP follows a path similar to the UUP is trying to
move forward in Northern Ireland, but currently they are not doing a very good job of it.
AC: What distinction if any do you make between Loyalists and Unionists?
RG: Loyalists are essentially working class Unionists with a slightly left of center bias.
In the past the Unionist Party contained all these contradictions. These working class
people I think began to realize they were working for a contradiction, and more
conservative party, and decided to break away somewhat. Unionism at the time had such
a spread in who was encompassed by it that some fractioning was almost inevitable in my
mind especially on issues beyond the constitutional issue.
So we had a constituency within Unionism that was…I don’t want to say Socialist
as that might be too strong a term, but left of center right through to moderate
progressives. Especially up until recently, these progressives had a significant amount of
influence in the party. What has happened is that the working class during the conflict
believed that we were under attack by the IRA, so they fought a war as they saw it
against the IRA. Of course then they were disowned by Unionists a bit, and at one stage
they might have even been a bit used by them, but they have been disowned now so they
formed their own party. They also in the early 1990s said, and this is significant because
these people have guns, they said, “Make a deal,” and the Unionists didn’t make a deal so
they said, “Well, we will have to do it ourselves.” And they were quite influential in
encouraging people to consider a deal with Nationalists. Gusty Spence and others were
the first to open up dialogue with Nationalists and Republicans, and in a sense if
Loyalists could do it others could do it. But then there came the attempt to demonize
them as left wing rebels themselves.
AC: You office here is located in an area know for its paramilitary involvement. How
does your office work to deal with these individuals and the communities which they
come from and have at times been supported by?
RG: Well, they are Unionists themselves, and so this is their constituency office. Don’t
forget as well that both the UVF and UDA, within them, they do not always vote for the
PUP, UPRG or UDP, and quite often vote for the DUP and UUP. There is amore of an
awareness of working class issues now so Unionists need to represent those interests in
they are going to get the votes. I suppose to try and reach that…your vote comes from
right across the community so you have to try and reach out. We know who the Loyalists

are and would represent their interests in some areas and not in others. That is just the
way of it, because in middle class Unionist areas, many of them don’t have time at all for
the Loyalists, so you have to try and work with both.
AC: What sort of problems are of particular importance to this community currently?
RG: Housing, anti-social behavior, pests, just about anything, you name it. A lot of
what we do is on a very day-to-day personal level for those people who come in, like
dealing with noisy neighbors or repairing blocked street gutters. If there is trouble
brewing up, we try and contain it or head it off before it gets out of control. Most of the
trouble is related to the sectarian divide, but not all of it.
AC: The UUP has recently fallen behind the DUP in terms of total numbers of MLAs,
what do you believe can be done to counter act this and bolster the support for the UUP?
RG: The UUP has had many of its efforts and policies distorted in the public eye and in
some cases has not even been successful in explaining itself for many reasons. One is
certainly the manipulation of what has happened and is happening with the peace process
by the DUP and UKUP. I mean, you are trying to reach an agreement with terrorists, the
same people who blew this place to smithereens. Ok, so Unionists and Loyalists didn’t
do many things right either, such as we should have met the demands of the Catholic
community during the civil rights period much more quickly, but of course a person who
slowed that down and prevented it was Paisley who protested adamantly against it. So it
was an easy job for him to stimulate all the old worries and fears within Unionism. The
DUP has given a voice to all the fears and insecurities of Unionism, and when you are
trying to do a deal with Sinn Fein, who have destroyed this region quite literally, it is
easy for the UUP to look like it is selling out. Gerry Adams helped fan the flames to by
declaring that the deal was just a step towards a united Ireland, which only helped to
confirm those fears. The UUP has been under siege like this since the 1960s, from
outside Unionism as well as from within.
Unionism has, and with good cause, always felt itself under threat. I would say
what needs to happen with the UUP is that it needs to make Unionism more acceptable to
a wider range of people, and also to adopt the stance that if we are going towards a united
Ireland, we make sure it is a better a safe united Ireland…but that, a united Ireland, isn’t
even a prospect right now. I think that David Trimble did the right thing because the only
way to get out of this thing is get peace and then demand that the IRA move away from
violence.
The ordinary mid class Unionist simply cannot understand how you can have
these people (IRA terrorists) in government. This is based in the deep suspicion and
distrust which makes up the siege mentality. In order to change this, you need radical
solutions but those are extremely difficult.
We went through all those years of bombings, shootings and killings, and most
people on the outside think, “Well, there has got to be something better.” The problem is
that you have to make compromises with those people who committed that very violence,
and they have an agenda which was an undemocratic agenda. Now, they have more or

less accepted the principle of consent so that the people of Northern Ireland have to agree
on a united Ireland.
AC: Can the idea of a maintained Union with Britain be sold to a portion of the
Nationalist community?
RG: I think it absolutely can, and has been because not all Catholics are Nationalists. I
think the realization is that a united Ireland as an ideal may be nice, but the logistics and
realities of it might not stand up to those ideals. The British welfare state has some real
benefits to it. Also, I don’t think Catholics and Protestants are all that different from one
another, and even Irish and British are not all that dissimilar. You look at our values, the
structure of our governments and churches, and they aren’t that far apart. So I think
people can be made to feel comfortable being Irish within a British state.
Now, if Unionism can show that it is not anti-Catholic, and quite open to this
other community, I think it will gain support. But that is hard to do with people like
Paisley around stirring up trouble and suspicious. This sectarianism is almost like oneupmanship, it’s the “we are better” mentality on both sides which makes closing or
narrowing the divide difficult.
AC: What are your reactions to the recent meeting between the DUP and the BritishIrish Parliamentary body?
RG: I think it is an effort on the part of the DUP to prepare the ground for a move away
from its hard-line stance. If they are going to make that move, they have to prepare, and
get the ground ready so to speak. So, I think it is a positive think, because it indicates
that the DUP wants to make a deal. The dilemma is that he has to damage his hard-line
position while at the same time claiming he has won some victory over the Shinners
which is very difficult, as the UUP well knows. Paisley is now in the position where he
can avoid making any real decisions, so he is preparing the ground but holding back on
real decisions. So it is a game being played and the question is whether he can get away
with it.
I still believe that Paisley would truly like to be First Minister, but the only way
he can do that is by cutting a deal. He has always taken what I think is the easy path in
being the opposition, wiping up fears, but I think he wants to go down as a man who
really did something.
AC: Do you believe that Unionism has a difficult time presenting a united,
understandable and acceptable ideology to those outside its constituency? Why is this the
case?
RG: I absolutely agree. But I don’t think it should be this difficult as there are clear
benefits to being a Unionist. You cannot sell Unionism on an anti-Sinn Fein or antiAgreement basis. We need to sell the union, and the reason why that sort of federalized
unity makes good sense. I think the selling point is that even within Nationalism and
some Republican circles, they see Northern Ireland as its own individual region whether
part of a united Ireland or Britain.

The fight on the constitutional status of Northern Ireland is self-perpetuating,
because while there are important issues like policing to deal with, they are not really
crucial only made to be so. There is radical change going on within Northern Ireland,
and as the legitimate concerns of Nationalism are addressed within the British system, I
think that can become a selling point for the union.
There has always been an inward looking, backward, reactionary insecure element
in Unionism which refuses to change. But there is also a very inclusive and
accommodating element as well, and it is about fostering the growth of that element
which is important.
AC: What are your feelings on the PUP in terms of its ideology, membership and tactics
as a Unionist party?
RG: The PUP is somewhat modeled on the Northern Ireland Labor Party which at one
time was quite strong and did quite well, but lost out over mostly silly things and the
constitutional issue. The PUP is encumbered by its relationship with the UVF, but the
UVF at one stage played a very important role in opening up to Nationalists and
Republicans in terms of electoral policies which bridge the sectarian divide. These are
found in slightly left of center labor and social policies which resonate to people in
certain situations regardless of position on the constitutional issue. A problem is that
they are also working to represent the Unionist position as well which turns of a large
sector of working class support they might otherwise have if the constitutional question
did not exist.
The PUP is trying to bring people along but have been demonized by Unionists
for not only their paramilitary connections, but also their socialist policies. The PUP
represents working class areas that are often demoralized, lacking confidence and many
services like education and health, so I agree with what they are try to do.
The PUP is trying to lead the UVF into politics and they are doing some very
positive work in this regard, especially trying to involve young people in leadership roles,
enhancing education and developing interest in culture. However, coming from where
they are coming from, people don’t trust them and that gives them all sorts of difficulty.
In my mind, they are very admirable people who come from tough backgrounds and a
wide variety of experiences. They are all radical thinkers who want to make a change,
and changes they really believe are for the betterment of the people.
There has always been the left wing element to the PUP, but they are Unionist. I
think right wing voters within the UVF vote for the DUP not because they support the
DUP’s stance on paramilitaries, especially within Loyalism, but because they do not
support the left wing agenda of the UVF.
For me, if the PUP wants to be successful, it needs to go all out and completely
for a radical working class agenda which reaches across the board to the Catholic
community. They have a difficulty doing this because some of those associated with
them in the UVF would not support such a move.
AC: I am particularly interested in the PUP’s attempts to help the UVF move from
violence to politics, and the party being born as a direct result of this sort of movement.

RG: I think a lot of that came from a very radical rejection of the Unionist hierarchy. I
think Gusty Spence and others are being realistic in trying to identify with those who are
very much part and parcel of the community which they represent, but this requires being
quite radical in ideology and approach at times. The problem in this society is that there
used to be just two political camps, Nationalist and Unionist, but now there is quite a lot
of fracturing which has gone on. In Unionism especially, larger political parties like the
UUP and DUP try and shoulder out smaller parties by any means because they take votes
away from them. This is not only logistically difficult for a political party to be under
attack from larger parties, but it is also demoralizing because you are being criticized by
“your own.” This leads a lot of smaller parties to focus on community work, and work
on the ground where they can stay under the radar of the larger parties and feel more
productive.
The future of the PUP is not exactly bright at the moment. I think they have two
options. One, they could pack it in, and join the UUP and actually have a big influence in
the UUP because the voters they would bring with them would warrant that. But then, if
they did that, they would be working with middle class people who probably will not
agree with the party’s position on working class politics. Still, I think they could have a
big influence because people like David Ervine, Billy Hutchinson and Dawn Purvis are
quite charismatic and influential, but also the voters they would bring would be very
valuable to the UUP…that might be the most constructive and hopeful way. Right now
they are losing out badly because they don’t control the UVF, but anytime the UVF does
something, they get associated with it and held responsible for it. To move into the
mainstream, they would have to break with the UVF, but doing that losses them a portion
of their current support base, so it is a Catch-22.
Unionists sometimes find it difficult to reach out beyond their communities and
social circles and sell themselves to different groups and people…this is true not only
with Nationalists but also within Unionism as well. The thing is that Unionists all have
some very obvious level of commonality between them, which does not exist between
them and the Nationalist community. However, where Unionists divide from one another
are areas which they often have in common with various parts of the Nationalist
community.
I think a lot of the Loyalist connection with violence can be attributed to the fact
that they were in fear, a very different sort of fear than most middle class Unionists.
They feared for their lives and their identity in a way that I think many more mainstream
Unionists never had to experience. This fear has been passed on and perpetuated for a
variety of reasons and to a variety of degrees.
Unionist have won, and been quite successful but they don’t know it or can’t see
it, and almost the reverse can be said of the Republicans. In fact, groups like the PUP did
some of the best work in selling the idea to Loyalists that they had won with the Good
Friday Agreement.
-Interview with Christopher Stalford, Belfast city councilor for the DUP on
April 29th, 2006:

Alec Chiquoine (AC): The first question I have for you then if how you came to be
involved with the DUP? Maybe you could give me a little bit of your background and
how that influenced you becoming involved in the party.
Christopher Stalford (CS): My family would have actually been very much an Ulster
Unionist family right up till recently. At the time of the referendum I was 16 and I
thought the leadership of the DUP was enunciating the right message about the
Agreement. They warned that terrorist prisoners were going to be released and that Sinn
Fein would be placed into the heart of our government without decommissioning. I think
that judgment has been vindicated. So it was through the leadership that the DUP
provided at the time of the referendum I came to be involved in politics. From that I
progressed to join the party and I was an active member canvassing at election times and
when I went to Queen’s University I was chairman of the DUP association at Queen’s.
At that time, I gained employment with Peter Weir, the DUP assembly member for North
Down. From there I went on to work as an assistant Jim Allister the DUP MP. I was
elected to the Belfast City Council last May.
AC: Of the Unionist parties which exist, what is it about the DUP that drew you to it as
opposed to another party? Was there anything outside the party stance on the referendum
issue?
CS: Well, I think there was a feeling amongst a lot of people that certainly David
Trimble’s word was not worth anything…what he said one day could be reversed the
next day. I felt that the DUP meant what they said and would stick to their word, and that
is a thing that drew a lot of people to the party. I think it would be unfair not to say that
charismatic leadership of our leader, Dr. Paisley, also drew me to the party. Various key
figures are major assets to the party in attracting new members and voters.
AC: What distinction, if any, do you make between Unionist and Loyalists?
CS: Unionists believe in the rule of law and believe in non-violent political methods. I
don’t like the use of the word Loyalist to describe paramilitaries because I think that
demeans the word Loyalist. Loyalists are loyal to the Queen and they are loyal to the
United Kingdom and as such abide by the rule of law and respect the rule of law. People
that have taken the word Loyalist to describe themselves are not necessarily loyal to
anything other than…some of them I think it is a question of lining their pocket with ill
gotten gains from crime. I think the main distinction that can be draw between parties
like the DUP and the Ulster Unionists on one hand and the PUP and UPRG on the other
is that mainstream Unionists believe in the rule of law and that the police, the army, and
the institutions of the state are the sole arbiters of law and order, the sole route by which
justice can be dispensed.
AC: Why is it that the Belfast City Council has continued to run while the National
Assembly is currently suspended due to political deadlock, even though the make up of
these two bodies, in terms of political parties, is the same?

CS: The functions of local government run regardless of whether there is a National
Assembly up and running or not. I suppose in that case it is fair to say that it is unlikely it
will ever collapse…local government will never collapse so parties have to make it work.
I think what we see in Belfast is the DUP has forged relationships with parties other than
Sinn Fein on the Nationalist side, I am talking about the SDLP. Last year the SDLP
supported us over Sinn Fein in the position of Lord Mayor of the city, and I think those
gestures will be reciprocated in the future and I think that Unionists are prepared to form
a working relationship with Nationalists who don’t reserve the right to murder them for
their political views. I think that we have seen a very constructive relationship built up
between the DUP and the SDLP in City Hall. It is a pity that the constructive relationship
we have with the SDLP in the City Hall and the pragmatic approach the SDLP councilors
in Belfast are prepared to take its not mirrored by their party leadership who are
absolutely insisting there will be no change in the Belfast Agreement even thought that
Agreement has been rejected by the Unionist electorate.
AC: There has been a significant body of research that has shown that Protestants in
general, since the implementation process of the Belfast Agreement, have been very
unsatisfied with the results. What do you think needs to be changed about the Agreement
and its implementation so that the Unionist feel that is more representative of their
wishes?
CS: Well, there is a fundamental problem with the Belfast Agreement in that it forces
parties into coalition, parties that might otherwise choose not to be in coalition. I don’t
think that any one party, least of all my own, has a God given right to be in the
government of a country. Forcing parties to work together when they don’t necessarily
want to, when they are pointing in different directions, when they have completely
different positions not only on the constitutional question but on social questions and
policy areas, forcing those parties to work together I do not believe is a good form of
government. I also don’t think that the situation that we have presently where
government ministers are essentially dictators within their own departments, where they
can go off and make whatever decisions they like, and even if the assembly passes a
motion against whatever decision the minister has made, the decision still stands, is a
good one. So I think ministerial accountability is one of the issues we need to see. We
can’t have Martin Magunniess simply going off and abolishing academic selection even
though the majority of the members of the Northern Ireland Assembly are in favor of
academic selection. If we are going to have a coalition government, we can not have a
situation where by government ministers are allowed to go off and do whatever they want
and not be held accountable to the assembly.
Other changes that I think we need to see…we need to see more accountability in
North-South cooperation. The DUP is in favor of North-South cooperation where it is to
the benefit of the people of Northern Ireland not the people of the Republic. For instance,
bird flu will not stop at the boarder and so it makes sense to cooperate on issue like that.
Where we don’t agree with North-South institutions being set up is where those
institutions are politically inspired without bringing any benefit to the people of Northern
Ireland. We want to see accountability on North-South. If the people of Northern

Ireland, through their elected representatives support North-South cooperation, but if they
do not it will not.
We also need to see, aside from the Agreement, a commitment from the
Provisional movement that they will buy into policing. It is entirely unacceptable to have
someone exercising government authority when they refuse to support the police. We
cannot have a situation where by government ministers refuse to tell…you know when
Robert McCartney was murdered Sinn Fein refused, despite the horrific way in which
that man died, Sinn Fein refused to tell their constituents to give the police any
information. There were 200 people in the bar the night he was murdered and by some
strange coincidence no one happened to see anything. We cannot have a situation where
a political party is holding back the implementation of justice in our country and that is
what we have had up until now. So we need to have a complete commitment by Sinn
Fein that they will buy into policing, support the police, they will encourage young
Catholics to join the police and that those young recruits will not feel like they are putting
their families at risk as has been the case up until now.
AC: Along those lines, I am aware of the DUP’s position on Sinn Fein and their
involvement in the governance of Northern Ireland given their involvement with
paramilitaries and that this is extended to Unionist parties with such ties as well, how do
you deal with the fact that these groups are democratically elected and thus representative
of a portion of the population?
CS: First thing I would say is that the Ulster Unionist Party and the DUP aren’t in any
way linked to paramilitary organizations and given a choice the Unionist electorate has
never voted for people who are linked to paramilitary organizations or political parties
that have paramilitary links. In the mid 1990s we saw a bit of support built up towards
the PUP and UDP but that has now melted like snow off a ditch. You know it never
ceases to amaze me in areas where supposedly paramilitary groups are really, really
strong and supposedly where they speak for all the people they get tanked gobed at
election time in those areas because ordinary decent people don’t vote for them. Now I
don’t know what’s wrong with the Nationalist community that they seem to have a
collective blind spot in terms of Sinn Fein’s involvement in criminality and Sinn Fein’s
continued involvement in paramilitaries. Perhaps its reflective of the failure of the SDLP
on the ground to work for their constituents and that’s why people have gone to Sinn Fein
on the Nationalist side but certainly I’m of the view that a majority of Unionists that no
mandate, no amount of votes can ever legitimize the use of violence for political aims.
You know are we going to say that because Hitler had a mandate that validated
everything that the Nazis did? Of course no one would say that. Similarly I don’t think
anyone can say that no matter how many votes that SF gets, even if they get 95% of the
vote, as long as they continued to reserve the right to kill me for my political opinions
then I don’t think there’s any place for them in the government of Northern Ireland and I
don’t think they will become, until violence is completely renounced and the IRA is
completely decommissioned and completely disappears from the scene I don’t think they
will be a political party in the conventional sense. I don’t think people will treat them as
one.

AC: It seems to that a number of divides within Unionism are centered along socioeconomic lines and that this leads to a sense of exclusion and inadequacy within some
groups, especially the working class. In your experience, is this something that needs to
be addressed and also what is the DUP doing to reach out to a wide range of Unionist
voters?
CS: I don’t buy into the argument…I mean, that argument is one which is put forward in
an attempt to justify the emergence and existence of paramilitary organizations. It is an
argument enunciated by those who would try and apply some sort of pseudo-socialist
argument about why they took up guns and why they started murdering people. I come
from a working class background and my family is working class, but we would go out
and regularly vote at election time and we never felt disillusioned from the Unionist
parties. My parents always voted Ulster Unionist Party up until recently and they cast
their votes for that party because they felt it best represented their interests. They now
thankfully cast their vote for the DUP but…I don’t buy into the argument that
disillusionment with the political parties lead to the formation of paramilitary groups. I
don’t accept that at all.
I do think that as a party we have broadened our base. I think that when the DUP
first emerged in the early ‘70s, it was very much a working class party and you wouldn’t
have had an enormous level of support from middle class Unionist voters in places like
North Down. But then by the same token, Ian Paisley would not have been able to win
every European election poll he ran in without significant middle class support in those
elections. So, I think it is hard to quantify, but certainly now the party has a much
broader base of people voting for it than it ever has…you know, two Assembly members
in North Down the biggest party in the local council there in a constituency where ten
years ago we had two councilors and no Assembly members. I think this support is
because we have broadened our appeal without diluting our principles.
AC: Besides the constitutional issue which often overshadows, especially in the media,
other political issues, what other policies on the city and national level are the DUP try to
address?
CS: Prior to the Westminster election, the DUP probably published about 30 different
policy papers on issues ranging from supporting and developing business, water rates,
health, education, and securing better deals for pensioners. So, I think it is through
publishing papers like those that you address individual constituencies within society,
their concerns, what they want to see from political parties. I also think that it would be
churlish to say that the party has not changed how it presents itself. We have a much
wider range of people now who are featured on television representing our views like
Peter Robinson, Nigel Dodds and Gregory Campbell. I also think the appearance of
people like Peter Weir and Jeffery Donaldson moving into our party as sent out a
message to people who have previously been very Ulster Unionist that the DUP is
actually there natural home. I know it wasn’t till Jeffery moved that my family started
moving to the DUP. I think it sends a message to what you could call middle Ulster, that
the DUP really is their natural home.

AC: This is a bit of a change in subject so I apologize. Some people have made the
claim that so called Loyalist “extremists” and political parties are more willing to seek
accommodation and cooperation with Republicans than mainstream Unionists. They
continue to argue that this is a more productive way to go about the peace process. What
is your response to those claims?
CS: It is very easy for one bunch of hoots to talk to another bunch of hoots. As far as
ordinary mainstream Unionists are considered, it is morally repellent to be sitting down
and talking to these people at a time when they maintain their arms and reserve the right
to use violence. Having said that, we have set down a number of conditions such as
complete decommissioning, the ending of all criminality and intelligence gathering, and
when those conditions are met we will be true to our word and we will follow through
and enter into meaningful dialogue. However, it will not be a day before those conditions
are met. Unionism got itself into a terrible mess in the mid-1990s under Trimble’s era
because Trimble had no bottom line. I think what we have seen is that the progress on
decommissioning has come about as a result of the fact that Sinn Fein knew they were
dealing with Unionists who will not dilute their bottom line. If we say we will not be
going into government until decommissioning is completed, that is the position, plain and
simple. I understand that David Ervine, Gusty Spence, and people like that are very big
on this former combatants coming together to try and find away forward. The problem
with them is that their brand of politics has been completely rejected by the Unionist
electorate at election after election. Ervine limped home in the Belfast City Council and
be under pressure in terms of holding his Assembly seat. So no I don’t accept the
argument that the best people to advance the cause of Unionism are the people who have
done the most over the last 35 years to demean it through terrorism and criminal activity.
AC: The DUP as quite often been referred to, and has even referred to itself, as an
opposition party. Now that the DUP is the largest party in Northern Ireland politics, how
do you think that is changing policy and stances within the party? Are the tactics or
messages changing at all now that you are no longer the minority and very much the
majority?
CS: I won’t say that we are an opposition party. If you look at the areas we are currently
in political control of, I think where the DUP are given the chance in terms of being a
governing party people are happy to live under a DUP administration. Similarly I think
there are a lot of people in the DUP who want devolution up and running, who want our
ministers in there leading decisions because we have confidence in them and believe they
would make great ministers. Ian Paisley would be an excellent first minister and I think
there are other members of the party who would do a great job as well. But once again I
think we are being held back from that by the refusal of Republicans to put violence
behind them. When we do see that happening, I am very confident that our ministers,
having in the last executive had our ministers be the mostly highly praised for their work,
I have every confidence that whoever our ministers are, similar praise will be coming in
their direction.

AC: Why do you believe that, even given all that has happened in Northern Ireland
especially since the early 1990s, do you believe paramilitary organizations still are
involved in violence?
CS: Paramilitary organizations continue to exist because it is a very profitable business
for the people who are members of them. I think the days of these organizations
representing any political ideology or signing up to any particular cause are gone. I think
these organizations now are effectively organized crime syndicates and they have
evolved into that because of the policies of the British government which allowed their
continued existence and allowed them to continue in their criminality. I think that is the
main reason that paramilitary organizations continue to blight our society. Particularly
on the Loyalist side, businesses are being bleed dry paying protection money, companies
are being forced out of business for what? It is not for any Loyalism or any Unionism, its
for lining the pockets of people who are doing it. It is so on the Republican side where
we have seen recent actions by North and South policing bodies, which is one area where
I welcome North-South cooperation as we obviously welcome action against organized
crime, and they intercepted a fuel smuggling operation of the Provisional IRA in South
Armagh. It is ridiculous that Gallagher’s cigarette company go from Belfast to Britain
and through Britain to get to Dublin because they are afraid that if they cross the border
in Northern Ireland and have the cigarettes stolen. So I think it is clear that these
organizations have evolved perhaps from political or ideological origins into organized
crime.
AC: And what do you think can be done to combat that?
CS: Tough policing is what is called for. The capacity of police to deal with crime like
that has been diminished as a result of the Patten Report which slashed police numbers.
We need more intelligence gathering by the police, we need closer cooperation between
the police and the Garda in the South to act against these people because it can’t only
involve internal action because they can jump over the border. Dublin needs to get tough
on this as well because for to long has a blind eye been turned by the South to the
criminal activities of the IRA. So, I think the primary way this can be dealt with is
through tough policing measures.
AC: I have heard people suggest that in addition to tough policing employment
campaigns could help to alleviate the problem.
CS: I can tell you now that the money that has been thrown at Republican and Loyalist
paramilitaries is obscene. The government has tried to buy these people off and it clearly
hasn’t worked. I have constituents who are struggling to get by on 80 pounds a week and
these paramilitaries aren’t struggling to get by on 80 pounds a week. I am absolutely
opposed to any suggestion that the government should be throwing money at paramilitary
organizations…that is a buy off and once you get into that area of paying them, you just
keep paying them and they always come back for more. No, I think what is called for is
tough policing responses. The high unemployment there is in places like the Shankill and
the Falls comes about as a result of the existence of these paramilitaries organizations

who have destroyed their own communities, destroyed the infrastructure and continue to
do so. They are a parasite on the back of their communities. The best thing that could
happen for working class inner city people on both sides is if paramilitaries go out of
existence.
AC: Is there anything you feel I haven’t covered in this interview, or a subject I haven’
touched upon which is particularly important in my understanding the DUP and/or
Northern Ireland?
CS: I think one thing that cannot be under estimated in all of this is the role of United
States in all of this. I think especially since George Bush was elected that the US
administration ahs been a force for good and the peace process here. I think what we
would like to see is that, because Sinn Fein is very responsive to pressure from the United
States, pressure applied because we are nearly there in terms of decommissioning and
that the pressure needs to be applied upon the Republican movement to get them to the
point where by all violence is put aside. In a post 9/11 there is much less tolerance within
America towards terrorist organizations, particularly the IRA which for years was sort of
romanticized by the American public and even glorified. I think pressure can be brought
to bear by the US administration on Sinn Fein which will be significant in getting a stable
devolution up and running.
I think the DUP might be making moves towards establishing lobbying offices in
the United States which is something I have been very big on. Unionism needs to start
selling itself abroad. I think if people truly understood the nature of the Northern Ireland
conflict they would be much less sympathetic to the type of ideology Sinn Fein espouses.
-Interview with Chris Hudson on Tuesday, May 2nd 2006:
-Note: Transcription is in abbreviated form
Alec Chiquoine (AC): Especially in the late 1980s and early 1990s when Loyalist
paramilitary violence, and violence in general, was escalating to new highs, how and why
did you decide to stay in contact with the UVF when many others were turning away?
Chris Hudson (CH): I did so because they had said to me during our discussions that if
we worked hard together there could be the big prize, and the big prize was peace. And
indeed in the early 1990s at one stage, I thought it came very close to them calling a
ceasefire before even before the IRA. To this day, I don’t know what went wrong, and
likely it was a combination of things. Still what was significant was that they had come
down to Dublin and said to me that they could deliver a ceasefire.
The other thing was that difficult for me was the sectarian killing at the time, and
the sheer senselessness with which they were targeting Catholics. I talked to David
Ervine and I said, “This doesn’t make any sense.” I went on the radio and said about the
UVF, “Well, it seems that they are speaking with honeyed words when they can say one
thing and go out a commit a barbaric act like this at the same time.” I said this wondering
whether they would still want to talk to me afterwards, and they did, but we continued to
have serious disagreements. However, they said they still wanted to pursue the peace

process. So I was challenging the UVF by sticking to my principles while still working
with them.
There were difficult moments, but I was continually told that if we stayed with
this (they needed me as their contact to Dublin) and if we all worked a little hard, we
could bring peace about. I think in a lot of violent campaigns you see them escalate
before they deescalate and finish. To some extend, I think people could argue that this is
them getting their retaliation in, but I also believe it is so they can say they ended on a
note and display of strength. Still, it was hard because I new innocent people where
going to be murdered through this.
I stayed with it because even though I was sitting with people whose associates
were out murdering innocent people, it was about the end game. I had committed myself
and I had to stay with it.
AC: What is your impression of the UVF’s presentation to the community and its
interaction with other groups?
CH: Paramilitaries are complicated because they often splinter and create factions within
themselves. They would describe themselves as an army, but that is not really the reality
in terms of cohesion.
It is hard to see precisely how they connect with their communities but with
Loyalists and the UVF, they definitely connect with their communities. They are not a
terrorist organization…they are as much part of Loyalist communities as the PIRA are of
their respective areas. But this connection is not as clear within the greater Unionist
community. Within greater Unionism, there was always an uneasy sense about
paramilitaries and a support for the security forces. In the more working class areas,
those on the margins, would see the paramilitaries as their people and acting on their
behave. They might not have immediately or directly agreed with them, but saw them as
necessary in getting their retaliation in against Republicans.
Ironically, when it comes to the political side, the community won’t vote for the
paramilitaries. In many ways this is because of the paramilitary experience as it prevents
them from extending political ties into the great Unionist community because they will
not be accepted. This is even though David Ervine is probably one of the most articulate
and visionary politicians in Northern Ireland and actually has a view on how to get out of
this conflict. However, that doesn’t hold sway with the general Unionist community
because of their paramilitary connection.
--Story about “respectable” families seeing the UVF guys as protectors in certain
situations and connections to them.
In private, and certain circumstances, many Unionists do have regard and respect
for the UVF, but of course this can never and will never be admitted publicly. Of course,
even the UVF volunteers don’t necessarily vote for or support the PUP.
AC: Why is it that the UVF will at best only partially support the PUP in politics?
CH: I think it is because Loyalist paramilitaries, unlike Republican paramilitaries, didn’t
see it was their business necessarily to have a political position. Their job was as a
military organization to protect Ulster against terrorists and to take the fight to them.

The only political view they would have is that if the union was under attack from
Republicanism or the Dublin government, they will take the fight to that base. They are
not politically ideological like Sinn Fein is quasi Marxists. Loyalists are not advancing a
revolution, they are protection their position as they see it within the United Kingdom
and ironically British identity and the British way of life. I would challenge them on this
front because their definition of what to be British is very narrow.
The only other consistent and wide held goal is the defeat of Republican
terrorism, again, which is not particularly political in and of itself.
Of course the flip side of this is that when it came time to discussing and coming
up with ways to get out of the conflict, the UVF and its members proved very capable of
coming up with new, practical and creative ways, and showed they were quite good at the
negotiation and political side of things as well. In the later years, their development in
this area, not so much politics, but moving things forward…conflict resolution and
transformation if you will, was really quite impressive and surprising.
AC: Do you worry about a return to open violence and if so, what could trigger this?
CH: Yes, I think a return could be precipitated by any attempt to impose joint authority
by the British and Irish governments we could see a return to violence. It may not be on
the same level has we have seen in the past, but almost certainly we would see a drastic
rise in violent undertakings. But I don’t think this sort of joint authority is likely to
happen at all. The logistics of it are too complicated and not really in the interest of the
Republic of Ireland at the moment.
That would be the only situation I can really think of that would cause that sort of
return, so I think that is something to be optimistic about, because I don’t think it will
happen. Loyalist paramilitaries will not return to violence for any other reasons.
Gangsterism will still exist, and issues/disputes over territorial control are likely to
continue, but I don’t think they will get out of control. They know that if they allow their
violence to significantly increase in any way they will be dealt with harshly by the
security forces. The IRA being in the process of standing down and certainly having for
the most part ended its violent campaign against Unionists means that the UVF will not
return to violence simply in the causeless vacuum which is created. USA intolerance of
any terrorist activity plays a big party is deterring the return to violence by any side as
well. In a post 9/11 world, I think all the paramilitaries realize that the willingness to
tolerate violence has mostly disappeared in the American and British mindsets.
So, I don’t think you will see any major return to violence by any group, and
definitely not the UVF. Northern Ireland has seen the benefits of being conflict and
violence free, especially for economic development over the last ten years, and everyone
is aware that a return to violence would damage this tremendously. The greater Unionist
and Nationalist communities are not going to allow paramilitaries to dictate what goes on
in Northern Ireland anymore. The UVF is very aware that unless very specific
circumstances were to arise, there would be no support from their communities for a
return to violence. The paramilitaries are trying to show that they are still around and
won’t be pushed around, but even that is disappearing and changing in appearance and
strategy as it does so. That is my understanding of where the UVF is going from my
conversations with them.

AC: Why, given all that has happened in Northern Ireland over the last 15 years, does
violence and criminality still exist in paramilitary form/activity?
CH: I can only speculate on this but security consultants might give you better insight.
What I would guess is that certain people who want to make a name for themselves attach
themselves to these organizations. People found that they can make money through the
paramilitary structure, not unlike politics, where people go in with the best intentions to
do good and create change but they find they can get a lot of money and people start
asking for favors. The unfortunate part is that people through this process have come to
realize that they can abuse their power through criminality while calling it something else
under the paramilitary guise. However, I would emphasis that corruption and criminality
is not something solely connected with the paramilitaries, it happens almost everywhere,
including places like the UN.
The danger is that this activity gets a grip on certain communities and it becomes
a part of the community operation. This leads to thinks like the mafia and such which is
certainly a cause for concern. The Official IRA actually warned the UVF about this.
They said that when the war is winding down, you have to bring your organization to an
end…do it and do it quickly. All paramilitary organizations will end up corrupt because
it is the next step in the progression of the beast.
So I don’t think the UVF is an organized crime syndicate, although certain
elements are involved in crime and if they aren’t careful, they stand to become further
involved and entrenched in that sphere.
I think part of it is that the paramilitaries are able, and have the capabilities to do
things like criminal activity. So, I would even be in favor of the police dealing with them
a little more harshly then they do in order to send a message from the community and the
government.
AC: In your opinion, could the Loyalists have achieved more or less and the
paramilitaries ever become active?
CH: Yes and no. You see in a way it is a chicken and the egg situation. The Loyalists
political organizations grew out of the paramilitary experience, especially with excombatants questioning what it was they were doing and why they were doing it, and
starting to put a political framework on what they were doing in a military sense. It
strikes me that they would not have been able to achieve what they have because they
would never have existed had it not been for the paramilitaries.
The only place politically I could see the paramilitaries having gone alternatively
is to the Northern Ireland Labor Party. However, that party fell apart because when the
Troubles came along, it forced people to choose a side on the constitutional issue and that
split the party asunder. So anything in regards to whether the Loyalists could have found
a political voice without the paramilitaries is highly speculative.
When the violence went on and on and on that is when the political framework for
Loyalist paramilitaries began to develop. The paramilitary experience is what created the
political realm for them.

AC: What particular views on violence were held by the UVF in terms of whether it was
the right thing to do, and how it should be employed?
CH: Well, I never discussed this with them in terms of specifics, maybe on a more
general moral level, but never about specific operations. However I was able to glean a
few things. Many of their murders were considered to be purely sectarian and that was
not how the UVF felt in most cases. Their intent was not to encourage sectarian random
murder campaigns. Also, they observed and began to mimic Republican violence and
explanations, especially in terms of defining legitimate targets. The UVF saw the PIRA
definition of legitimate target as encompassing pretty much the entire Protestant
community and then responded in similar ways.
There was a limited acceptance of the fact that many murders and operations were
undertaken on completely sectarian grounds by the Loyalist paramilitaries which never
really occurred with the Republicans which I think does show a certain realism on the
part of Loyalism in identifying that at heart, the conflict in Northern Ireland was a
sectarian battle at many points, and not some high flying battle of political ideals and
their role in it. As we move away from the Troubles I think we find a lot of people trying
to glamorize their role within it, but that has been largely absent on the part of the UVF
Glamorization dehumanizes the tragic loss of innocent life which should be the focus of
looking back at this time in history, so I think in a bizarre way, by being very open and
frank about what they did the UVF is helping to do because they are not participating in
the glamorization.
AC: Many mainstream Unionists refuse to work politically with paramilitary groups as
they see it as sanctioning paramilitary groups.
CH: Well I actually think they are right in doing that. My involvement in this is has
been much different because I am a churchman and negotiator, not a politician. This isn’t
to say paramilitaries should be written off and out completely by politics, they need to
know what is going on and why, but there is a time at which it is completely legitimate to
turn the light on the UVF and say, “OK guys, the war is over and it is time you packed
your bags and leave as a paramilitary organization, it’s over to politics now.” The DUP
and UUP also cannot be seen to tolerate in their own communities what they criticize in
other’s like the Republicans.
Having said all that, I think there have been times of ambiguity between the
paramilitaries and Unionist politicians. Some Unionists have met with the paramilitaries
and rightly so, because they are trying to get them to step down, not to ask their political
view points. It would be totally unacceptable for some political party to come in and try
and use the connection with a Loyalist paramilitary group to force itself forward.
However, that does not mean that politicians from all sects of Unionism cannot at a
community level sit down with the paramilitaries and help them to stand down. I don’t
buy their argument that the paramilitaries are nothing more than criminal organizations at
this point so that being the reason for not meeting with them isn’t legitimate to me.
If the UVF wants to really enter the realm of politics, if its members want to do
that, the best thing they could do is disband as completely and fully as possible, as
quickly as possible. Beyond that, they owe it to the Unionist and Loyalist people to

disband. They have no right to operate anymore. At one time they could have argued
they did have a legitimate reason in community defense for existing, which can be
argued, but is certainly more legitimate than any reason they may have now for their
existence. At this point, the paramilitaries do not have a role to play…their only role is to
get off the stage and let politics take over completely…this they owe to the people. They
have an obligation now to support legitimate politics in one of the variety of political
parties and also subscribe to law and order, which represents all the people of Northern
Ireland, and support it.
They need to see that they are in a changed world and work quickly to catch up to
that change. Many people see what they did with the ceasefire and peace process and are
quite impressed.
----Explanation about ceasefire and internal violence with the Loyalist Volunteer
Force (LVF) is that they cannot leave without dealing with this “problem”
The UVF’s logic in this regard isn’t my logic, nor is it probably many people’s,
but it does still exist and is very legitimate for those who hold it so you have to talk
around it and about it.
The DUP and UUP are right to demand that those involved in the governance of
Northern Ireland break off ties with paramilitary organizations, whatever side they may
be on, even if they are a little ambiguous about how to approach this.
AC: Would you say that the communities that the paramilitaries perceived themselves to
be defending throughout the Troubles feel that the current Unionist Parties do an
adequate job of representing them politically?
CH: People vote for who they vote for. If you look at now, even on the Shankill Road
the DUP is getting elected, where years ago I would never have believed such a thing
could happen. It is a little shocking to me to see this move politically, because I would
have seen that community as one which would have been more likely to go for the PUP
or a progressive UUP candidate like Chris McGimpsey. It may be that the people there
do not want to be associated with paramilitarism any more, so therefore they might
ambiguously support a paramilitary organization at the ground level but are unwilling to
vote for organizations and parties associated with them.
People in Loyalist areas might also be looking at the work done by people like
Peter Robinson in East Belfast, which are now quite prosperous and making major
strides, and be thinking, “Well maybe they will do the same for us.” There is no doubt
that Loyalist areas have suffered from a variety of social ills. I think that the British
government may also be trying to maneuver the DUP into governance with Sinn Fein by
allowing money to go into Loyalist working class areas through the party, which boosts
their support. At the same time though, I am sure David Ervine is in there trying to get
this funding for people as well.
So, I won’t say people are not represented by the main Unionist parties, however
the Loyalist paramilitaries might give you another picture and say there are seriously
neglected areas, areas that have been left behind and are becoming the new proletariat
and marginalized community. They would tell you that Unionist politicians don’t care
about them, but that remains to be seen. The biggest thing I think is the fact that in many

Loyalists areas, people don’t even bother to vote, so it is hard to get a read on their
feelings in terms of political representation.
It is complex because you have everyone doing better with the peaceful situation
we have now, but then you have Loyalist working class areas that are not doing well on a
number of social levels. These tend to be where the paramilitaries are the strongest at the
moment. But his sort of neglect of certain areas is no different than in major cities all
around the world. The danger is that these areas become “no hopers” where politicians
stay away because they figure why bother changing the minds of those who won’t even
vote. The difficulty is trying to come up with ways to deal with these areas and cure
them of some of the social ills which they face. On this front, I think politicians need to
listen carefully to those Loyalists paramilitaries who truly want to be active in politics
and community work, because they have an acute knowledge of what is going on in these
communities. This goes for shutting down the paramilitaries as well. Members of those
organizations who are looking to disband have the best inside knowledge and experience
on how to do exactly that, so politicians should pay careful attention to what they are
saying because that will be the best way to move things forward.
---The following are excerpts of talking with Chris Hudson about the compatibility
of Unionism and Nationalism
CH: Although Republicans and Nationalists would deny it up and down, Nationalism is
really about Catholic Irish homogeneity. So in that sense it is far more exclusive than I
think the traditional sense of being British that Unionists hold. Of course, arguing the
inclusive nature of being British and Unionist is damaged by the knee jerk and
discriminatory reaction to the civil rights campaign. However, I still see British identity
as more inclusive than the Irish Catholic one.
I think a major part of why the Troubles escalated like it did was that Catholics to
an extent say the working class Protestants and not the middle and upper classes as the
ones who were oppressing them and lashed out against them. I think working class
Protestants were understandably taken aback by this onslaught and struck back in an
equally harsh and sometimes indiscriminate manner.
One major problem is that especially within the working classes of Northern
Ireland, there is no sense of a shared identity. When this shared identity begins to form, I
think that will nullify the constitutional issue to a greater extend and really change the
politics of Northern Ireland in terms of where the political divides lie.
AC: Was there a coherent strategy on the part of the UVF when you began working with
them on how they would move from violence to politics, and to use a Gerry Adams
phrase, balance between the ballot box and the armalite?
CH: The reason the UVF connected with me was to discuss precisely that. They had
made the decision that something was happening within the Republican community that
would lead to the IRA’s campaign being brought to a closure. They felt they too should
be in such a process but weren’t at that point in time. In a way, my job was to help them
create this process. It didn’t have a strategic goal as such, other than to bring around a
Loyalist ceasefire. But I like to think of myself as a strategic thinker, and I tried to

encourage them to do the same so that we could gently and steadily move forward
through what was being said. What the UVF needed to know was that there were no
secret deals between the Irish government, the British and the IRA, to be sure that they
would not stand down only to be forced through back alley deals into a united Ireland.
The Loyalists did start becoming more strategic as we worked together. They are
not just emotive, or responsive, but they put a lot of thought into things. They very
carefully watch and listen to what is being said. However, I am a little disappointed and
feel that we should be a lot further along. Here we are in the year 2006 with the IRA still
giving the run about to the decommissioning commission and the Loyalists are still only
just now starting to disband and stand down. It isn’t good enough for it being 12 years
since the ceasefires and 8 from the Good Friday Agreement. I think everyone blew a
great opportunity with the Good Friday Agreement, the support it had initially, and the
great space of peace it created to allow politics to work in initially. But, we could be
where the Palestinians and Israelis are, so it could be worse.
We need to be pushing hard on all the paramilitary groups to get them to pack up
and go away and allow politics to take their place in Northern Ireland. We need
organizations like the paramilitaries and the Orange Order to stop ratcheting up the ante
all the time. If groups like the UVF don’t start addressing what they are becoming, which
is increasingly criminal and a hate figure for the other community, it will only get harder.
It is time they really began to deal with themselves seriously and find out what they are
all about at this point…and deal with it intelligently, because they are not stupid people.
So in away I wish everyone would get their act together and really start addressing what
needs to happen to push the peace process in Northern Ireland fully, completely, and
permanently into the realm of politics, and hopefully politics beyond the constitutional
issue.
-Interview with Dawn Purvis of the PUP and policing board of Northern Ireland
May 5th, 2006:
Alec Chiquoine (AC): The first question I have for you then is a little bit of background
about yourself, I know some of what you have done thus far in Loyalism and Unionism
and your experience here in Belfast but pretty much I have only read second hand
sources. I’d like a little bit of an idea of your background, where you grew up and how
that influenced where you are today in terms of politics.
Dawn Purvis (DP): The area where I grew up (Pakenham Street in south west Belfast)
is the same area I live in today. It is a mainly working class loyalist area in south Belfast.
I suppose we had…my up bring would be described as deprived. There wasn’t much
money about but it was a very close-knit community. The Troubles started when I was
about three so I have never know anything but the Troubles. The Troubles to me were
being lifted out of bed at night because there was a bomb in the street, or the soldiers
kicking down the door, carrying you out of the house and standing you against the wall
because there was a bomb on the next street. Standing against the wall in the middle of
the night with fenders and hubcaps and things lying in the street from the explosion in the
next street. Barricades at the top of the street because there was vigilantly gangs that

were shooting down the street. All sorts of things, I could list you chapter and verse lots
of different incidents like that.
But, in saying that, it probably sounds totally abnormal to somebody who never
knew that conflict, but when you are growing up in conflict it seems totally normal. So,
my involvement with the Progressive Unionist Party (PUP) and loyalist politics if you
like, started around 1994 when I was involved in…I was a community activist in this
area. The loyalist paramilitaries had called a ceasefire in October of 1994 and I was
beginning to listen to the likes of David Ervine and Billy Hutchinson on TV talking about
Northern Ireland, talking about the conflict, talking about peace, and what struck me
about these men were: one, these men were former paramilitaries, secondly, they spoke
about Northern Ireland in reality terms and what Northern Ireland really was. That was a
can of worms because prior to that we had Unionist politicians who looked at Northern
Ireland through rose colored lenses and said it was a wonderful place and if all the bad
men would go away it would be even better. But where I lived it wasn’t a particularly
nice place, and the bad men were not people who had parachuted in from outer space, so
there was no way they were going to go away, they were part and parcel of the society
which had created them. They were uncles, brothers, cousins, they were my friends’
fathers, my friends’ brothers, my friends’ husbands, and you know in my simplistic
logical since I was a child since about ten years of age was that the people who were
going to slow down the peace process in Northern Ireland are the men with the guns and
until they sit down and sort out their problems and differences with one another, this
conflict is going to go on. And I think in 1994 I seen a chink of light because the IRA
had called a ceasefire, the loyalist paramilitaries had called a cease fire and I thought at
last we are going to get the protagonists sitting down and talking with one another.
So I actually became quite interested then in the PUP at that time and was indeed
head hunted if you like by a friend of mine who approached me and asked me to join. I
didn’t want to join because of the association with the UVF, but he hounded me for
weeks and gave me the manifesto and explained to me that the PUP gave political
analysis to the UVF in terms of the constitutional position of Northern Ireland but that the
UVF didn’t have a policy on housing, pro-choice, women’s rights you know. The PUP
was really a stand alone political party with its own policies and manifesto which were
very progressive and very radical in terms of Unionist politics. So I did join and became
a founding member of the South Belfast PUP, and I think at that time really got swept
away on the wave of what seemed to be a roll towards peace you know, and I think
between… I know we had a few set backs in 1996 with the IRA breaking their ceasefire
and the Canary Wharf bombing and stuff in February. But then we had the elections in
May and then the talks started in June 1996 and I think at that stage I recognized that an
agreement was achievable and people in the party could see there was a real dynamic
here for change. So, I became actively involved in the PUP then and I’m still here.
AC: How has Loyalism attempted to establish itself as a mainstream Unionist political
community and what is needed from groups like the PUP to achieve this and bolster
political support?
DP: To answer the first part of your question, um, I would say for a number of years at
least in my own experience, I felt that the mainstream Unionist political parties, the DUP

and the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) were becoming increasingly disassociated with
working class Loyalist communities. My home here in this street was bombed in 1992 by
the IRA. My home was completely wrecked and I had a 17 month old son and an 8 week
old son, and we had to move out for a year while the houses were being fixed up. I
remember our MP at the time was an Ulster Unionist, and I remember asking him for all
sorts of help in terms of compensation and everything else. Really he was ineffective, he
seemed to be to me a government guy, you know, someone who really wouldn’t go
against the grain and would go with anything for an easy life. I thought to myself,
“These tired old men really do not represent what I need in my community.” You know,
for a long time the DUP were thought of, this is the other Unionist political party the
DUP, were thought of as really representative of the working class community but
because of their fundamentalism and their views as well, this whole notion of them being
tied up with religion, I would never be able to vote for them because I am avowedly prochoice and you know just because… you can look for yourselves, the utterances of the
DUP are somewhere where I wouldn’t go. So, I think increasingly people within my
community felt as though they didn’t have a voice. The PUP to me happened along at an
opportune moment.
How they are going to establish themselves in terms of mainstream politics.,
Unionist politics, still remains to be seen.
A break while Dawn was introduced to a new interface worker in the area
who had come to pay her a visit.
The difficulty the PUP faced from day one was its association with the UVF and
Red Hand Commando. There is a hierarchy in Unionist politics and always has been
from the formation of the state where the Ulster Unionist represent the political elites and
middle classes and sort of very much look down upon working class communities. And
so, in terms of the conflict as well, if you look at the early days of the conflict, you’d see
there were allegiances between paramilitaries, loyalist paramilitaries, and the Ulster
Unionist Party and the DUP. But then as government policies of criminalization got
underway in the late ‘70s and early ‘80s, the mainstream Unionist parties then started a
separation and disassociation from the Loyalist paramilitaries. You have heard all the
comments, I am sure, calling them scum bags and such.
AC: Yes, I’ve heard, I’ve had contact with Dr. Paisley and the DUP.
DP: It’s double speak, you know, it is total hypocrisy. At one time they were totally
associated, they couldn’t get any closer in the bed beside them. But because that job of
criminalization and demonization was so well done, that is the difficult and the PUP and
the UDP if you like, faced in terms of the common establishment within mainstream
Unionist politics, their association with Loyalist paramilitaries. And to me, for my part,
the way I felt about it was, “You can’t cut off people and leave them behind.” The
notion… I mean Trimble’s leadership was about, “Hack all these bad people into a boat
and let’s watch them sailing off into the sunset.” That is never dealing with the issue, and
the DUP came to adopt that position as well. For me, that was never, ever, going to deal
with the issues. It was trying to make our society realize that the way to deal with the

issue was bringing people along with you and the PUP and the UDP were trying to do
that; they were showing people a path to democracy, or a way out of the jungle if you
like. So, that is the difficulty the PUP faces in terms of trying to establish itself in
mainstream Unionism.
I think we sort of reached our peak around 1998 when we had been part of the
talks, part of the Good Friday Agreement. We were seen, if you like, hand in hand with
the Ulster Unionist party going into the talks in 1997 with Sinn Fein, and there was the
Ulster Unionist Party with the PUP and UDP beside them. The DUP had walked out, Mr.
Paisley and his party and walked out and Robert McCartney had walked out but here was
a Unionist force if you like going in to face down Republicanism and get a good deal for
Unionism. So we rode a crest of a wave at that time, we had done very well in elections,
we were more accepted, generally we were accepted in Loyalist working class areas but
we were becoming more acceptable in middle class areas. But then I think management
of the political process with David Trimble at the helm suffered a lot. The only way I can
describe it know is if you have the manager of a football team and the team are winning
cups and medals and what have you…and are at the top their league then the manager is
doing well. But when the team is perceived to be losing and not winning games and
constantly at the bottom of the league, you get rid of the manager, so I think Unionist got
rid of Trimble and have taken on Mr. Paisley as their new manager. In doing so, the PUP
have been effected from that fall out because we have always been avowedly proAgreement. The Ulster Unionists were ambiguous about being pro-Agreement but we
have always been avowedly pro-Agreement. So, there is that shift in Unionist politics. I
don’t think it has totally moved away from the Agreement, I think the DUP just sell
themselves a little bit better.
It is difficult for us to establish ourselves because, one, we are mainly working
class, two, because we are associated with the UVF and Red Hand Commandos and three
because of our pro-Agreement stance.
AC: What is your opinion on that fact that it seems many of the people and community
members who may be part of the UVF or RHC, or support them, don’t vote for the PUP?
DP: Well, the UVF leadership does not tell their members that they have to vote in a
particular way, they are free to vote for whom ever they wish. And it just goes to reflect
that these members, the members of paramilitary organizations, are part and party of
society. They are not people who parachuted down and are under the ultimate control of
one arbitrator, or whatever you want to call it, who says you are going to do that, your are
going to do that. They are part and parcel of society, they reflect and are representative
of the community we live in, and it just so happens the community we live in at the
minute has the DUP as a majority party, so members of the UVF and RHC support the
DUP and its political analysis. However, the leadership of the UVF actually support the
PUP and their political analysis.
AC: What role do you see violence having played in the Northern Ireland conflict and
where it is currently? What role has politics played? Do you see any connection between
these two different forces within Northern Ireland?

DP: (Long pause). That is a big question. (Long pause). I really don’t know. What role
does violence play? Well some would argue that people have bombed and maimed their
way to the negotiating table, and they would argue that on both sides because if you look
at the increase in violence for both Republicans and Loyalists, but particularly Loyalists,
prior to the ceasefires, they would argue that it was one last push to strengthen their hand
and make it to the negotiating table. But when you look at the political settlement if you
like which culminated in the Good Friday Agreement, it could have been settled years
ago…years and years and years ago. I think it was uh, Mark Durkin or Seamus Mallon
who called the it the Sunningdale Agreement for slow learners. And then when we were
at Leads Castle the year before last, and the DUP actually came in for talks for the first
time, one of my party colleagues coined the phrase, “Leads Castle was the Good Friday
Agreement for slow learners.”
I think obviously people resort to violence when they believe they have no other
option. But soldiers fight war to bring peace so, wars at some point have to end and
peace has to be made. I think politics now has taken over where once there was violence.
I think the whole conflict transformation process that began prior to 1994 because
Loyalist and Republicans were talking prior to that and I believe that the whole conflict
transformation process began long before the ceasefires were called. I think even if
politics failed now in Northern Ireland, that the conflict transformation process would
continue and that is in terms of dialogue between people with different ideologies. So,
even in absence of violence that process will go on. But we need to show others, if you
like dissidents and others, that politics can work and will work. And really its about
everyone having their own place in the sun.
AC: Do you believe that without the violent aspect of the conflict in Northern Ireland
occurring that the political process could have developed in such a way that it began to
work on conflict transformation, or did violence force the political process along to more
directly and realistically address the problems?
DP: I think politics were beginning to change in Northern Ireland. If you look at the rise
of the Northern Ireland Labor Party in ‘64 and ’65 and O’Neill’s reforms and changes
that were coming out at that time, I mean the Ulster Unionist Party fought their tickets at
that time on mainly labor policies. So change was happening. I think the difficulty we
had was there were those in leadership positions that always played the sectarian card and
always tried to divide the working classes. When we had the civil rights movement there
were a number of Protestants leaders, but there always the fear that the civil rights
movement would b taken over by nationalists. That fear proved well founded when the
nationalists did take over the civil rights movement, many on the Protestant side who had
stood back and watched to see how the civil rights movement would unfold said, “Well,
we told you so.” The divisions became more and more apparent then, and that is when
we moved into conflict and it became tit for tat, tit for tat until you forgot who was tit and
who was tat, it just carried on. As the conflict escalated, the division escalated.
But certainly the reforms, if they had been moved in and implemented more
quickly it wouldn’t have helped, because you still had a sizeable section of the Protestant
community lead by Ian Paisley who were building up fears in Protestant working classes
that this was a way to a united Ireland. We are forty years on and still no closer to a

united Ireland but in 1965 that is what they were screaming about and whipping up fears
in the working class. So if those reforms had been brought in more quickly, it might have
re-enforced those fears. Again, it is about knowledge and change and how you manage
change. But there is no doubt that reforms were needed. I mean it wasn’t just about
Catholics, the working class in general was discriminated against as well. But you, as a
Protestant were lead to believe you weren’t, because it was your government that was in
power. My mother didn’t have a vote, because she wasn’t a ratepayer as she lived with
my grandparents. So, the discrimination went across the board but obviously more
Catholics were affected by it. The politic reform at the time I don’t believe it would have
lead to a revolution at all. If you look civil rights it was bout British citizens asking for
British rights in a British state, it had nothing to do with a united Ireland or the
Republican ideology at all. Civil rights was about British citizens wanting equality with
in their own country. If they had received that, we wouldn’t have had the conflict we did.
AC: Given your recent selection to the policing board, what is your view on criminality
to loyalist paramilitaries? What can and should be done to stop it?
DP: I think it is unfair to say criminality is linked just to loyalist paramilitaries.
Criminality is linked to all paramilitaries. There are different types of criminality.
Loyalist paramilitaries criminality tends to be more in your face. I remember
interviewing the chief of police and him telling me that as loyalist paramilitaries get the
money, they spend the money. They show their wealth, on their wrists, on their rings, on
their fingers and their cars, and clothes and their holidays. Republican paramilitaries tend
to hide their wealth. They are both involved in different types of criminality. Republican
paramilitaries would be money-laundering, fuel-laundering…stuff like that. Loyalist
paramilitaries tend to be extortion, drugs, and that sort of thing. So there are different
types of criminality which are shown in different ways.
And again, while there are loyalist paramilitaries up to their neck in criminality,
the leadership of the UVF is totally opposed to criminality and are working really hard to
bring an end to it. It is wrong, its hurting the most vulnerable communities and really it
should end, and people need to work in partnership with the police to get it ended, to get
it stopped. This loan sharking hurts the most deprived and vulnerable in our community,
the most needy in our community. Prostitution exploits women…vulnerable women,
drugs again affect working class communities. I mean, to me Loyalist working class
communities are almost like poor white trash in the United States in that they are being
left and increasingly marginalized. In this area around here, you have the marginalized
within the marginalized, you know, and it’s a disgrace in the twenty first century. But
criminality is only part of the problem there are a whole lot of other social issues that
need to be addressed as well in terms of education, housing and a whole raft of others.
But paramilitaries I know are working hard to end the criminality within their
own communities because it is no good, its wrong and it has to stop.
AC: So, would you be of the opinion then that criminality in a legal definition, has
existed in paramilitaries across the board since their founding, but that now it is
committed in a very different mind-set and for different purpose than it was when the
Troubles were really beginning to escalate in the early ‘70s?

DP: Well, I think in the early ‘70s criminality was for a purpose. Probably
paramilitaries wouldn’t term it has criminality when it was in terms of bank robberies and
things like that. It was trying to gain wealth for the purchase of weapons so they
probably didn’t view it as criminality. When the extortion started in the ‘70s and stuff
like that you had various people, you can look them up yourself, who were synonymous
with extortion, particularly in the UDA. And then sometimes when people get a taste of
power and a taste of wealth, they find it really difficult to let go, or they find it hard to
pass it on to the purpose which it was for in the first place. So, they got the stage now in
2005 where there are criminals with in paramilitary organizations who use the color of
paramilitary organizations for their own ends. And that is the difference now, from the
‘70s to now. Paramilitarism is being wound down and brought to an end, they don’t need
money for weapons, their prisoners have been released so they don’t need money for
welfare, you know, all those issues have to be brought for an end. And I know that the
leadership is working hard towards those ends.
AC: On a related note, what do you see then as the future role of paramilitaries in the
Northern Ireland peace process and the political process if any?
DP: They have a role if they want to have a role. And I think they need to ask
themselves the question, “How do you want to be remembered?” Do they want to be
remembered as an organization that degenerated into criminal gangs or do they want to
be remembered as an organization that played a combatant role in the conflict and at the
end of the conflict they put down their weapons and went home? They can remain as a
commemorative organization…I would prefer to see them becoming active in politics,
Loyalist politics, or active in community, their community, and doing something for the
community. There is a real lack, if you like, of volunteers particularly within Protestant
working class areas, and people who really care about their community and want to get
involved. If you compare the sort of community infrastructures in Catholic working class
areas and Protestant working class areas there is a real discrepancy there so there is a
need for people to become involved in their community and become proactive within
their community. If they are dedicated to defending their communities and helping their
communities, then this is the way they can do it but certainly I would love them to
become politically active.
AC: Do you think that is a possibility for them given the current rather hostile stance
taken towards the paramilitaries by many politicians especially in Unionism?
DP: Well, its open to them and there are a number of opinions available to them. They
can down weapons and go home and go back to work. They can join a political party and
become active politically. Or they can become active in community work and give
something back into their community. And there are others who will just stick to the
crime. So, there are a number of options open to them there, but each one involved a
certain degree of commitment. You would like to think that especially in the community
and political routes, it would be committed people who genuinely care about their
communities who would take those routes. But, you can’t blame some for wanting to go

back to their families and just get on with life. They are absolutely entitled to do that.
But the ones that are increasingly turning to crime and sticking with crime, the forces of
law and order are coming after them. You can’t hold an organization to ransom by a few
criminals who want to keep going, who want to use the paramilitary organization as
cover for what they are doing. There is no excuse; paramilitarism is coming to an end
and if they want to go the criminal route, they go so alone. The police and other criminal
justice agencies will sweep up that.
AC: A big headline in the papers is criminality being on the rise, but I have heard it
suggested that the fact there is this increase is a sign that the police are able to do their
jobs now and that they are stopping these things which have been going on for some
time.
DP: Well, you can read it a number of ways. You can read it as we are now a society
which is becoming normal. We are probably the safest place to live in the United
Kingdom in terms of crime figure…probably one of the safest places in the world. But as
you see a lot of the crime increasing, it is a sign of normalization. People are screaming
their heads of saying, “But we don’t want this!” but this is a sign of normalization where
you have crime, in any society. Its also a reflection of the demise of paramilitaries,
because they don’t control their communities as once they did…people would argue they
had an iron grip at one point in time. People within my community actually saw that as a
good things because the paramilitaries were the policemen, and there was no anti-social
behavior, there were no burglaries, there were no robberies, no car crime and all those
sorts of things. So when you see those things it is a sign of the demise of the paramilitary
organizations.
It can also be interpreted as increasing confidence in the PSNI. Where once you
did have paramilitaries acting as community policemen, increasingly you have
community turning to the proper forces of law and order for help and assistance. I think
what is striking in the last crime figures was the increase of the number of crimes within
particularly Republican areas in west Belfast. And that tells me the Republican
community is increasingly confident in turning to the PSNI for justice and reporting
crime and what have you. It also shows you the lessening grip of paramilitaries there.
Obviously, there is still a gap because we have had 30 years as paramilitaries acting as
social workers, community policemen and everything else, so that dependency is still
there. But increasingly the paramilitaries are saying to the communities, “You cannot
depend on us, we will not step in and sort things out. You really need to be turning to the
police and working with the police.” And to me the community needs to be shown the
benefit of working with the PSNI. If they are shown no benefit, then why bother working
with them?
AC: The last question I had for you then was if there was one thing you think is missed
in terms of the message the PUP is trying to deliver, what would it be?
DP: Our democratic socialism is totally, utterly and completely missed by everyone.
But then we have a society here that focuses consistently on the constitutional question of
Northern Ireland. As far as I am concerned it was settled in 1998 but when you have

other parties hyping it up, like Sinn Fein and the DUP, then people are going to focus on
it. But they have completely missed our social policies and I would hope that when we
get to a situation in Northern Ireland that we are looking at issues such as education,
health, housing, all those issue that affect people, that is when the PUP will become
relevant if you like.

-Interview with Henry McDonald, Ireland editor of The Observer, former
security correspondent for the BBC in Northern Ireland, and author of the
books UVF and UDA.
Alec Chiquoine (AC): The first question I have is just a little bit of background
information about yourself, specifically how you became to be involved in journalism
especially looking at security issues in Northern Ireland.
Henry McDonald (HM): Well, I grew up here right through the Troubles, I was four
when the Troubles started. My cousin Jack Collin, native of New York City, was a
journalist in the 70s and I saw a lot of his work on TV. His books and articles would be
lying about the house, so it was sort of a general interest I developed. I did a bit of school
journalism but really got involved in college at Queen’s were I was the editor of Gown. I
was freelancing while I was at Queen’s as well and also became part of the music,
alternative music scene as I was in a band at the time. I continued freelancing into
graduate school when I was in Dublin, and the Irish News gave me a break so I went to
work for them. This was at a time when there was a surge in violence in Northern
Ireland, by both Loyalists and Republicans. Basically, from that period to when I left in
1992 it was a very violent time. I can recall on some occasions going to two or three
murders every day. It was constant non-stop, sort of a merry-go-round of terror. So that
was the grounding for my work. I saw a gap in the monitoring of the Irish News which
were that they were not talking to the Loyalists, which might be because it was a
Nationalist newspaper, but I felt that I could see the Loyalist upsurge and I knew the
names of many players like Johnny Adair, who were prominent previous to that. I came
to develop links with the UDA and later the UVF because I felt their story wasn’t being
told properly…even if I abhorred what they were doing and even if I disagree with them
ideologically (I was a part time soldier in the Irish Army), I wanted to understand where
they were coming from and take interest in them. This dovetailed with issues of
collusion as well…a lot of people held the view that Loyalist paramilitaries were just
mere puppets. So it was that experience on the streets, literally rapping on the doors of
Loyalists, going to the scenes of murders, seeing the corpses in some cases, prompted me
to sort of try and connect with them and hear their story, because as I said it wasn’t being
properly articulated in the press particularly in the Nationalist media in the North and the
media in general in the Republic.
AC: It appears that the UVF has almost always had an agenda to its tactics and
operations but hasn’t always been able to put that, and I guess this would go for the UDA
as well, out as a political message and sometimes it doesn’t appear that it has wanted to
do that…

HM: There are reasons for that. Part of it is historical in that they always left the politics
to the politicians, Unionist politicians but that ended with them being essentially used in
the 74 and 77 strikes. It is only in the last dozen years or so that they have realized they
have a message to. The problem for the Loyalist paramilitaries is that they do not have
the same sort of support that the Republican movement had because the majority of
people identify with state forces. I mean pro-state terrorists have limited ground on
which to operate on because the bravest and the best within the Protestant community are
going to join the police or the army. It is lower on down the food chain that you get the
membership of the loyalist paramilitaries, which is principally the unemployed and the
“under class” if you like. That is much more pronounced in the UDA than it is in the
UVF as the UVF is far more selective in who it will recruit. I mean you will get people
in the UVF like ex-soldiers and other members of the security forces. But it is as much
more to do with class politics and the sub divisions within the working class as anything
else. The problem is again that quite frankly the Protestant community do not support
pro-state terrorism like they do state forces.
AC: In your mind how have the UDA and UVF tried to balance the ballot box and
armalite strategy and have they been more successful at one or the other?
HM: I don’t think you can talk in a homogenous terms between the organizations. For
one, the UVF has a centralized command structure…its run on militaristic almost
democratic centralist lines with central leadership. The UDA is much more federalized,
broken up. People will guard regard their fiefdom as their own and no one else will cross
onto it. That is key and vital in understanding their politics and development. The UVF
is now at a stage where they gave an interview to The Observer, where they want to
completely wind down their military force…they want to completely disband it and
simply not have it exist any more. There won’t be meetings…it will be purely political
for those who decide to stay, others will go home to live their lives, but some will go
political. The UDA is finding that much harder because it does not have a coherent
command or message…it is different individuals and fiefdoms. So politics are extremely
limited and that is essentially due to the structure of the organization. They got their
fingers burned in 1996, the UDP felt like it would break through and John White couldn’t
believe it when he was so soundly beaten. This is essentially because the Loyalist and
Unionist communities generally will not vote for groups will paramilitary ties. But the
UVF are more political in their approach…some of their leadership would be very well
read on things like Irish history and have a curiosity about the Irish Republic. Jackie
McDonald of the UDA is trying to take that organization in the same direction with his
connections to the President of Ireland but it is only of limited value politically. They
can’t harvest any votes from ties like that and its shows because at best the UDA, UDP,
and UPRG can get the odd city councilor elected.
AC: Why is it that to this day Loyalist communities that at one time may strongly have
supported their local paramilitary organization are unwilling to vote for them politically?

HM: There are lots of reasons. Criminality is one…they think of them at times as
“thugs in suits” and that turns a lot of peoples’ stomachs. I think another thing is general
Unionist community has turned against the GFA and the Loyalist paramilitaries to a large
extent are pro-Agreement, or are at least seen to be that way. Cynics would say that is
because it got their prisoners out of jail but a more sophisticated analysis is that Loyalists
paramilitaries were sort of becoming educated and realized the importance of a
compromise. The general swing away from the GFA has really hurt those associated
with the Agreement and supporting it. In particular the PUP has suffered politically
because of this. The PUP have made tactical errors in not aligning themselves strongly
with any mainstream Unionist groups but other fringe parties like the UDP and the
Women’s Coalition. They also seem to be too chummy with their old enemies in Sinn
Fein. I also the PUP has over concentrated on the importance of the working class, you
know the working class is shrinking as a social base, unfortunately as I came from one
myself. The PUP message is very traditional old Labor, pre-Clause Four, and I don’t
think the Loyalist community buys into that anymore. The majority of them would be
middle class, conservative in their ideology. I just don’t think the politics of the PUP are
connecting with what would be called middle Ulster. I think they would have a lot of
time for David Ervine and pushing the UVF towards peace but not national policies.
AC: In your mind then what motivated the Loyalist paramilitaries to enter into a
ceasefire in 1994 and was that process a thought out process?
HM: It was heavily debated…very heavily debated. I think they realized that if they
continued to kill once the Irish had stopped, they would be the bad guys. But there were
moves to get ceasefires before 1994, remember the Loyalists called a ceasefire in 1991
which lasted for awhile. In 1994 the IRA began targeting a lot of Unionist but especially
the UDA as they felt they the unstable underbelly of the whole thing. So it was fairly
well thought out process, I mean even the choice of Fernhill House to announce the
ceasefire was deliberate and calculated. The UDA wanted to call the ceasefire in the car
park of the Maze, but the UVF prevailed because they tried to connect them with
historical significant in Carson’s Army and such. It was a long drawn and thought out
process but I suspected in the early 90s and ended up being right, that the Loyalists were
sending feelers to the Irish government (Chris would know a lot more about this so you
should ask him). It was a fairly well thought out process as the people at the top were
quite sophisticated people…the problem was when you go down on the base level it isn’t
so sophisticated in people like those who joined Billy Wright and the LVF or Johnny
Adair. It is a complex picture…in my impression even in the late 80s and early 90s their
philosophy was composed of if the Provos stop, we stop…you stop we stop was the
mantra running through conversations throughout the Loyalist groups.
AC: Especially recently, how have mainstream Unionist communities as well as
politicians attempted to deal with Loyalist paramilitary groups and have there been any
changes?
HM: Lets take two phases, the first phase was David Trimble and the Ulster Unionists.
There were huge amounts of attempts by Trimble to try and influence the UVF and UDA.
I know for a fact that Trimble put pressure on John White to get the UDA

decommissioning and that almost happened…it really almost did happen but events
scraped it. The UVF were less enamored with decommission and actually still refuse to
decommission. Post Trimble period is headed up by the DUP. The DUP is likely to have
less influence on the Loyalist paramilitaries because they distrust and loath the DUP to an
extent. The Republican line is often, “What are you doing about Unionist
paramilitaries?” but this is mostly a propaganda stunt because the DUP have even less
influence than Trimble did in this area. However, the DUP represents the majority of the
people including members of both Loyalist paramilitaries…there is most definitely a
contingent of people in these groups who vote DUP and not PUP or anything else. The
DUP cannot directly influence or change the policies of Loyalist paramilitaries but
indirectly they can because those who vote DUP within the ranks of these organizations
will be heard and listened to. Even in areas like the Shankill, people are fed up with the
existence of groups like the UVF and UDA and they want them to go away or at least do
something different.
-At this point Henry McDonald had a long monologue about the future of the
UDA in which he predicted more infighting would break out in that group soon over
the issue of whether the group will move towards non-violence, politics, and
community work or activities associated with crime, and that the state would step in
quickly to contain it.
AC: In there anything that could lead to a return to open violence by Loyalist
paramilitaries?
HM: The only thing is if there were some sort of disaster. There are three things that
could do it. If there were the equivalent of an Omagh in Northern Ireland…in a way it
was horribly fortunate that bomb went off in England because had it been in Northern
Ireland, we could still be at war today. But this seems unlikely because those Republican
groups who would do such a thing are highly penetrated and infiltrated by the security
forces…they can hardly fart without somebody knowing about it. The other possible
event would be violence on the interfaces, but there doesn’t seem to be the stomach for
enough of that know to trigger anything major in terms of a return to open violence.
However, it isn’t completely out of the question and should be watched carefully as a
result. Because there are so many fault lines, so many cracks in the social structure of the
interfaces, something could always happen. The final thing is the threat of joint
authority. I know for a fact that the UVF is close to getting its units to stand down and
disband…that is put in jeopardy by threats by the British and Irish governments to bypass
a stalled Stormont because it puts the constitutional question and principle of consent
back on the table and in contention (especially since it would directly involve the ROI).
However, the ROI has been quick to communicate to the Loyalists, via Chris Hudson,
that they actually do not have any interest in joint authority. So it was actually Peter
Hain’s blunder recently in that announcement which almost caused a major set back in
standing down the UVF. There is always the possibility of Blair or Ahern adopting a
position on joint authority and the principle of consent for political reasons (attempts to
bolster and secure themselves at home) but as architects of the peace process, I think both

know this would be a seriously bad move. But if you leave all those things aside, I think
it is unlikely anything will happen that could create a return to full open violence.
AC: One of my last questions is more of a personal question in that I would like to find
if it you ever found it difficult, in a moral sense, to interact and speak with these groups
who were committing such heinous acts?
HM: I had a time when I had a friend whose father was killed. His only crime was
doing his job delivering Chinese food. I ended up a few days later sitting in a room with
the very Loyalist paramilitaries who had likely committed that murder…that really gets
to you and sticks in your craw. But, you have to be professional. There doesn’t exist a
journalist who is completely impartial and it can because otherwise you couldn’t tell the
truth. Its isn’t a question of morality so much as it is one of taste and feeling creepy
about those people you are dealing with. I think I did the right thing in the end of letting
the world know that what they hold as common stereotypes of these groups and
individuals simply are not correct. They have a message, and there was a chance for
historic compromise so I wanted to help that…it helped to balance out any individual
moralistic qualms I had with the people I was working with. I can remember meetings
with the UVF after they had committed a particularly sectarian and brutal murder, and I
spent half the meeting screaming at them about what the hell was this, they were saying
one things and doing an entirely different thing right after.
AC: Is there something people tend to miss, over look or get incorrect when they are
looking at Loyalist paramilitaries?
HM: What people get wrong is that many suggest there is a guiding brain, external of
these groups, either British intelligence or Unionist middle class politicians and radical.
They come from the streets, they are organic organizations which are no different from
their main base of people which is primarily urban working classes. I think people over
analyze the collusion claim. Yes there was collusion, but it was on a smaller and more
individual level, and not as some structural happening. Collusion is a mesh of deceit that
isn’t the driving brain of either the UVF or the UDA. I also think another point they miss
that generally speaking the leaders of these groups are in their 40s, 50s and 60s. They
have seen it all and have no desire to go back. The probably is that there are armies of
young men out there, fueled on testosterone and bomb culture and paramilitary sub
culture who identify with guys who when they were kids a war was going on that directed
many of their actions at the time. So it will be very difficult on a management level to
control these young people. The Republican movement managed this very cleverly by
creating a sub-economy where if you stuck to the party peace line, you were guaranteed a
job somewhere. There is a entire social structure where if you don’t tow the party line,
you are out, but if you do, you’ll be taken care of. Loyalists’ people management is not
so good. So you get young men doing things just to stir up trouble.
I am reasonably optimistic at this stage they will get over that hump. And that is
why I think it is a good idea to invest in these deprived Protestant areas (so long as it is
done through the correct channels and in a legitimate way so it isn’t creamed off) because
we have to get these young guys something to fucking do.

AC: Do you think that will have an effect on the criminality we see?
HM: Well yes but these groups are ridden with criminals. Some will always go off into
more “ordinary” crime, but hopefully the majority won’t. The problem is this
unemployed army needs to be given something to do.
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